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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the underlying reasons for Turkish-Iranian security rapprochement during 
the Erdogan Administration, and attempts to discover whether the ongoing rapprochement 
indicates Turkey’s realignment in the international system. It employs a rigorous qualitative 
analysis to explore the perceptions of the key decision makers throughout the intergovernmental 
partnership process with Iran on three major security policies: counterterrorism, nuclear 
proliferation and energy security. It counterposes the threat perceptions and major arguments of 
the pro-status quo and revisionist elites. The data has been collected through extensive 
elite/expert interviews and content analysis of the Turkish and international media.  
 Findings of this research indicate that the Turkish and Iranian governments cooperate in 
counterterrorism policy because both are mainly concerned with the spillover effect of 
micronationalist independence movements in the post Iraq War security landscape. The Erdogan 
Administration supports the Iranian nuclear initiative mainly because the key political actors 
believe that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and Iranian nuclear program poses no 
significant threat to Turkey’s national security. In addition the Erdogan Administration forged an 
energy partnership with Iran not only to meet increasing domestic energy demands but also to 
promote Turkey’s strategic interests through development of trans-regional pipeline networks.  
The investigations revealed that Turkey’s growing security partnership with Iran does not 
indicate realignment from the West to the Muslim world. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran is 
driven by practical and rational calculations rather than Islamic identity or aspirations. Even 
though many key actors in the Justice and Development Party government comes from religious 
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social networks, their statements indicate that the Erdogan Administration does not seek to align 
itself with the Muslim World at the expense of the existing pro-Western orientation. Instead, 
Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran is an integral part of the Strategic Depth doctrine of Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu to expand Turkey’s interrelations with the East in line with national interests. 
In so doing, the Erdogan Administration not only addresses the practical security interests but it 
also attempts to regain the strategic superiority in the Near East.      
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. THESIS STATEMENT  
Turkish foreign policy changed profoundly after the 2002 election victory of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). This change coincided with the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the War 
on Terror. In the new era, traditional strategic security alliances with the U.S. and Israel no 
longer dominate the agendas of foreign and security apparatus of the state. Instead, the Turkish 
government has turned to regionalism, promoting energy, security and trade relations with the 
Middle Eastern and Caspian countries. Many analysts consider the new posture as a reorientation 
towards non-Western venues at odds with the traditional course of Turkish foreign policy. The 
shift in foreign policy became most apparent in Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran. Indeed, the 
Erdogan administration (2002--) signed comprehensive energy, security and trade agreements 
with the Iranian government. Apart from these agreements, the Erdogan Administration (AKP 
government) supports the Iranian nuclear energy program and opposes international sanctions 
without having substantial evidence on weapons grade enrichment. The Erdogan 
Administration’s new posture undermines the Western nuclear containment policy and provides 
at least tacit support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It undercuts the security interests of Turkey’s 
traditional military allies, the United States and Israel, in the Middle East. 
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Traditionally, Turkey had pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, as the governmental 
leaders aspired to transform the country into a modern Western power.1 Turkey joined the OECD 
(1948), Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952) to facilitate its integration into the Western 
world.2 Concomitantly, Turkey formed a trilateral alliance with the United States and Israel 
against regional security challenges such as Soviet expansionism, Arab nationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism.3 In parallel, pro-status quo military elites, who had been dominant actors in the 
National Security Council (MGK), saw post revolutionary Iran as the center of global terrorism 
and Islamic fundamentalism.4  
In the pre-AKP period, the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) frequently 
lambasted the Iranian government for providing logistical support to Turkish Hezbollah (THB)5 
and The Great Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA/C) 6 and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)7 terror 
organizations.8 Iran’s support to the THB and IBDA/C was considered as a particularly insidious 
effort to export its fundamentalist regime to secular Turkey. Concurrently, the Iranian nuclear 
program and missile technology aroused grave concerns in the Turkish National Security 
Council (MGK) particularly after the Shabab-3 and Shabab-5 missiles were tested.9 The military 
wing in the MGK was strongly in favor of bandwagoning with the U.S. and Israeli containment 
                                                      
1 Nasuh Uslu, Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, Nova Science Publishers. 2003;  Stephen Kinzer, 
Crescent and star: Turkey between two worlds: Farrar Straus, Giroux, 2002  
2Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Drinlik: Turkiye’nin uluslararasi konumu, Kure Yayinlari, Istanbul/Turkey, 2007; Idris 
Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era, Brown Walker, Boca Raton, 2004 
3 Alptekin Dursunoglu, Stratejik Ittifak: Turkiye Israil Iliskilerinin Oykusu, Anka Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2005  
4 Yucel Bozdaglioglu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A constructivist Approach, Routledge, 2003 
5 Turkish Hezbollah is different from the Lebanese Hezbollah. It emerged after mid 1990s at Southeastern Anatolia. 
It was accused of assassinating secularist elites such as Ugur Mumcu (Journalist), and Gaffar Okkan (Police 
Commissioner of Diyarbakir Province).  
6 Great Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA/C) was another radical Turkish terror organization determined to establish 
Islamic Caliphate through use of force.  
7 PKK=Kurdistan Workers Party, is a ethnic terrorist organization that aims free Kurdistan in Southeastern Turkey, 
Northern Iraq and Northwestern Iran.  
8 Mehmet Saray, Turk-Iran Iliskileri, Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, Ankara/Turkey, 2006 
9 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, Iran Nucleer Krizi, Usak Yayinlari/Uluslararasi Iliskiler Dizisi, Ankara/Turkey, 2009; Ian 
O. Lesser, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 3(2), 89–112. 2004 
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of Iran’s nuclear program, because they believed that a nuclear armed Iran would radically shift 
the balance of power in the Middle East.10 Before the Iraq War (2003), pro-status quo military 
leaders strongly opposed an improvement of political, economic and security relations with Iran. 
Regardless of Turkey’s relentless quest for alternative energy suppliers and Iran’s desperate need 
for new markets, Ankara and Tehran avoided a major energy and security partnership until the 
mid-1990s.11 
Despite the security and identity concerns of the pro-status quo military leaders, the 
Erbakan Administration (1996-1997) forged the first rapprochement policy with the Rafsanjani 
Administration of Iran. 12 As Hakan Yavuz put it, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party government had 
been a devoted opponent of Turkey’s “obsessive” pro-Western trajectory and sought to reorient 
Turkish foreign policy towards pan-Islamic venues.13 Prime Minister Erbakan pioneered 
establishment of the organization of the Developing 8 (D-8)14 to promote economic and political 
integration among the largest Muslim nations; Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey.15 In this context, Iran emerged as the most favored neighbor of 
Turkey. Ankara and Tehran forged comprehensive bilateral energy and trade agreements despite 
strong opposition from the pro-status quo Kemalist military elites. Prime Minister Erbakan and 
Iranian President Rafsanjani signed a $20 billion energy contract in 1997 that proposed 
                                                      
10 Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 1974-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics, Mazda 
Publishers, Costa Mesa, CA, 2004.   
11 Tayyar Ari, Gecmisten Gunumuze Ortadogu; Siyaset, Savas ve Diplomasi, Alfa, Istanbul/Turkey, 2007 
12 Gurkas, 2007 Karakoc, 2009  
13 Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”, Comparative Politics: 63-82, 1997 
14 D-8 has been established in 1997 at the Istanbul Declaration of Summit of Heads of State/Government. The 
organization aims to facilitate economic integration and development of major Muslim countries. D-8 is dedicated to 
improve facilitate cooperation on energy, trade, industrialization, agriculture, tourism and transportation. More 
information can be obtained from the organizations official website  http://www.developing8.org/index.php 
15 Haldun Gulalp, “Political Islam in Turkey: The rise and fall of the Refah Party”,  The Muslim World, 89(1), 22-41, 
1999 
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construction of a joint pipeline and annual transfer of 140 billion cubic meters of natural gas.16 
However, Prime Minister Erbakan’s attempts to reorient Turkish foreign policy created a 
backlash in domestic politics, particularly among the ultra secularist military elites, who crafted a 
postmodern coup17 in 1997 to preserve the status quo and perpetuate the pro-Western stance of 
the country. The Turkish-Iranian detente came to a halt after the resignation of Prime Minister 
Erbakan in June 1997. Indeed, bilateral relations deteriorated after the Iranian Ambassador was 
deported for attempting to overthrow the secularist system in Turkey.18 Bilateral relations 
remained at loggerheads during the successive coalition government (DSP, MHP and ANAP), as 
key political and military leaders preserved the anti-Iran stance.  
 
1.1.1. The shift in Turkish foreign policy and rapprochement with Iran   
 
Turkish foreign policy has undergone profound changes since the landslide election victory of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 elections. The rapprochement with Iran 
resumed and Turkey enjoyed unprecedented intergovernmental relations with its neighbor in 
three respects. First, Ankara and Tehran developed a mutual counterterrorism and regional 
security postures against growing Kurdish separatism arising out of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.19 
The Turkish and Iranian governments signed successive security and counterterrorism 
cooperation agreements in 2004 and 2009. These agreements allow enhanced exchange of 
                                                      
16 BOTAS “The natural Gas Trade Agreement with Iran” September 15, 2008, available at   
http://www.botas.gov.tr/>faaliyetler/anlasmalar/iran.html, [accessed September 19, 2008] 
17 Post modern coup is a frequently used term in Turkish politics. It refers to the military intervention in government 
politics in February 28, 1997. Rather than a military takeover of the governmental administration, the Turkish armed 
forces coerced the government to enact a list of precautions to preserve the secular stance of the country.  
18 Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 1974-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics, Mazda 
Publishers, Costa Mesa, CA, 2004.   
19 Erkan Dogan, Turkey's Iran Card: Energy Cooperation in American and Russian Vortex,  Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, 2004 
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intelligence and joint operations against the PKK and its subordinate network PJAK. Particularly 
since 2003 Iranian authorities mounted numerous operations against the PKK/PJAK strongholds 
in both Iran and Iraq. The traditional intransigent resistance of secularist Turkish elites towards 
collaboration with Iran gradually disappeared after 2003 and there has been a consensus within 
the state's foreign policy machinery. In parallel with resentment to U.S. policies in Iraq, Iran's 
new posture against the PKK is highly appreciated both by the higher echelons of the Erdogan 
administration and the predominant majority of Turkish society. 
Second, Iran became a major trade partner of Turkey as the bilateral trade volume 
increased more than eight-fold between 2002 and 2009.20 Prime Minister Erdogan and Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad signed major energy agreements in 200721 and 2008. The amended 
bilateral energy agreement in 2008 proposed: i) transfer of 35 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
over Turkey annually (half will be diverted into domestic markets), ii) $12 billion investment by 
the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)22 in the South Pars field of Iran, iii) transfer of 
Turkmenistan gas to Turkey via transit pipeline through Iran, and iv) construction of 2000 
kilometers of pipelines extending from Turkmenistan to Turkey.23 Turkey had been purchasing 
less than four percent of natural gas from Iran before 2002. The new contracts increased the 
overall volume of natural gas trade between Iran and Turkey over 800 percent.24 The Turkish 
Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) anticipates supplying over 19 % of natural gas from 
                                                      
20 TUIK, “Foreign Trade Statistics Database” February 8, 2009, available at  
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4, [accessed September 20, 2009] 
21 This agreement was amended and expanded by the consecutive agreement in 2008  
22 A state energy company 
23 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, “Turkiye Iran Arasinda Imzalanan Dogalgaz Mutabakati” available at  
http://www.usakgundem.com/yazarlar.php?id=1073&type=17>, [accessed  May 30, 2009]; BOTAS “The natural 
Gas Trade Agreement with Iran” September 15, 2008, available at   
http://www.botas.gov.tr/>faaliyetler/anlasmalar/iran.html, [accessed September 19, 2008]  
24 TUIK, “Foreign Trade Statistics Database” February 8, 2009, available at  
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4, [accessed September 20, 2009]  
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Iran in 2010.25 According to the Turkish Institute for Statistics, Iran emerged as the primary 
crude oil supplier of Turkey and oil purchases from Iran increased 71% between 2002 and 
2007.26 The intensity and volume of bilateral cooperation on energy and security expanded 
dramatically after the U.S. occupation of Iraq.27  
Third, the Iranian nuclear program has become a serious foreign policy issue for the 
Erdogan Administration, as the conflict moved towards the forefront of international politics. 
The U.S government demanded that the Erdogan Administration collaborate in containment of 
Iran's nuclear program. As a strategic ally, Turkey is expected to make substantial contributions 
to overcome this strategic security threat to traditional allies. However, key foreign policy actors 
have made it clear that Turkey will endorse neither economic containment nor military 
intervention. Prime Minister Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu asserted that Iran has a right to develop nuclear energy and Turkey will support Iran’s 
peaceful nuclear program.28 Key state actors reiterated that the Turkish government does not 
believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. In United Nations Security Council meetings 
Turkey constantly voted against the sanctions on Iran. More recently, on June 9, 2010, Turkey 
voted against the UN Security Council resolution 1929 proposed by U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton. Erdogan Administration’s posture contradicts the American and Israeli policies 
of preventing nuclearization of a “rogue” regime that could pose an “existential” threat to Israel. 
The Turkish government’s policy towards the Iran’s nuclear program astonished many of the 
Western powers and Israel, as they had been Turkey’s military allies in the cold war and beyond. 
                                                      
25 BOTAS “The natural Gas Trade Agreement with Iran” September 15, 2008, available at   
http://www.botas.gov.tr/>faaliyetler/anlasmalar/iran.html, [accessed September 19, 2008]  
26 TUIK, “Foreign Trade Statistics Database” February 8, 2009, available at  
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4, [accessed September 20, 2009] 
27 Abdullah Karakoc, Turkey's Relations with Iran and the United States: A Shift in Alignment: Naval Postgraduate 
School Monterey, 2009. 
28 ibid 
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Many foreign policy analysts argue that the Erdogan Administrations’ new posture 
towards Iran indicates a profound shift in the traditional course of Turkish foreign policy. 
Graham Fuller, a Middle East analyst at the RAND Corporation, argues that Turkey’s energy and 
security interests began to clash with the American and Israeli interests in the Middle East.29 For 
him, discord over regional security became most apparent in containment of the nuclear Iran. 
Turkey’s energy agreements undermined the U.S. containment of Iran, because the hydrocarbon 
exports enabled the Ahmadinejad Administration to sustain its hardliner stance in nuclear 
proliferation. Moreover, the increasing price and volume of natural gas sales finances the Iranian 
government’s arms buildup for a potential military confrontation with the United States or Israel. 
Many security analysts also argue that Iran uses the petrodollars to support terrorists and 
insurgents who attack American and Israeli targets in the Middle East.30  
 
1.1.2 Literature gaps and the significance of this study  
 
The shift in Turkey’s posture has focused the attention of the foreign policy community. 
Different schools of thought have identified various internal and external developments to 
explain the substantial changes in foreign policy. Students of international security mainly look 
at the external environment and claim that shifting dynamics of external security have compelled 
the Turkish government to reformulate its alliance strategies in the post Iraq War security 
landscape. For them, the major threat in the region is no longer an expansionist nuclear power 
(Soviet Union); but  the real threat is growing ethno-sectarian terrorism that undermines the 
                                                      
29 Graham Fuller, The new Turkish Republic: Turkey as a pivotal state in the Muslim world, United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2007 
30 Rowan Scarborough, “Iraqi Insurgent Linked to Iran, Hezbollah”, Washington Examiner, May, 21. 2007 
8 
 
regional status quo and territorial integrity of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey.31 Professor Sait 
Yilmaz argued that alliance patterns have been reformulated to preserve the political integrity of 
the states and regional status quo in the Middle East.32There is a broad consensus among Turkish 
security analysts that the U.S. occupation of Iraq exacerbated regional instability and increased 
the volume of ethno-sectarian conflicts. As Idris Bal put it, the collapse of the Baathist regime 
created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq, and the Kurdish quest for an independent state has 
been stimulated in this fertile ground.33 Ankara and Tehran strongly oppose the creation of an 
independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, as both are gravely concerned with the spillover of 
independence movements into their homelands. Karakoc notes that the changing nature of threats 
forced Ankara and Tehran to sign a bilateral counterterrorism agreement and develop a joint 
posture against Kurdish separatism.34  
Many energy analysts argue that the shift in Turkey’s Iran policy has been fundamentally 
driven by growing energy dependency on Russia and supply disruptions in Iraq. These countries 
had been major energy providers to Turkey.35 According to the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation 
(BOTAS), Turkey’s natural gas demand increased from 1.2 billion cubic feet to 37.8 billion 
cubic feet between 1988 and 2008.36 The BP Annual Statistical Review indicates that domestic 
oil consumption in Turkey increased from 466,000 barrel per day to 677,000 barrels.37 
Nevertheless Turkey remains highly vulnerable to major supply disruptions as it is 99 percent 
                                                      
31 Tayyar Ari, Geçmisten Günümüze Ortadogu Siyaset, Savas ve Diplomasi, Bursa, 2008 
32 Sait Yilmaz, 21. Yuzyilda Guvenlik ve Istihbarat. Milenyum Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2007 
33 Idril Bal, “Instability in the Middle East and the Relevant Role of the PKK”. In Idris Bal (Eds), Turkish Foreign 
Policy in Post Cold War Era, Brown Walker Press, Boca Raton, 2004 
34 Abdullah Karakoc, Turkey's Relations with Iran and the United States: A Shift in Alignment: Naval Postgraduate 
School Monterey, 2009.  
35 Necdet Pamir, “Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzas› ndaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarnin Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenligine 
Etkileri”, Harp Akademileri, 2006 
36 BOTAS, “Yillar Itibariyle Ithal Edilen Dogal Gaz MIktarlari”, Ankara, BOTAS, 2009 
37 BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy”, London, BP, June 2008. 
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dependent on foreign natural gas and 90 percent on foreign oil.38 Particularly, Turkey’s 
dependency on Russian hydrocarbon resources reached an alarming ratio of 60 percent in the 
early 2000s.39 Turkish students of energy security argue that the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement 
is mainly driven by supply diversification of the Turkish government. 40 Cagri Kursat Yuce notes 
that Turkish foreign policy makers are dedicated to diversify hydrocarbon suppliers to reduce 
vulnerability to potential supply disruptions in Russia and Iraq.41 He believes that the current 
Turkish-Iranian energy rapprochement is a balancing strategy against Russia’s monopolistic 
control of regional pipeline networks. Necdet Pamir, a prominent Turkish energy expert, even 
argues that the ongoing energy partnership with Iran is an integral part of the Erdogan 
Administration’s efforts to transform Turkey into an interregional energy hub that would regain 
strategic importance in world politics.42  
Redirection of Turkish foreign policy has become an increasingly popular debate among 
the institutionalists who focus on the innenpolitik to explain foreign policy behaviors. Many of 
them claim that the ongoing foreign policy change has been driven by the power shift from the 
ultra secularist military to the pan-Islamist politicians.43 Traditionally, the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TSK) had been dominating the policy making process in the National Security Council (MGK). 
TSK represented the pro-Western status quo, whereas civilian leaders sought revision both in 
domestic politics and foreign policy. A growing array of institutionalists claims that the balance 
                                                      
38 Atilla Sandikli and Hasret Bilgin, Turkiye'de Enerji ve Kalkinma Sempozyumu. TASAM Yayinlari, Ankara, 2006 
39 Necdet Pamir, “Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzas› ndaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarnin Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenligine 
Etkileri”, Harp Akademileri, 2006 
40 Necdet Pamir, “Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzas› ndaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarnin Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenligine 
Etkileri”, Harp Akademileri, 2006; Cagri Kursat Yuce,  Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Enerji Kaynaklari Uzerinde 
Mucadele. Otuken,  Istanbul, 2006; 40 Ilyyas Kamalov, “Rusya’nin Yeni Enerji Politikalari”, AVSAM, 2008  
41 Cagri Kursat Yuce,  Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Enerji Kaynaklari Uzerinde Mucadele. Otuken,  Istanbul, 2006  
42 Necdet Pamir, “Kafkaslar ve Hazar Havzas› ndaki Ülkelerin Enerji Kaynaklarnin Türkiye’nin Enerji Güvenligine 
Etkileri”, Harp Akademileri, 2006 
43 Metin Heper, “The European Union, the Turkish military and democracy”, South European Society and Politics, 
10(1), 33-44, 2005 
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of power within Turkey’s foreign policy machinery has fundamentally changed throughout the 
EU accession reforms. Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyuz highlighted that there has been a constant 
transition of power from the military to the civilians in the post-Helsinki  process as the EU 
strongly recommended demilitarization of Turkish politics.44 Metin Heper notes that post-
Helsinki adaptational pressures not only curtailed the power of pro-status quo military leaders, 
but it also strengthened the hands of the revisionists in Turkish politics. Karakoc maintains that 
strong military leaders were able to impede Turkish-Iranian rapprochement during the Erbakan 
administration (1996-1997) but after the transition of power they failed to prevent the ongoing 
rapprochement with Iran during the Erdogan Administration.45 
Another group of foreign policy analysts seek the roots of the change in Turkish foreign 
policy in shifting national aspirations and political identities. For them, re-Islamization of the 
sociopolitical domain shifted the aspirations of the governing elites towards pan-Islamic and pan-
Turkic platforms.46 Barry Rubin asserts that, after the end of Cold War “Ankara had to look 
elsewhere for alignments and sources of identity consistent with the country’s goals and self-
image…Bitterness and disappointment [with the EU] over past treatment had already set Turkey 
on the path of a multiregional approach in defining its identity and interests.” 47 Ahmet 
Davutoglu, a prominent Turkish scholar and foreign minister of the Erdogan Administration, 
advocates an expansionist foreign policy, in which Turkey emerges as a core state of the Middle 
East, Caspian Region, Balkans and the Muslim World.48 Hakan Yavuz argues that Turkey’s 
                                                      
44 Ersel Aydinli; Nihat Ali Ozcan, & Dogan Akyaz, “Turkish Military's March toward Europe”, Foreign Affairs, 
85(1), 77-90, 2006 
45  Abdullah Karakoc, Turkey's Relations with Iran and the United States: A Shift in Alignment: Naval Postgraduate 
School Monterey, 2009  
46 Jenny, B. White, Islamist mobilization in Turkey: a study in vernacular politics, University of Washington Press, 
2003 
47 Barry Rubin, Turkey in World Politics. An Emerging Regional Power, Boulder and London, 2001,  p.252 
48 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye’nin uluslararasi konumu, Kure Yayinlari, Istanbul/Turkey, 2007 
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rapprochement with Iran coincided with the rise of pan-Islamic and neo-Ottomanist aspirations 
and fall of pro-Western images in domestic politics.49 Duran concurs that Islamic aspirations of 
the Welfare Party (RP) and Justice and Development Party (AKP) paved the way for the 
rapprochement process between Turkey and the post-revolutionary Iran.50  
Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran raised considerable interest among the foreign analysts 
in Turkey, U.S. and Israel. However, existing studies failed to provide substantial analysis of the 
prolonged detente as they failed to amass empirical data to examine the perceptions of policy 
makers. Even though the foreign policy literature has grown exponentially, the literature on 
Turkish-Iranian security partnership is disparate, descriptive and noncumulative. Former studies 
presents the diachronic evolution of Turkish-Iranian relations in a descriptive manner but often 
fail to shed light on the internal and external drives of the policy making process. Another pitfall 
of existing studies is their overemphasis on the statics of the bilateral relations but neglect of the 
dynamics of change. This dissertation aims to address this gap in the literature through 
investigating the underlying reasons for the tectonic shift in Turkish foreign policy and detente 
with Iran. The primary importance of this study is reliance on an extensive field research, 
including elite/expert interviews and content analysis. Semi-structured interviews with the elites 
and experts are designed to explore the perceptions and motivations of the policy makers. Since 
the interviewees have been selected from a wide array of experts, this research contributes to our 
understanding of divergent institutional and individual stances on rapprochement with Iran in 
three security realms; counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy security.  
 
                                                      
49 Hakan Yavuz,  The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, University of Utah Press, Glen 
Canyon, 2006 
50 ibid 
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1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The core research question of this dissertation is “Why did the Erdogan Administration forge a 
three-tiered security partnership with Iran when the United States pushed for containment of the 
emerging nuclear power?” There are a number of subordinate questions:  
 Why did the Erdogan Administration forge counterterrorism partnership with the Iranian 
government?   
 Why did the Erdogan Administration support Iran’s nuclear energy program and oppose 
international sanctions? 
 What are the underlying reasons of bilateral partnership on energy security? 
 How did the Islamic identity of the key actors in the Erdogan Administrations affect the 
detente with the post revolutionary Iran? 
 How does intergovernmental security partnership with Iran affect Turkey’s alignment in 
the international system? 
 
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
This study deploys qualitative case study and process tracing as the principal research methods to 
investigate the underlying reasons of Turkish-Iranian security partnership during the Erdogan 
administration. Turkey’s ongoing intensive security cooperation with Iran was selected as a case 
study for two reasons. First, the new posture of the Erdogan Administration indicates a profound 
shift in Turkish foreign policy and contradicts the traditional patterns of Cold War alliances. 
Second, this intergovernmental security partnership took place at a very sensitive time when the 
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United States and Israel were increasing efforts to prevent Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons 
capability. 
Selection of the case study as an investigative tool has been driven by three major 
advantages of the method that are articulated in Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s 
landmark work, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.51 First, case 
studies enable in-depth investigation of the action arena as the researcher discovers the factors 
that are most relevant to the policy making process. The researcher designs a relevant interview 
protocol and looks for the insiders who have first hand experience in the investigated sets of 
events. In this study, in-depth interviews with experts provided more insightful explanations on 
the reason d’état of the Turkish government than a large-N survey of non-expert individuals. A 
quantitative study would provide insufficient and superficial implications of the motivations of 
the policy makers in this multifaceted issue. Second, case studies facilitate “heuristic 
identification” of further strong predictors of the investigated phenomenon. During the semi-
structured interviewing process, the researcher is able identify and probe new factors that had 
been omitted by the initial research design. Third, case studies allow adjustment of “complex 
casual relations such as equifinality, complex interaction effects and path dependency”.52 In this 
study, qualitative content analysis and expert interviews provided substantial information about 
the complex interaction among Turkish foreign policy makers. Power and constituencies of each 
actor are more easily traced by the in-depth qualitative case studies than quantitative statistical 
analysis with standard data sets.   
                                                      
51 Alexander George, and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2005 
52 ibid  
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George and Bennett note that qualitative case studies necessitate extensive process 
tracing evidence to explicate multifaceted aspects of the historical events.53 They maintain that in 
the process tracing method, the investigator “examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies 
in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” 
(p.6).54 Moreover, the research process may require interviews to fill the gaps in secondary data 
that are collected from the open sources such as government documents, archives and foreign 
policy chronicles. This study uses the process tracing technique to map out the patterns of shifts 
in regional security dynamics, energy geopolitics, institutional power distribution and political 
aspirations of the Turkish foreign policy elites during the Erdogan Administration. As there is no 
relevant data set, necessary qualitative data has been collected through intensive expert 
interviews, media broadcasts, governmental documents and think tank reports. The expert/elite 
interviews function as a verification mechanism for the secondary information sources. In many 
political processes, secondary data only provide a superficial record of the complex interactions 
among the policy makers. In this research elite interviews enabled the principal investigator to 
delve into the black box of the state machinery and question the government officials who 
directly witnessed the investigated events. Moreover, the written materials may not document 
important processes that can incorporate key information to draw strong inferences about the 
research questions. Author’s interviews with the elites filled these gaps by recorded re-narration 
of the past events from an insider’s perspective. Given the complexity of the issues investigated 
and paucity of substantial secondary data, this research employed expert/elite interviews as the 
principal source of process tracing technique.  
                                                      
53 ibid 
54 Alexander George, and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2005 
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1.3.1. Sources of data  
Throughout the research process, I examined three major sources of data. The first source has 
been semi-structured interviews with 32 experts/elites. I visited Turkey for several months to 
conduct interviews with pre-identified elites/analysts and snowballed sample of key experts. 
Selection of the interviewees depends on two primary criteria: i) my long term observations and 
investigations of Turkish-Iranian intergovernmental relations, and ii) references of the pre-
identified elites/analysts. The interviews were conducted entirely on a voluntary basis. The 
interviewees were informed about the place, time and subject of the interviews in advance. 
Broadly, the following elites and analysts were targeted for the expert interviews:    
 Existing and previous members of the Parliamentary Commissions on/of Foreign 
Affairs 
 Acting/retired officials/advisors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Analysts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Former ambassadors and attaches to Iran, Israel and US 
 Acting/retired officials/advisors of the Ministry of Energy 
 Retired army officers who work at security think tanks 
 Counterterrorism experts at the General Directorate of Security 
 Government affiliated security think tank analysts 
 Energy analysts at major think thanks , TURKSAM55, ORSAM56, SDE57, SETAV58 
and USAK59 
                                                      
55 International Relations and Strategic Research Center  (TURKSAM) 
56 Middle East Strategic Research Organization (ORSAM) 
57 Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) 
58 Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETAV) 
59 International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) 
16 
 
 Foreign policy correspondents of major newspapers  
 Independent expert analysts 
These interviews lasted from 25 minutes to 2.5 hours. Even though I had an initial semi-
structured interview protocol, I readjusted the questions in line with the expertise areas and 
backgrounds of the interviewees. Throughout the interviews, as well as delving into the standard 
questionnaire, I probed alternative themes that we re emphasized by the subject. This helped to 
discover new factors that had been omitted by the initial research design. References of my 
initial interviewees lead to identification of other key interviewees in the field. I have tape 
recorded 18 of 32 interviews but remaining interviewees rejected any records that would reveal 
their identity. The interviews provided a penetrating insight into the perceptions of the policy 
makers throughout the change in intergovernmental relations with Iran.  
The second source of data has been qualitative content analysis of the documents in 
Turkish, American and Iranian media broadcasts and think tank reports. Secondary interviews 
and special reports of major Turkish think thank organizations such as TURKSAM, ORSAM, 
SDE, SETAV and USAK have been obtained from their official websites. Moreover, I have been 
collecting the statements of the Turkish, Iranian and American government officials from the 
Turkish and international media between 2003 and 2010, when the change of foreign policy 
became apparent. The collected secondary data has been filtered, coded and integrated into the 
overall qualitative research process. Further updated statements of the key officials will be 
integrated into the ongoing data analysis process.  
The third source of data is the official reports of the government agencies and 
international energy corporations such as the Turkish Ministry of Energy (EB), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), The Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), the Turkish Petroleum 
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Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS), the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (DTM), the Turkish 
Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Relations, the General Directorate of Security (EGM), 
Turkish Institute for Statistics (TUIK), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
the British Petroleum (BP). Governmental news sources such as the Diary of Foreign Affairs 
(Disisleri Guncesi), History of the Month (Ayin Tarihi), institutional press releases and 
institutional minutes of the meeting reports have been scrutinized to trace the official processes.  
Moreover, I reviewed various U.S. executive branch and congressional reports that are relevant 
to the research questions. I also obtained the predominant portion of the relevant official data and 
documents from these agencies since 2003. This official data has been integrated into the overall 
qualitative analysis process.  
 
1.3.2. Data Analysis  
As suggested by Michael Patton, the qualitative investigation methods engender voluminous data 
sets that may initially look unmanageable.60 I have collected a great deal of secondary qualitative 
data through filtering the statements of energy and security policy makers in Turkish, Iranian and 
American media. The volume of the data grew even larger after transcription of the interviews. 
Analysis of the qualitative data is a process of sorting, reorganizing and restructuring the mass of 
collected information.61 For Marshall and Rossman, qualitative analysis is a “search for general 
statements about the relationships among categories of data; it builds grounded theory”. 62 From 
another perspective, Schartzman and Straus  claim that “probably the most fundamental 
                                                      
60 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman,  Designing qualitative research,  Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
2006 
61 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative research and evaluation methods, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2002 
62 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman,  Designing qualitative research,  Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
2006, p.111  
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operation in the analysis of qualitative data is that of discovering significant classes of the things, 
persons and events and the properties which characterize them” (p.110).63 In this research 
project, data processing and analysis helped the principal investigator to reduce the collected 
mass of information into manageable and interpretable chunks. I have employed a five stage 
qualitative analysis process:  
 Data reduction:  Streamlining and filtering out non-usable and non-interpretable data was 
the first stage of my analytic process. Data reduction rested on a delicate balance of 
losing valuable information and losing track of scrutiny in a large mass of collected data. 
I have avoided this problem through systematic categorization and coding of the available 
data.  
 Categorization: Throughout this process I identified consistent regularities, indigenous 
typologies and salient categories in the interviews, media content and relevant parts of 
institutional reports. The consistent regularities refer to the most frequent concerns in the 
statements of the foreign policy makers and analysts. Indigenous typologies refer to the 
common pattern of explanations among certain groups such as party members, military 
officers, and think thank analysts. The salient categories refer to the predominant themes 
that are most commonly expressed by the interviewees. This process entailed concerted 
efforts and heightened awareness to discover the explicit and implicit undercurrents of 
the statements.  
 Data entry and Coding: Interview transcripts, relevant media contents and institutional 
documents were coded and analyzed with NVivo Software program, which is an 
intelligent qualitative analysis tool. This Software facilitated an evenhanded entry of open 
                                                      
63 Leonard Schatzman and Anselm Strauss, Field research; strategies for a natural sociology, Englewood Cliff, 
Prentice Hall, 1973 
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and axial codes in interview transcripts.64 Nvivo helped categorizing, restructuring and 
reorganization of the available qualitative data. Moreover, it enabled searching, and auto 
linking of the relevant statements of different subjects. It allowed identification of the 
gaps and overlapping in the available qualitative data.  
 Interpretation and testing the assumptions: After the systematic categorization of the data 
set, I tested the assumptions that are driven from review of the literature. Depending on 
the grounded theory approach, I investigated the major explanatory factors in three policy 
areas; counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy security, as well as the evidence 
of foreign policy realignment. In this process, I also looked for alternative explanations 
on the growing Turkish- Iranian energy and security partnerships. The expert interviews 
discovered many other explanatory factors that had been omitted by the existing 
literature.   
 Reporting: The analyzed qualitative texts were inserted into contextualized dissertation 
body. I counterposed the arguments of the existing and former policy makers and analysts 
in an analytical manner. I also presented countervailing arguments and criticisms of the 
Erdogan Administration’s policy of rapprochement with the Iranian governments.  
 
1.3.3. Limitations and field method challenges 
I encountered two major field method challenges during this research project. The first challenge 
was encouraging particularly high ranking security officials to talk on this sensitive issue. To 
overcome this barrier, I reminded them of the qualitative research safeguards and signed a 
protocol to maintain their anonymity. I tape recorded more than half of the interviews with a 
                                                      
64 For more information please see http://www.qualrus.com/ 
20 
 
digital voice recorder. Before each interview, I asked for consent of the interviewee for recording 
and keeping their voices until the transcription. All voice records were kept in network secure 
hard drives and deleted after the transcription. Some of the subjects rejected revealing their 
identity and tape recording. In these cases, I took written notes of their statements. I will deliver 
a copy of my dissertation to the interviewees to assure their protection and accuracy of the 
quotations.    
The second challenge was getting appointments with high level officials within their tight 
schedules. Some of them rejected my request for an interview. To overcome the reluctance 
problem I used social networking references. I had no difficulty, however, in getting 
appointments with the most prominent Iran specialists at the major think tanks, TURKSAM, 
ORSAM, SDE, SETAV and USAK. As a government official, I had direct connections with 
many relevant mid-level officials and had no trouble in accessing government employed 
energy/security analysts.65  
 
1.4. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the general introduction of 
the proposed dissertation. It sets forth the thesis statement, background of the problem, the 
research puzzle, research questions, purpose and significance of the study, and the roadmap of 
the research process. The second part of this chapter presents the methodology of this research 
process. It outlines how data was collected, coded, analyzed, interpreted and reported. It first 
delineates the characteristics of the sample group of experts and strategies in the interviewing 
                                                      
65 Many of the targeted interviewees are my former colleagues or their constituents.   
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process. Second, it provides details of data reduction and categorization process that transformed 
the data mass into an interpretable information source. Third, it elucidates how qualitative data is 
handled to draw inferences about each research question. Fourth, it expounds potential field 
method challenges and my strategies to overcome these barriers.  
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on theories/models of foreign policy change, 
and four different approaches to foreign policy change in Turkey. The literature review is 
divided into three major parts. The first part presents various definitions of the concept of foreign 
policy change. Then it reviews the premises of major works and models of foreign policy change 
since World War II. It discusses underlying reasons and various dimensions of foreign policy 
change ranging from adjustment change to reorientation. It presents strengths and weaknesses of 
the existing models of change. The second part presents the main arguments and theoretical 
underpinnings of three systematic approaches to foreign policy change; a security approach, a 
domestic politics approach and an aspirational approach. The third part of this chapter adopts the 
security approach as an analytical tool in investigation of intergovernmental rapprochement 
between Turkey and Iran. It first identifies the key actors in the foreign policy machinery of the 
Turkish state. Then, it operationalizes the security model to explore the perceptions of decision 
makers in the action arena. During the operationalization process, core propositions of the 
security approach are presented regarding counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy 
security policies. It asks further sub-questions to explicate the concerns, motivations and 
judgments of the policy makers.     
Chapter 3 focuses on the underlying reasons for counterterrorism rapprochement 
between the Erdogan Administration and Iranian governments. This chapter analyzes the effects 
of nine internal and external factors that have been identified throughout the grounded qualitative 
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analysis process; i) resurgence of PKK after the U.S. occupation of Iraq, ii) unsatisfactory U.S. 
cooperation against the PKK, iii) Various crises between Washington and Ankara, iv) Iran’s 
concerted efforts against the PKK, v) Iran’s effective public diplomacy, vi) convergence of the 
regional security policies of Ankara and Tehran, vii) shifting threat perceptions of key foreign 
policy makers, viii) consensus among the key foreign policy actors, and ix) legitimization of the 
relations with Iran.  It presents the statements of foreign policy elites, analysts and government 
officials to understand the concerns of the Erdogan Administration that have driven the ongoing 
bilateral counterterrorism partnership with the Iranian government.   
Chapter 4 lays out the underlining reasons for the Erdogan Administration’s unequivocal 
support for Iran’s nuclear energy program. This chapter addresses two sub-questions; i) Why did 
Turkey choose not to bandwagon with American-Israeli containment of nuclear Iran? ii) How do 
Turkish foreign policy makers conceive Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Moreover, this chapter 
explicates six perceptions held by key officials that infuse the current posture of the Erdogan 
Administration towards the Iranian nuclear program; i) Iran has an inalienable right to develop 
nuclear energy, ii) the Iranian nuclear program poses no significant threat to Turkish security, iii) 
economic sanctions will not work, iv) military intervention will bring about catastrophic 
consequences, iv) the NPT regime is flawed and serves the nuclear status quo, v) 
denuclearization in the Middle East should start with elimination of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, vi) 
only multilateral diplomatic approaches that facilitate direct negotiations between Tehran and 
Washington can resolve the nuclear conflict.    
Chapter 5 investigates the exploratory power of the energy security approach in the 
Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. It discusses why the Erdogan Administration forged an energy 
partnership with Iran despite strong opposition from the U.S. and Israel. It discusses the impacts 
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of six factors that have been identified throughout the grounded qualitative research; i) reducing 
dependency on Russia, ii) balancing Russia’s predominance in energy supply, iii) supply 
disruptions in Iraq, iv) growing domestic demand,  v) reducing vulnerability to supply 
disruptions,  v) aspirations to be an interregional energy hub.  This chapter attempts to answer 
the following sub-questions. What were principal concerns of key actors in the Turkish 
government’s energy apparatus? To what extent Turkey has been dependent on Russian and Iraqi 
energy resources? What are the alternatives to reduce dependency on these two major energy 
suppliers? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives? Why did Iran 
emerge as the most viable alternative? Why did Turkey sign major energy agreements with Iran 
during the Erdogan Administrations? What are the stances of key energy actors in the Turkish 
government and bureaucracy? What are the arguments of the proponents and opponents of the 
energy partnership policy with Iran? Why does Turkey disregard American and Israeli demands 
to terminate the ongoing energy partnership with Iran?  
Chapter 6 discusses whether the three-tiered security partnership (counterterrorism, 
nuclear proliferation and energy) with Iran indicates a realignment of Turkey in the international 
system. This chapter addresses several sub-questions. To what extent has Turkey been satisfied 
with its alignment with the West? Is the Erdogan Administration’s rapprochement policy with 
Iran driven by practical concerns or Islamic identity? How did the growth of pan-Islamism affect  
relations with post-revolutionary Iran?  Is Iran the only country with which the Erdogan 
administration developed partnerships? What is the place of the relationship with Iran in the new 
grand strategy of Turkey? Who are the proponents (revisionists) of rapprochement with Iran and 
what are their arguments? Who are the opponents (pro-status quo groups) of policy and what are 
their main concerns? Why did the revisionist posture prevail during the Erdogan Administration? 
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What are the advantages of security partnership with Iran at the expense of weakening strategic 
ties with Israel and the US?  Does rapprochement with Iran means realignment towards the 
Muslim World.  
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this qualitative research project. It compares and 
contrasts the assumptions of the literature review with the findings from the field research. It 
presents the ultimate synthesis about the explanatory power of each internal and external factor 
influencing the Turkish-Iranian energy and security partnerships in a complex geopolitical 
setting. Second, it provides suggestions for further research projects that are determined to 
investigate Turkish-Iranian relations from an energy security standpoint  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Change and realignment are two permeating issues in foreign policy analysis. The question of 
why states realign remains an essential debate in foreign policy discourse. Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Iran during the Erdogan Administration indicates a profound shift in its 
traditional course of foreign policy. This study investigates why the Erdogan Administration 
forged a security partnership with Iran, and whether this partnership indicates realignment of 
Turkey in the international system. In accordance, the following literature review discusses why 
nations change the course of foreign policy and evaluates the explanatory power of major 
models.  
 This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents various perspectives on the 
concept of foreign policy change. It then reviews the premises of major works on foreign policy 
change since World War II. In this context, it presents foreign policy change models of 
preeminent scholars such as James Rosenau, Kalevi Holsti, Robert Gilpin, Charles Herman, Jerel 
A. Rosati and Jakob Gustavvson. It discusses underlying reasons and various dimensions of 
foreign policy change ranging from adjustment change to reorientation.  It presents the strengths 
and weaknesses of existing models of change.  
The second part examines three systematic approaches to foreign policy change; the 
security approach, the domestic politics approach and the aspirational approach. The security 
approach propounds that states shift the course of foreign policy in response to emerging 
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security threats. As the ultimate goal of the states is survival in an anarchic international system, 
they adjust alliance patterns in line with the shifting dynamics of external security. According to 
the domestic politics approach, foreign policy is formulated within various spheres of 
competence by pulling and hauling among the presidents, foreign ministers, defense ministers, 
national security advisers, military commanders and organizational leaders. Foreign policy 
change is driven by domestic factors such as regime changes, realignment of constituents, 
institutional restructuring and shifts in domestic distribution of power among the foreign policy 
makers. The shift in foreign policy can be accentuated by major economic and political crises in 
domestic politics. According to the aspirational approach, norms, identities and aspirations, 
rather than rational calculations and interests of the key actors, give meaning to foreign policy 
actions. The course of foreign policy shifts in line with the changes in deeper norms, national 
aspirations and political identities.  
The third part of this chapter adopts the security approach as an analytical tool in the 
investigation of thr intergovernmental rapprochement between Turkey and Iran. It first identifies 
the key actors in the foreign policy machinery of the Turkish state. Then it discusses the roles, 
powers and common patterns of interactions among the actors throughout the decision making 
process. Ultimately, it operationalizes the security model to explore the perceptions of decision 
makers in the action arena. During the operationalization process, core propositions of the 
security approach are presented regarding counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy 
security policies. It asks further sub-questions to explicate the concerns, motivations and 
judgments of the policy makers.     
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2.1. DEFINITION, DIMENSIONS AND EARLY MODELS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
CHANGE  
 
Over the past three decades we have been observing dramatic foreign policy changes in line with 
the shifting dynamics of domestic and international politics. Dissolution of the Soviet bloc, 
triumph of capitalism, rise of political Islam, European integration, rise of East Asia, conflicts 
over the natural resources and proliferation of non-state security threats precipitated the changes 
in the course of foreign policy. These developments inspired a number of scholars such as James 
Rosenau66, Kalevi Holsti67, Charles Herman68, Jerel A. Rosati69 and Jakob Gustavvson70  to 
study the underlying reasons of foreign policy change and realignment, which had been mostly 
neglected throughout the Cold War.  During the bipolar strategic rivalry, students of foreign 
policy devoted much energy to systemic and static analysis but little attention was devoted to the 
dynamics of change. 
After the 1980s, a growing array of analysts began to focus on analysis of change in line 
with tectonic transformations in domestic politics and the international system. These scholars 
presented various definitions of foreign policy change that ranged from restructuring to 
realignment. Among them, Jerel A. Rosati defines change as “foreign policy phenomena that 
experience broad alteration, ranging from more modest shifts to major foreign policy 
                                                      
66 James Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation F. Pinter; Nichols Pub. Co, New York,1981. 
67 Kaleve Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World Allen & Unwin 
Pty,Australia, 1982 
68 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990. 
69 Jerel A. Rosati, JD Hagan, and MW Sampson, Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to 
Global Change, Univ of South Carolina, 1994 
70 Jacob Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 1, 1999. 
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restructuring”.71 He defines continuity as “broad patterns in foreign policy that tend to persist 
over time, encompassing more micro and incremental changes”.72 For James Rosenau, foreign 
policy is an adaptation instrument to the changes in international politics.73 He maintains that the 
“political organism is always experiencing both continuities and change, and thus it is always in 
motion, slipping behind, moving ahead, holding fast, or otherwise adjusting and changing in 
response to internal developments and external circumstances”.74 Therefore, he argues that 
studying dynamics of political adaptation is essential to comprehend the foreign policy 
redirection. Volgy and Schwarz define the concept of realignment as “a fundamental and 
comprehensive change in foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a very short time, as 
manifested through behavioral changes in a nation’s interactions with other actors in 
international politics.”75 (p.24). Holsti and his associates define restructuring as “the dramatic 
wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations”.76   
A growing array of analysts concur that the scope of foreign policy change ranges from 
adjustment change to reorientation.77 Charles Herman identifies four major types of foreign 
policy change. First, adjustment changes refer to the shift in efforts and methods to achieve 
certain goals.78 Second, program changes indicate qualitative changes in methodology and 
                                                      
71 Jerel A. Rosati, "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring; The politics of Continuity and Change in the U.S. 
foreign policy", in Jerel A. Rosati , Joe D. Hagan and Martin W. Samptson, (eds), Foreign policy restructuring: how 
governments respond to global change , University of South Caroline Press, South Caroline, 1994, 
72 ibid, p.225 
73 James Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation F. Pinter; Nichols Pub. Co, New York,1981 
74 Ibid, pp. 1-2 
75Ibid, p.24  
76 Ibid, (p.ix) 
77 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990;  Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World;  
Rosati, "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring," Foreign policy restructuring: how governments respond to global 
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Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990.  
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instruments of statecraft. Third, problem/goal changes imply the redirection of the goals and 
aspirations of the state’s foreign policy machinery. Fourth, International orientation change, is 
the most fundamental shift in foreign policy direction. Throughout the reorientation process 
states redefine their allies, policy priorities, purposes and the methods to achieve these goals. In 
Skidmore’s view, change in foreign policy bifurcates into “evolutionary” and “sporadic”.79 For 
him, the degree of change associates with relative power of the state within the international 
system and level of support from domestic constituents. Evolutionary changes are more common 
in weak states, whereas strong states only experience sporadic changes in foreign policy 
orientation. Rosenau concurs that domestic and international developments can mutually 
reinforce each other, and foreign policy shifts “when the developments at home give rise to new 
needs and wants with respect to their environment, or when developments abroad give rise to 
political threats to their essential structures.”80   
Gilpin81, Rosenau82 and Rosati83 conceive foreign policy restructuring as a cyclical 
process that combines continuity, transition and change. The cyclical models entail long-term 
observation of single cases studies to identify the drivers of change. As seen in figure 2.1, Rosati  
argues that the “interaction of the state, the society, and the global environment produces a 
dialectical process where governmental foreign policy evolves through different cycles or phases 
                                                      
79 David Skidmore, "Explaining State Responses to International Change; The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy 
Rigidity and Change", in Jerel A. Rosati , Joe D. Hagan and Martin W. Samptson, (eds), Foreign policy 
restructuring: how governments respond to global change , University of South Caroline Press, South Caroline, 
1994 
80 Ibid, p. 42 
81 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983 
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and international Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966 
83 Jerel A. Rosati, "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring; The politics of Continuity and Change in the U.S. 
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over time; from a period of stability in which continuity in policy tends to prevail to a period of 
transition.”84  
Figure 2.1: Rosati’s cyclical model of foreign policy change  
 
For Rosati, the periods of transition may produce four major outcomes: i) 
“intensification”, ii) “refinement’, iii) “reform”, and iv) “restructuring”.85 Intensification refers to 
strengthening of existing posture and lack of change in policy objectives and procedures. 
Intensification is more likely when the status quo powers face no major challenge. Refinement 
means minor alterations when the government and the society undergo cyclical continuity and 
change patterns. Reform indicates moderate amendments in the party program and orientation of 
foreign policy. Restructuring is the most dynamic process where governments make profound 
changes in foreign policy programs and orientation. States may realign to overcome major 
challenges in foreign policy practice. 
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In addition to domestic cycles of change, various foreign policy analysts put emphasis on 
cycles of stability and transition in the international system. Robert Gilpin argues that the 
challenge of strong revisionist powers leads to turbulence and may overturn the stability in the 
international system.86 Foreign policies of both revisionist and status quo powers may undergo 
tumultuous changes during the transition process. The world experiences an era of 
disequilibrium until a new international system is established. Jerel A. Rosati acknowledges that 
international organizations, agreements and commitments function as instruments of the status 
quo, whereas crises may overturn the stability in the international system.87 For him, states 
redefine foreign policy priorities and partnership strategies as the system builds upon new 
balances of power.  
Kalevi Holsti advanced the study of foreign policy restructuring with his prolific works 
throughout the 1980s. Most notably, in Why Nations Realign, Holsti differentiates incremental 
foreign policy change and restructuring, and notes that restructuring occurs more abruptly and 
fundamentally than sporadic change.88 Holsti identifies four major types of restructuring; i) 
“isolation”, ii) “self reliance”, iii) “dependence”, and iv) “diversification”.89 He investigates 
foreign policy change in 25 countries and claims that the developed countries are less likely to 
restructure foreign policy because they are more satisfied with the existing patterns of relations 
in the status quo. On the flipside, the states at the periphery are more prone to reorientation as 
they are not content with the international distribution of power. Holsti acknowledges that 
foreign policy restructuring at the periphery does not propel significant reaction from the major 
                                                      
86 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983 
87 Jerel A. Rosati, "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring; The politics of Continuity and Change in the U.S. 
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powers because it does not radically change the global balance of power. However, reorientation 
of the major powers is more likely to “exacerbate international tensions and the result in a variety 
of coercive, punitive and violent responses by the former hegemons.”90  
According to Charles Herman, foreign policy change is driven by four different factors; 
leaders, bureaucratic interplay, domestic realignment and external shocks (See figure 2.2).91 
Leader driven change is mostly experienced in autocratic regimes where leaders demonstrate 
strong proclivity to unilateralism and domestic opposition is weak. In this type, subjective 
calculations, threat perceptions and the world vision of the leaders underpin the shift in the 
course of foreign policy. Bureaucratic advocacy driven change refers to a multilateral process in 
the institutional domain. In this approach change is the product of constant bargaining among the 
organizational leaders. Revisionist and pro-status quo leaders develop coalitions and 
constituencies to gain the upper hand in the bureaucratic bargaining process. Domestic 
restructuring indicates major shift in postures of politically awakened segments of society. The 
most common form is transformation of the agents of stability into agents of revision. Domestic 
realignment intensifies when the public is highly discontent with the dominant political 
paradigm. Ultimately, external shocks precipitate the incentives to redirect foreign policy. The 
external shocks may be in the form of military encroachment, economic crisis or major energy 
supply disruptions. The government’s failure to respond to these changes stimulates the 
incentives to shift the traditional course of foreign policy. For Herman, the primary change 
agents can be mutually reinforcing. For example, external shocks may have profound 
implications on domestic politics and may even spark a process of regime change.  
                                                      
90 Ibid, p.218 
91 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990.  
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Figure 2.2: Charles Herman’s model of foreign policy change  
 
Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple argue that comprehensive foreign policy investigations 
should employ five levels of analysis; i) “individual, ii) “group”, iii), “composite group” or 
“state”, iv) “inter and/or multistate”, and v) “global systemic”.92 For them, even though the 
foreign policy behavior of states take place at the fourth level, a foreign policy analyst should 
take into account the developments at all the levels, because an overwhelming driver might come 
out of any of these spheres. For Charles Herman, the foreign policy decisions emerge as a 
response to problems.93 The response of the compartmentalized decision makers at three levels -
predominant leader, single group, and coalition- may be fundamentally different from each other. 
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If the decision maker is a predominant leader, the analysts need to identify whether the leader is 
more prone to multiple advocacy or unilateralism. The analysts should investigate the power and 
characteristics of the key constituents if the leader is more prone to multiple advocacy. Herman 
notes that the single leaders are less prone to domestic opposition, whereas the pluralist 
democracies are more concerned with domestic constituencies.  
Figure 2.3: Gustavvson’s model of foreign policy change  
 
Jakob Gustavsson’s model offered a more promising analytical framework.94 As seen in 
figure 2.3, Gustavsson argues that foreign policy change is driven by complex array of 
international and domestic developments that open policy windows towards more favorable 
environments. For Gustavvson, international factors refer to “power relations and the traditional 
military aspects of national security” that are examined thoroughly by the realist school of 
international politics.95 The domestic factors bifurcate into economic and political aspects. The 
political aspect refers to “the support from voters, political parties, and societal actors to uphold a 
                                                      
94 Jacob Gustavsson, "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 1, 1999.  
95 Ibid, p.83 
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certain foreign policy”.96 The economic aspect focuses on “GDP growth, the rate of inflation, 
and the level of unemployment in addition to institutional conditions influencing the relationship 
between the state and the parties of the labor market”.97 Foreign policy makers deliberate on 
international and domestic factors and ultimate decisions are made through constant pulling and 
hauling among competing policy alternatives. Gustavsson believes that the actions of the 
individual decision makers are socially constructed and cyclical feedbacks in internal and 
external environment can have determining impact on the decision making process.  
 Gustavvson argues that foreign policy change will be a turbulent process when policy 
entrepreneurs face substantial opposition from pro-status quo leaders. Both revisionists and 
status-quo groups develop coalitions with compatible constituents to bring about the preferred 
outcome in the governmental bargaining process. Political identities, threat perceptions and 
cognitive elements define the nature of reformist and anti-reformist coalitions. As well as the 
power of these coalitions, the level of institutionalization and volume of internal/external crisis 
and social feedbacks might significantly affect the level of change in the course of foreign 
policy.   
 
2.2. THREE SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE  
 
2.2.1. SECURITY APPROACH 
 
According to the security approach, the primary goal of the state is survival in an anarchic 
international system. Partnership and alliance strategies are built upon rational calculations of 
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balances of threat.98 From the security perspective, foreign policy restructuring is fundamentally 
driven by the shifting balances of threat at the external environment. In other words, 
governments shift foreign policy alignments or reformulate alliances to respond changing 
dynamics of external security. The alignment strategy may be in the form of balancing or 
bandwagoning with the source of external threat. Foreign policy makers rationally chose the 
most appropriate policy option among two alternatives. In this approach, the states are more 
likely to balance against growing external threats.  
Theoretical underpinnings of the security approach have been drawn from the realist 
school of international politics. Stephen Walt claims that the perception of the external threat is 
the main incentive for the alliance-making strategies of states.99 In determining the volume of 
threat Walt looks at four criteria; i) aggregate power, ii) offensive power, iii) geographic 
proximity and iv) aggressive intentions. For Walt, foreign policy makers have greater tendency 
to balance against growing external threats, because “it is safer to balance against potential 
threats than to hope that strong states will remain benevolent”.100 Similarly, Kenneth Waltz 
argues that the states forge alliances to ensure survival in an anarchic international system.101 For 
him, states realign when they contend that the existing alliance systems are incompatible with 
national security. For Mearsheimer, states shift the course of foreign policy or alliance patterns 
when the nature, extent and direction of external threats undergo profound changes.102 
In the traditional realist lens, the primary source of threats has always been states. Indeed, 
only a few major states really mattered after the advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental 
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ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The disproportionate destruction capability of nuclear weapons made 
it unlikely that non-nuclear states pursue aggressive postures against major nuclear powers. 
Therefore, the nonnuclear states sought alliances with either the USSR or USA to take advantage 
of the nuclear deterrence shields of these superpowers throughout the Cold War. Kenneth 
Waltz103  John Mearsheimer 104 and Stephen Walt105 do not perceive non non-state actors (i.e. 
terrorism and transnational crime) as a major threat to the security of the states. They believe that 
the states will remain as the dominant actors, power projectors and source of threat in 
international politics. Kenneth Waltz notes that terrorism “hardly pose threats to the fabric of a 
society or the security of the state…Instead, the effect of September 11 has been to enhance 
American power and extend its military presence in the World”.106 Mearsheimer and Walt note 
that the ad hoc counterterrorism alliances or temporary “coalitions of the willing” against the 
elusive terrorism threat does not change the basic principle of international alliances.107 For 
them, the main source of external threat remains major states with nuclear power rather than non-
state actors that have no substantial economic, political and military power. Therefore, the threats 
from the major states will remain as the principal drive of alignment in international system.  
Another group of security scholars such as Phil Williams108, Thomas Risse Kappen109, 
Bruce Hoffman110, and Thomas Homer Dixon111 argue that non-state actors, mainly terror 
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organizations and transnational criminal networks, began to pose a substantial threat to national 
security in the post Cold War world. Many states listed terrorism as the principal national 
security threat and counterterrorism has become the primary thrust of national security policy 
particularly after 9/11 terror attacks. In their view, traditional forms of strategic alliances became 
obsolete and the states began to develop nontraditional coalitions against elusive terror 
organizations that can penetrate into any society and strike from any direction.112  
Concomitantly, resurgence of separatist terrorism in many countries such as Turkey, Russia, 
China, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria and India forced these countries to develop security partnerships 
with other countries that are exposed to the same threat.113    
In addition to conventional state and non-state threats, energy security has become an 
increasingly important element of security policy over the past century in parallel with the 
growing importance of hydrocarbon resources for economic, military and industrial performance. 
According to this approach, “energy indicates national prosperity and underwrites national 
security. States now desire energy security in the same sense that they desire military and 
economic security.”114 The energy security approach argues that states shift the course of foreign 
policy to avoid major supply disruptions and prevent use of hydrocarbon resources as a political 
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leverage. 115 The second proposition of the energy security model is that states develop 
alternative pipeline networks in order to prevent monopolistic control of energy supply networks 
by certain countries.116 Therefore, in this approach, states shift the course of foreign policy to 
avoid major energy supply disruptions and balance against monopolistic control of energy 
transportation networks. 
Theoretical foundations of energy security have been laid out since the Arab Oil 
Embargo (1973) when the developed world experienced a dramatic crisis due to major supply 
disruptions.117 Since then many scholars argue that energy security should become the pivotal 
goal of foreign affairs and replace the preponderant military agenda in foreign policy 
discourse.118 For them, the primary goal of overseas engagement and military deployment should 
be to ensure continuous supply of energy resources at a reasonable price. Kalicki and Goldwyn 
propose that the states should “evolve from more traditional foreign policy view, preoccupied 
with military security issues, to a modern view that addresses economic and political factors and 
recognizes that world events are determined far more by flow of resources -human and natural- 
than by flow of officials and diplomats or even soldiers” (p.9).119 In a similar vein, John Gault 
notes that, energy security is “inextricable from broader economic and foreign policy changes 
                                                      
115 John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government, Cornell University 
Press, New York, 1988 
116 Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, "Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy," in  
Kalicki, JH and Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, John Hopskins University 
Press-Woodrow wilson Center Press, 2005 
117 John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government, Cornell University 
Press, New York, 1988. 
118 Amelie Hadfield, "Energy and Foreign Policy: Eu-Russia Energy Dynamics," in Foreign Policy: Theories, 
Actors, Cases, ed. S Smith, A Hadfield, and T Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 323; 
Kalicki and Goldwyn, "Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy.", D Yergin, The Prize: The 
Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (Free Press, 2008). 
119 Kalicki and Goldwyn, "Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy.";  Daniel Yergin, The 
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, Free Press, 2008, , p.9 
40 
 
and solutions”.120 Barry Buzan places energy security within the intersecting realms of economic 
and military security.121 From an economic standpoint, the centerpiece of oil geopolitics has been 
sustainable supply of energy at a reasonable price. Uninterrupted energy supply is crucial for 
economic power projection. From a military perspective, oil became a fundamental instrument 
for operability of the military forces after the end of World War I. Buzan believes that energy 
security can drive the “high politics” of the state, despite the fact that it is a “soft” component of 
the global security.122 According to Daniel Yergin, the fundamental principle of oil geopolitics is 
diversification of suppliers to reduce vulnerability to major disruptions. For him, energy security 
means consistent and affordable supply of hydrocarbon resources to consumers such as Turkey, 
EU and the US. For the suppliers such as Russia, Iran and Iraq, energy security means 
sustainable and absorbing markets for long term export of natural resources. Put another way, the 
importing countries are more concerned with the security of supply, whereas exporting countries 
are more concerned with the security of the demand. Yergin suggests that energy dependent 
countries always search for alternative suppliers to reduce vulnerability to supply disruptions and 
supplier’s proclivity to use of oil/gas as political leverage.123  
 
2.2.2. DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACH 
 
The domestic politics model delves into the black box of the executive branch and investigates 
the roles, concerns, power and constituents of each actor in the decision making process. 
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Fundamental precepts of this approach have been drawn from the literature on bureaucratic 
politics, particularly from the works of Graham Allison, and the book by Spanier and Uslaner. In 
domestic politics approach, the state is not a unitary rational actor. Instead, it is a sphere of 
competence in which foreign policy decisions are formulated through constant pulling and 
hauling among the key actors. In this model, bureaucratic leaders are not submissive actors, but 
strive to influence the governmental decision-making process in line with their institutional 
views or parochial interests.124 Organizational interests range from expansion of power, 
influence and budget to restructuring of the government machinery. According to the domestic 
politics approach, realignment of foreign policy is driven by domestic factors such as regime 
changes, realignment of constituents, institutional restructuring and shifts in domestic 
distribution of power among the foreign policy makers. 
 The theeoretical foundations of the domestic politics model were laid by the post war 
institutionalists, who argued that systemic factors could not account for all the variations in 
foreign policy behavior. In this vein, growing array of foreign policy analysts such as Richard 
Snyder125, Graham Allison126  and Morton Halperin127 began to place more emphasis on the 
bureaucratic politics and internal dynamics of the state’s foreign policy apparatus.  The 
institutionalists reject the realist assumption that states are rational unitary actors. The domestic 
politics approach “breaks apart the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors. It focuses 
                                                      
124 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review, 
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Press, Princeton, 1954 
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on the people and the unit that comprise the state.”128 According to this model, foreign policy 
making is a multifaceted bargaining process among the political, bureaucratic and military 
leaders. Allison and Zelikow assert that the outcome of the institutional bargaining process is 
profoundly different from unilateral rational calculations of presidents.129 The domestic politics 
approach propounds that bureaucratic organizations are quasi-sovereign powers with pivotal 
roles in “forging and wielding” of the foreign affairs.130 Snyder concurs that foreign policy 
decisions are formulated through interaction of at least three clusters of variables; i) “spheres of 
competence”, ii) “communication and information”, and iii) “motivation”.  For him, foreign 
policy behavior is the upshot of an intensive bargaining process among various “spheres of 
competence” in the government.131 Throughout the decision making process, each actor applies 
various strategies to promote specific preferences over the countervailing postures.  
According to the domestic politics approach, changes in the course of foreign policy are 
driven by domestic factors such as regime changes, realignment of constituents, institutional 
restructuring, and shifts in distribution of power among the foreign policy makers. The policy 
domain is comprised of pro-status quo and revisionist actors. Each of these actors may pursue 
national, organizational or parochial interests in seeking change or preserving the status quo. 
Powers, constituencies, images and commitments of each side determine the nature and extent of 
change. Charles Herman  notes that foreign policy processes may have six different outcomes: i) 
“one party’s position prevails”, ii) “concurrence”, iii) “mutual compromise/consensus”, iv) 
                                                      
128 VM Hudson and CS Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Mershon International 
Studies Review  (1995): 210. 
129 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Longman, 1999). 
130 Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Snyder, Decision-Making as an 
Approach to the Study of International Politics, Allison and Zelikow, Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
131 Richard Snyder, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1954 
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“lopsided compromise”, v) “deadlock”, and vi) “fragmented symbolic action”.132 Herman argues 
that intensive cohesion among the revisionist decision makers increases the likelihood of 
fundamental shifts in foreign policy particularly when status quo is discredited by policy failures 
and crisis. 133 Alex George asserts that high levels of coordination and cohesion among the 
opposition groups may yield dramatic shifts in the original version of the revisionist policy.134  
According to Alex George, redirection of the foreign policy is more likely during times 
of sociopolitical instability and crisis, whereas the status quo is more likely to prevail in highly 
institutionalized stable environments.135 For Graham Allison, “dramatic change occurs usually in 
response to major disasters. Confronted with an undeniable failure of procedures and repertoires, 
authorities outside the organization demand change, existing personnel are less resistant to 
change and key members of the organization are replaced by individuals committed to 
change”.136 Charles Herman concurs that turbulent change is more likely when large segments of 
the society are discontented with the existing paradigms. 137 
In this model, foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics and changes in both 
realms can be mutually reinforcing.138 This model posits that “political processes do not operate 
independently, but rather are important to the extent that they condition the impact of the broader 
                                                      
132 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990 
133 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990 
134 Alex George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice,  
Westview Press Boulder, CO, 2000, ———, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The 
Need for Policy Legitimacy," Change in the international system  (1980), ———, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy 
in Making Foreign Policy," The American Political Science Review  (1972). 
135 ibid 
136 Graham Allison, "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis." (p.85) 
137 Charles Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy.", ———, Charles 
F. Hermann, "Avoiding Pathologies in Foreign Policy Decision Groups," Diplomacy, Force and Leadership: Essays 
in Honor of Alexander L. George, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993 
138  Joe D. Hagan and Jerel A. Rosati, "Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy Restructuring," in Jerel A. 
Rosati , Joe D. Hagan and Martin W. Samptson, (eds), Foreign policy restructuring: how governments respond to 
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domestic and international sources of foreign policy change”.139 For them, shifts in the 
international system and foreign policy realignment may propel significant changes in domestic 
politics as well as transform the organizational structures and the roles of key foreign policy 
makers. On the flipside, radical changes in distribution of power and influence among 
contending institutions may shift the orientation of foreign policy. The power shift in domestic 
politics is more acute after the revolutions and turbulent victories of opponent political 
paradigms.140 
 
2.2.3. IDENTITY BASED AND ASPIRATIONAL APPROACHES  
 
2.2.3.1. Identity and foreing policy change  
 
According to the identity based approach, actions of foreign policy actors are not driven by 
rational calculations of power and interest; instead, the leaders behave in accordance with 
national/political identities that are constructed by deeper norms and shared beliefs. In other 
words, identity- rather than the material capabilities or distribution of power in international 
system - define interests. Identity is socially constructed and can be fueled by national history, 
cultures, norms, ideologies and intersubjective interactions. Identity may define the perceptions 
of enmity and amity among the states, as well as engagement in international conflicts. For 
instance, imperial identity to promote or protect the image of superpower may propel over 
engagement in international affairs. According to this approach, key actors and institutions may 
promote and advocate divergent identities in a competitive setting. Ultimate form of national 
identity is the upshot of constant bargaining and compromising among various groups.   
                                                      
139 Ibid, p.272 
140 Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International 
Studies Quarterly , 3-21, 1990 
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According to this model, the restructuring of foreign policy is impelled by shifts in 
national and political identities. States realign in the international system when prevailing 
identities are overthrown by revisionist images. Rise of new identities may be fueled by 
historical episodes, ideologies, international crisis or major disappointments with the status quo. 
Rising identities undergo tests of historical, social, cultural appropriateness before accomplishing 
preponderance. This model claims that states develop alliances with other states that share 
similar identities.  
Theoretical foundations of the identity based approach were laid out by the constructivist 
school of foreign policy that challenged the materialistic precepts of realist and institutionalist 
paradigms. According to this school, material calculations of power and interest are not the 
principal drives of foreign policy conduct. Instead, intersubjectively constructed identities, norms 
and aspirations define how individuals and states interpret the concepts of power and interest.141 
In What makes the World Hang Together, John Ruggie concurs that the countries with similar 
cultures (i.e U.S. and UK) are less likely to be considered as threats, whereas countries with 
conflicting cultures, and political economic systems are more likely to be accounted as serious 
threats when they obtain non-conventional weapons capabilities (i.e. Iran, Iraq, North Korea). 142 
For Peter Katzenstein, alertness and preparedness of the military forces will depend on the 
images and identities of the confronting states.143 For example, the United States welcomed the 
nuclear proliferation in Britain but it strongly rejected the nuclear proliferation efforts in North 
Korea, Libya, Iran and Iraq because of contrasting identities. Friedrich Kratochwil argues that 
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the American government’s intervention in Vietnam and delayed withdrawal was highly related 
to U.S. identity as a superpower.144 By overseas military engagement the U.S. reproduced its 
own identity of great power, as well as the image that gave meaning to its action.  
 
2.2.3.1. Aspirations and foreing policy change  
 
Aspirational approach claims that foreign policy change is driven by the shift of aspirations 
among the ruling elites. A contemporary investigation of the aspirations model was conducted by 
Anne Clunan, who investigated “Russia’s Resurgence” under Putin’s rule.145 She examined the 
role of aspirations in foreign policy that stem from “the need to maintain positive self esteem or 
improve negative self esteem” (p.10).146 For Clunan, aspirations can lay out the underpinnings of 
national interests and frame governmental efforts to increase national self esteem. She argues 
that national self esteem is promoted by national self images that are “sets of ideas about the 
country’s political purpose and international status.” 147 Clunan notes that the governments often 
deploy “management strategies” to stimulate the national self esteem and certain aspirations. 
However, in many cases, there is no broad consensus among the governing elites on the 
appropriate type of aspirations to be promoted. The political elites may propose competing 
models of aspirations. Some of them can make references to historical achievements while others 
may have greater proclivity to ideological or religious aspirations.  According to Telhami and 
Barnett, political aspirations that are more relevant to the socioeconomic and historical context 
                                                      
144 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge University  Press, New York, 1989 
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147 Ibid p.10 
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are more likely to prevail in a competitive setting.148 Similarly, Anne Clunan suggests that 
history, culture and identity are strong indicators of the national aspirations. Clunan notes that 
“once a majority of political elites are persuaded of the correspondence among a national self-
image, historical aspirations, and reality, that self image becomes dominant and defines national 
interests…it becomes a national identity on which a collectively valid social order can be 
built.”149  She uses history and efficacy tests to predict whether certain political identities will 
prevail (see figure 2.4). The history test measures whether the political identity match up with 
the historical experiences and aspirations. Efficacy tests measure the extent to which certain 
political images are realistic and appropriate to deal with contemporary issues. Clunan notes that 
“a national image that passes both history and efficiency tests should dominate the competitors. 
National self-images that are congruent with shared historical aspirations should appear more 
legitimate to political elites.”150 
According to this model, foreign policy shifts in two situations; i) when aspirations of the 
ruling elites undergo substantial change, ii) when another political group with different 
aspirations assume power in national government. The incumbent governments forge three 
strategies to preserve the dominant aspirations; i) “mobility”, ii) “competition” and iii) 
“creativity”.151 Strategies of mobility are designed to increase the intensity of behavioral 
orientations among the people who share the dominant aspirations. Competition strategies, on the 
other hand, project contending programs and policies against the rising alternative images. The 
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strategies of creativity include revision of the political aspirations in line with the new economic, 
political and military developments in international politics.  
Figure 2.4: Anne Clunan’s model for domination of self images (p.39) 
 
 
All of the above mentioned models have made significant contributions to 
systematization of foreign policy change. Particularly parsimonious works of Richard Snyder152  
and Graham Allison153  achieved significant breakthroughs in redirecting the focus from 
systemic analysis to interactions among policy makers. Foreign policy analysts began to delve 
into the black box of state machinery rather than presuming the state as a unitary rational actor. 
However, all of these foreign policy analysis models have various weaknesses. First, the 
structural models in particular paid too much attention to inertia and static factors, but failed to 
comprehend the shifting dynamics of decision making in international and domestic 
                                                      
152 Richard Snyder, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1954 
153 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. LXIII, NO.3, 1969; Graham Allison, Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little, 
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environment. The second drawback of these models was their inability to combine the structural 
and domestic variables in change models. Kenneth Waltz’s154 three images and Graham 
Allison’s155  conceptual models combined three levels of static analysis, but later studies failed to 
adopt these models into study of foreign policy change. Third, some of these models (i.e Rosati’s 
model) over-generalized the patterns of behaviors and became inapplicable to idiosyncratic 
events in foreign affairs. On the flipside, some other models (i.e. Holsti’s analytic frameworks) 
failed to produce generalizable assumptions about what motivates states to reorient their foreign 
policies. Fourth, foreign policy change models are predominantly applied to the United States. 
There are only limited numbers of case studies that test the validity of these assumptions in other 
countries. Ultimately, these models disregarded the ideational, aspirational and cultural motives 
of change. Many of these models were developed before the upsurge of the constructivist school 
in international politics. Eventually, study of ideas, cultures, norms and aspirations became a 
main pillar of the study of foreign policy but none of these issues are reflected in the models of 
foreign policy change. Thus, the need for more comprehensive analytical frameworks became 
evident as the existing models failed to catch up with the dynamics of foreign policy practice.   
 
2.3. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITY APPROACH TO THE CHANGE 
IN TURKISH FOREING POLICY    
 
This dissertation adopts a modified/qualified security approach to investigate the underlying 
causes of intergovernmental rapprochement between Iran and Turkey. Security approach has 
been adopted, because the most dramatic change in Turkish Iranian relations are observed in 
                                                      
154 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959 
155 Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. LXIII, NO.3, 1969  
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three security fields; counterterrorism, nuclear security and energy security. Assumptions of the 
security approach provide the best framework in investigaton of the ongoing three dimensional 
security partnerships between Ankara and Tehran. “Why” questions in foreign policy analysis 
require that we probe the governmental decision making process that takes into account “spheres 
of competence of the actors involved, the flow of communication and information and 
motivations of the various players”.156 This study seeks to answer why the Erdogan 
Administration forged a three-tiered security partnership with Iran, and seeks to understand the 
perceptions of key actors in the state machinery. Fundamental tenets of the security approach 
have been drawn from precepts of the realist paradigm in international politics. However, 
contrary to the mainstream realist approaches, the security model adopted here does not assume 
the state is a unitary actor. Instead, this study draws elements of Graham Allison’s analytic 
framework157 and proposes that security policy is the outcome of constant bargaining among the 
major government elites in the National Security Council.  
This model acknowledges that Turkey’s grand strategy and alignment in the international 
system is not unilaterally determined by the chief executive. Instead, as in most democratic 
countries, it is shaped by constant pulling and hauling among six major types of actors: i) the 
President, ii) Prime Minister, iii) Council of Ministers, iv, leaders of security institutions, v) 
bureaucratic leaders v) military leaders, and vi) opposition parties. These actors function under 
the scrutiny of the parliament (TBMM), media, civil society organizations and the citizenry.  
This approach concedes that key actors’ policy preferences may be fundamentally different from 
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each other owing to divergent views, professional experiences, political and institutional 
affiliations, ideology and aspirations.  
Traditionally, Turkish presidents had only symbolic power and function in foreign 
affairs. Even though the Law on National Security (1983) increased the responsibilities of the 
president as the chairman of the National Security Council, the President remains a largely 
symbolic figure in the practice of foreign affairs.158 The Turkish Prime Minister is the most 
important actor in the foreign policy decision making process. He not only commands the 
executive branch but also exerts powerful influence on the legislative branch. As the chairman of 
the largest party group in parliament, the Prime Minister’s views are often ratified by the Turkish 
Grand Assembly (TBMM). Prime Ministers have the authority to appoint ministers, 
organizational leaders and military commanders. Even though the Prime Minister does not 
appoint the president, he/she plays a defining role in the presidential election process.159 
The Prime Minister is assisted by the cabinet members and organizational leaders in 
practice of foreign affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs runs day to day bureaucratic 
operations of Turkish foreign policy. The Foreign Minister advises the Prime Minister and 
supervises the implementation of the recommendations of the Council of Ministers and National 
Security Council. The Ministry of Energy is the principal actor in energy security and pipeline 
politics. It coordinates the operations of state energy companies and institutions such as the 
General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs (PIGM), the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), 
and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). The Prime Minister is also assisted by the 
National Intelligence Agency (MIT), Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and General Directorate of 
                                                      
158 Osman Metin Öztürk, Ordu Ve Politika, Gündogan Yaynlari, Istanbul, 1993 
159 The presidents of Turkey have been elected by the parliament until 2007. The constitutional amendments in 2007 
abolished parliamentary voting and adopted popular voting but the existing president was elected by the parliament 
before the constitutional amendments. President Gul had been the deputy of current Prime Minister Erdogan 
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Security (EGM) in security related issues. These agencies provide necessary 
information/intelligence to the Prime Minister, President and the National Security Council. 
Turkish Parliament (TBMM) is not a principal actor in day-to-day operations of foreign affairs. 
The parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee functions as an advisory board to the prime 
minister. The committee presents draft legislation and proposals on behalf of the parliament. 
According to the article 92 of the Turkish Constitution, deployment of troops outside Turkey and 
authority to station foreign troops in the Turkish homeland is subject to parliamentary 
approval.160 
Figure 2.5: Key foreign and security policy makers in Turkey 
 
The National Security Council (MGK) had been the highest board of decision making in 
Turkish foreign policy. According to the Law on National Security Council (1983), the MGK is 
                                                      
160 See Turkish constitution 
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comprised of the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Minister of Interior, 
Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Justice, Chief of General Staff and 
Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie.161 When necessary the Director 
General of Security (Chief of Turkish National Police) and the Director of the National 
Intelligence Agency are invited to discuss relevant matters.162  
 
2.3.1. Operationalization of the security approach  
 
Turkish-Iranian security cooperation mainly takes place in three policy areas: counterterrorism, 
nuclear proliferation and energy security. The security model will be operationalized under three 
categories because judgments of foreign policy elites might be entirely different in each policy 
area. Moreover, key foreign policy actors change according to the policy area and decision 
making takes place in a different setting. This study is designed to explore judgments of the key 
foreign policy actors in each policy area. It will counterpose the threat perceptions and major 
arguments of the pro-status quo and revisionist elites. 
 During the operationalization process, my integrated security model projects more 
specific questions to clarify the vague aspects of Turkey’s rapprochement processes in the three 
policy areas since 2003, when the change in foreign policy began to emerge. Why did the 
Erdogan Administration shift the policy? What are the main concerns, preferences, political 
affiliations and aspirations of the key policy makers? What are the arguments of the pro-status 
quo actors? What are the arguments of the revisionist actors? Why did the revisionist camp 
                                                      
161 MGK ve MGK Genel Sekreterliği Kanunu, (The Law on National Security Council and Secretariat No: 2945, 
November, 11, 198 
162 Until the 2003 amendment in the Law on National Security Council and the Secretariat, the Secretary General of 
the MGK had been military officials. Since the Prime Minister and the President appoints civilian Secretary 
Generals.  
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prevail in intergovernmental relations with Iran? To what extent does the ongoing partnership 
indicates a realignment by Turkey.  
Figure 2.6: Analytical framework for investigation security rapprochement  
 
2.3.1.1. Counterterrorism dimension  
 
The core argument of this approach is that states reformulate alliance strategies to respond to 
shifting external security threats. The demise of strategic nuclear rivalry and upsurge of non-state 
security threats such as terrorism and ethnic separatism compel a shift in traditional partnership 
patterns. In other words, rather than further commitments to strategic alliances, states look for 
practical partnerships to overcome regional security challenges. According to this approach, the 
shift in Turkey’s alignment is driven by the shift in the balance of threats in the external security 
environment. The main argument is that the threats posed by Soviet power have been replaced by 
Kurdish separatism as the principal national security concern. Therefore, Turkey seeks new 
pragmatic alliances to eliminate Kurdish separatism and preserve the regional status. This sub-
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model seeks to answer the following sub questions: How did the key security actors conceive 
major shifts in the external security environment? How do they respond to resurgence of the 
PKK/PJAK threat? Do the foreign policy elites believe that former strategic alliances are 
sufficient to overcome emerging regional security threats, particularly after the U.S. occupation 
of Iraq? What are the new partnership proposals to neutralize micronationalist Kurdish 
independence movements? Why policy makers chose Iran as an ally against PKK/PJAK 
terrorism in post Iraq invasion security landscape? Who are the proponents of counterterrorism 
rapprochement with Iran and what are their arguments? Who are the opponents and what are 
their arguments? What are the implications of the new partnership policy for Turkey’s alignment 
in the international system?  
 
2.3.1.2. Nuclear proliferation dimension 
 
The core argument of this approach is that the states balance against emerging nuclear powers 
because the spread of nuclear weapons radically shifts the balances of threat. Emergence of new 
nuclear states shifts the regional patterns of alliances as non-nuclear neighbors tend to coalesce 
against asymmetric nuclear threats. In conventional wisdom, the Erdogan Administration is 
expected to balance against Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons. However, it supports Iran’s 
nuclear program and opposes international sanctions against Iran. The Administration’s posture 
tends to undermine Turkey’s traditional alliance patterns, as well as the containment policies of 
the U.S. and Israel, Turkey’s longtime strategic partners. This study investigates the underlying 
reasons of this phenomenon and analyzes the perceptions of key foreign policy actors in the 
Erdogan Administration. It seeks to answer the following questions. How does the Turkish 
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government perceive the Iranian nuclear program? Why did Turkey choose not to bandwagon 
with American-Israeli containment of nuclear Iran? What are the arguments of the proponents 
and opponents of Turkey’s foreign policy in this area?  
2.3.1.3. Energy security dimension 
 
The core argument of this approach is that the states seek alternative suppliers to reduce 
vulnerability to major supply disruptions and use of energy as a coercion mechanism in foreign 
policy. According to this approach, the Turkish government developed an energy partnership 
with Iran to reduce dependency on its major energy suppliers, Russia and Iraq. In so doing, the 
Erdogan Administration sought to diversify energy suppliers and reduce vulnerability to major 
disruptions. The disruptions can be driven by four factors; i) technical problems and 
malfunctioning of the transportation infrastructures, ii) sudden increase in prices, iii) use of 
hydrocarbon resources as a coercive mechanism in foreign policy, and iv) wars and internal 
strife. This study seeks to answer the following questions in order to understand the underlying 
reasons of the energy partnership with Iran: What is the level of annual hydrocarbon 
consumption in Turkey? To what extent has Turkey been dependent on Russian and Iraqi energy 
resources? What are the alternatives to reduce dependency on these two major energy suppliers? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives? Why has Iran emerged as the 
most viable alternative? What are the stances of key energy actors in the Turkish government 
and bureaucracy? What are the arguments of proponents and opponents of the energy deals with 
Iran? Why did Turkey disregard American and Israeli demands to terminate its energy 
partnership with Iran?  
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2.3.1.4. Is rapprochement with Iran an indicator of Turkey’s realignment?  
   
Through three dimensional probing this study seeks to explore whether Turkey’s security 
partnership with Iran is an indicator of realignment towards the Islamic world. Concomitantly, it 
seeks to uncover if Turkey’s entente with Iran is driven by Islamic identity or by practical 
national interests. In order to provide a penetrating view on the issue this study seeks to answer 
the following sub questions. Do key actors in Erdogan Administration follow practical rational 
interests in counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy security policies? Do the Islamic 
identity and aspirations of these actors play any role in intergovernmental rapprochement with 
Iran? To what extent has Turkey been satisfied by the traditional alliance with the West? Does 
rapprochement with Iran develop at the expense of Turkey’s relationship with the West? What is 
the place of Iran in the new grand strategy of Turkey? Does the Erdogan Administration forge 
similar partnerships with other countries? If yes, what are the common characteristics of these 
countries? What other factors play a role in Turkey’s new posture in international politics? 
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CHAPTER 3   
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PARTNERSHIP ON COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
Iran’s posture towards the PKK163 terror organization has been the principal barometer of 
Turkish-Iranian relations. The previous Turkish governments had low profile security relations 
with the post revolutionary Iran due to several conflicts, primarily the harboring of terrorism 
against each other. On the one hand, the Iranians accused Turkish governments of supporting the 
Mujahid Al-Khalq and other regime opponents; on the other, Turkey accused Iran of supporting 
the Turkish Hezbollah (THB) and the PKK. Iran was perceived as the principal external threat by 
the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) during the 1990s. In particular, the military wing 
in the MGK often argued that Iranian officials trained and equipped PKK militants. Even though 
both sides rejected these claims, Turkey and Iran remained at loggerheads until the Erdogan 
Administration came to power in 2002.  
                                                      
163 The Partiya Karekeren Kurdistan (PKK), is a separatist terror organization which was established in 1978 in 
Diyarabakir Province of Turkey. Its terror operations began in 1984 and gradually increased until mid 1990s. 
According to the vast majority of Turkish terror experts, ideological basis of PKK was formed in 1974, when 
Abdullah Ocalan was a student of Political Science in Ankara University. Ocalan participated in the leftist 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army and involved in the activities of Revolutionary Youth organization. 
However, instead of liberating the Turkish proletarian class, he believed in the liberation of ethnic Kurdish groups. 
The leaders of PKK represented themselves as the “savior” of the Kurdish ethnic minority in Turkey, which are 
alllegedly discriminated from major privileges of a nation. It embraced a Marxist-Leninist ideology, Stalinist 
leadership paradigms and Maoist strategy for the conquest of power. The organization is responsible for killing of 
over 35,000 Turkish citizens that includes Kurdish peasants, soldiers, police officers, village guards, doctors, 
teachers, and civil servants. The enrollment policy of PKK is significantly different from Al-Qaida or Hezbollah 
which recruits qualified and voluntary members to the organization. On the contrary the basic enrolment policies of 
PKK rely on abduction of male and female teenagers especially from the southeastern Turkey. The abducted 
individuals are forcefully taken to the training camps in Syria and Northern Iraq. Death is certain for the militant 
candidates who try to escape from training camps.  The PKK was re-named KADEK in 2002 and KONGRA-GEL in 
2005. The organization is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States, European Union and many 
other states in the World, as well as multilateral security institutions such as NATO, INTERPOL and EUROPOL. 
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During the Erdogan Administration, however, Ankara and Tehran entered into an 
unprecedented counterterrorism partnership (See figure 3.1). The Turkish and Iranian 
governments signed successive security and counterterrorism cooperation agreements in 2004, 
2006 and 2009. These agreements allow enhanced exchange of intelligence and joint operations 
against the PKK and its subordinate network PJAK. Particularly after 2003, Iranian authorities 
mounted numerous operations against the PKK/PJAK strongholds in both Iran and Iraq. The 
traditional intransigent resistance of secularist Turkish elites against collaboration with Iran 
gradually disappeared after 2003 and there has been a consensus within the state's foreign policy 
machinery. In parallel with the resentment at U.S. policies in Iraq, Turkish security elites began 
to appreciate Iran’s value in counterterrorism and regional security policy. Iran’s new posture 
against the PKK is highly appreciated both by the higher echelons of the Erdogan administration 
and the predominant majority of Turkish society. 
 
Figure 3.1: The shift of security relations: Turkey-Iran 
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investigations revealed that this security approach has been a useful framework in understanding 
the foreign policy changes in Turkey. The existing literature mostly asserted that resurgence of 
the PKK and convergence of the security interests laid out the grounds for counterterrorism 
partnership between Ankara and Tehran. My field research confirmed these projections, and 
identified seven additional factors that motivated the key Turkish security actors to forge a 
counterterrorism partnership with the Iranian government ; i) unsatisfactory U.S. cooperation 
against the PKK, ii) Various crises between Washington and Ankara, iv) Iran’s concerted efforts 
against the PKK, v) Iran’s effective public diplomacy, vi) shifting threat perceptions of key 
foreign policy makers, vii) legitimization of relations with Iran, and ix) consensus among the key 
foreign policy actors. After presenting the predominant views among the elites, arguments of the 
critics will be laid out at the end of the chapter.   
 
Figure 3.2: The factors of counterterrorism cooperation between Iran and Turkey 
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3.1. Resurgence of the PKK terrorism after the Iraq War 
 
The PKK had been dormant since the incarceration of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999. Many security 
analysts projected that the leaderless PKK would soon dissolve due to waning state sponsorship 
and weakening leadership. The remnants of the PKK were expelled from Syria and the existing 
PKK cells in northern Iraq were put under sutained pressure by Turkish security forces. 
However, the U.S occupation of Iraq created new safe havens for PKK militants in mountainous 
terrains of Northern Iraq.164 The PKK exploited these camps as a launching pad and intensified 
attacks against key targets in Turkey. In 2003, the PKK began to assault more sensational targets 
such as crowded shopping malls and tourist resorts that would instigate the utmost fear in 
Turkish society. Statements of government executives, counter terrorism experts and government 
statistics clearly indicate that the PKK’s armed campaign surged dramatically after the 2003. On 
numerous occasions Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed 
Forces and the Director General of Security emphasized on the increase in terror attacks since 
2003. This fact is also voiced by prominent Turkish counterterrorism analysts. For instance, 
Ihsan Bal, director of Terrorism Research Center at the International Strategic Research 
Organization (USAK), highlighted that “The PKK attacks have been on constant increase since 
the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The terror attacks peaked by summer 2006.”165 Moreover, 
institutional statistics of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ministy of Interior and General Directorate 
of Security confirms the statements of the governing elites and analysts. As seen in Figure 3.3, 
statistics of the General Directorate of Security (EGM) clearly demonstrates the rising trend of 
PKK attacks after 2003. 
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165 Ihsan Bal,“Turkiye Iran Iliskilerinde Talabani Faktoru”, Usak Stratejik Gundem, November 13, 2007.  
62 
 
             Figure 3.3: Number of PKK attacks against Turkish targets  
 
Source: General Directorate of Security, Counter Terrorism Statistics, 2009 
 
As Ambassador Faruk Laloglu put it, the resurgence of the PKK’s armed campaign 
escalated governmental and societal sensitivity to the costs of the prolonged terror campaign 
since 1984.166 These costs can be summarized in several pillars. First, the PKK's armed 
campaign resulted in nearly 35,000 deaths throughout Turkish society; including civil servants, 
military and law enforcement officers, teachers, doctors, businessman, village guards and 
indigenous Kurdish citizens. 167 Second, economic costs of the counterterrorism operations since 
1984 exceeded $200 billion.168 Owing to the prolonged terror campaign, the Southeastern 
Anatolia region remained relatively underdeveloped. According to the 2006 report of the Turkish 
Institute for statistics, the GDP per capita in the Marmara district is over $16,000 but it remains 
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around $5,000 in the regions that were intensively exposed to terrorism. 169 Third, the PKK 
remains the single most important threat to territorial integrity of the state as it claims vast 
portions of Southeastern Anatolia. Fourth, the prolonged counterterrorism campaign boosted 
military power projection in domestic politics. In Southeast Anatolia, the government structure 
resembled a “garrison state”, under the OHAL Marshall Law (1987-2002).170 This phenomenon 
inhibited democratization of Turkey's sociopolitical domain at least for two decades.  
Given these concerns, the Erdogan Administration put forth concerted efforts to eliminate 
the remnants of the PKK organization. Murat Mercan, the Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign 
Relations Committee, asserted that the resurgence of the PKK put the Erdogan administration 
under enormous public pressure.171 Prime Minister Erdogan emphasized that the “Kurdish 
Problem” and the PKK had become Turkey’s most important agenda in domestic politics, as well 
as the foreign policy of the AKP government.172 Concomitantly, the PKK reasserted itself as the 
principal issue in National Security Council meetings. The state's security apparatus became 
quite sensitive towards resurgence of the PKK attacks, because the prolonged terror campaign 
undermined public trust in governmental institutions. 173 The key security institutions, Turkish 
Armed Forces, General Directorate of Security and National Intelligence Agency, re-committed 
themselves to combating the resurgent terrorism problem.174  
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The common perception of Turkey’s governing elites was that the U.S. intervention into 
Northern Iraq created a safe haven for the survival and flourishing of the PKK.175 Key actors in 
the Erdogan Administration expressed their resentment at this in various venues. Ali Babacan, 
the former Foreign Minister (2007- 2009) noted that “Northern Iraq has become a terror base. 
We will not just watch the terror attacks that are launched from there. 176 Yasar Buyukanit, the 
Former Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (2006-2008), noted that “The War in Iraq 
allowed positioning of PKK camps in Northern Iraq. The PKK uses these camps as a launching 
pad in its attacks against Turkey. The camps in Iraq serve as principal venues of logistics, 
training and financing. The PKK coordinates its smuggling activities from these camps.”177 
Similar threat assessments have been projected by predominant portion of the author’s 
interviewees from the security apparatus of the government. According to Celalettin Yavuz, a 
retired military officer and security strategist at the TURKSAM178, “The PKK was almost 
neutralized after the capture of Ocalan in 1999. However, the U.S. occupation of Iraq provided a 
safe haven and the PKK has revived due to protection and logistical support”179 Yavuz 
maintained that “Every American intervention in this region is making things worse. Foreign 
intervention is the principal catalyst of ethnic and sectarian terrorism. We are the ones that suffer 
from the aftereffects of their catastrophic mistakes.”180  
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3.2. Unsatisfactory cooperation of the U.S. forces in Iraq 
 
Subsequent to various sensational PKK attacks in the post-Iraq War period, the Erdogan 
administration demanded that the Bush Administration take rapid action against stationing of 
PKK camps in Northern Iraq. Turkish authorities including the President,  Prime Minister, 
military officials, the Director General of Security and various diplomats reiterated this demand. 
Even though the Bush Administration made bold promises, the U.S. forces in Iraq preserved 
their non-cooperative posture against the PKK until 2007.181 My field research reveals that a 
major reason that Turkey forged a counterterrorism partnership with Iran was the disappointment 
with the U.S. posture in counterterrorism policy. Almost all of the author’s interviewees and 
many other key government officials maintained that U.S. inaction against the PKK camps in 
northern Iraq radically shifted the Erdogan Administration’s alliance strategy against the 
terrorism threat that is the principal issue in Turkey’s National Security Strategy. The shift of 
policy has been supported by almost all echelons of bureaucratic institutions, the military, civil 
society organizations and Turkish society in general.182  
Turkish foreign policy makers became convinced that the U.S. occupation forces would 
not assist in counterterror efforts against the PKK. The resentment of the Turkish government is 
very evident in the public statements of key actors in the Erdogan Administration who are also 
the principal decision makers in the National Security Council. Prime Minister Erdogan himself 
has been highly critical of the U.S. failure to cooperate against the PKK.  Erdogan noted that 
“The Turkish government is gradually losing patience as America continues to avoid military 
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action against the Kurdish terrorists who are presently based in Northern Iraq”. 183 General Ilker 
Basbug, the Chief of Staff in the Turkish Armed Forces highlighted that the Turkish state has no 
patience left for inaction on the part of the U.S. occupation forces against the PKK.184 He 
maintained that “The Americans should understand and see that it is not time for words but 
action.”185 In June of 2008, General Basbug announced that Turkey and Iran has forged a 
counterterrorism alliance against the mutual threats of the PKK and PJAK. 186 On several 
occasions General Basbug clearly asserted the shift of partnership preferences of the Turkish 
Armed Forces in counterterrorism policy.  
Many of the interviewees shared a similar perspective with the public statements of the 
MGK members. Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, who currently serves in the advisory board of the 
Foreign Minister, highlighted that “We could not receive the desired support neither from the 
Americans, nor from the Europeans. It is quite natural that we are cooperating with our 
neighbors who are exposed to the same threat… We are thinking practically not 
ideologically.”187 Another interviewee Celalettin Yavuz maintained that, “Americans have never 
been sincere in fighting against the PKK. They have done some minor things, but they neither 
gave actionable intelligence nor did they attack the PKK strongholds around the Qandil.”188 
Ihsan Bal, a prominent Turkish counterterrorism expert noted that “Turkey was punished by the 
neo-conservative elements of the Bush Administration for not providing the military assistance 
prior to Iraq War…Therefore, the PKK terror organization has been persistently ignored by the 
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U.S. since 2003.”189 According to Nasuh Uslu, a senior foreign policy analysts in Turkey, 
“Americans never really care about Turkish security interests. Since 1990 everything they have 
done undermined Turkey’s national interests. The non-fly zone in Iraq, Operation Poised 
Hammer, dual containment of Iraq and Iran, revival of the PKK and ultimately occupation of 
Iraq inflicted serious damages on Turkish national interests.”190  Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, Chair of 
Iran Studies at the International Strategic Research Organization highlighted that “Turkey waited 
for a long time expecting that Americans would destroy the terror camps. We waited and waited. 
There was no real response, no real action.”191 These statements clearly indicate the intensity of 
resentment among Turkish elites towards the U.S. non cooperation against the PKK.  
Prior to the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Turkish security forces conducted frequent 
incursions into Northern Iraq to dismantle PKK enclaves. In some of these incursions the 
Turkish Armed Forces deployed 35,000 troops to destroy the remnants of the PKK.192 Even 
though these incursions could not inflict much damage on ultra-mobile PKK cells, they 
prevented the buildup of PKK forces across Turkish territories. During the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq, however, the existence of the U.S forces in northern Iraq inhibited Turkish incursions into 
the Iraqi territories. High ranking American officials, including President Bush objected to a 
Turkish invasion of northern Iraq on the grounds that it would destabilize the only stable part of 
Iraq.193 Moreover, several U.S. government officials such as General Petreus and Governor Paul 
Bremer maintained that the PKK was not a priority for the occupation forces that have been 
overly engaged with combating insurgents and sectarian violence.  
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The U.S. inaction against the PKK exacerbated existing anti-Americanism in Turkish 
society and among government officials. Many public surveys indicated that the sympathy 
towards the U.S. deteriorated to historically low levels. By 2010, a predominant majority of the 
Turks, regardless of their political affiliation, perceived the U.S. as the principal threat to 
national security.194 Ihsan Bal, a terrorism analyst in Turkey, highlighted that “U.S. inaction 
against the PKK has been the primary reason for increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey.”195 
Some of my interviewees noted that growing anti-Americanism coincided with growing 
sympathy to Iran. As Bayram Sinkaya put it, this sympathy is not driven by admiration of Iran’s 
fundamentalist regime, but it is boosted by Iran’s enhanced counterterrorism campaign against 
the PKK/PJAK enclaves. 196 
Many of the officials and analysts that I interviewed emphasized that the U.S. failure to 
cooperate against the PKK is the “principal driver” of the Turkish-Iranian counterterrorism 
partnership. According to Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, a senior Middle East Analyst at USAK, “The 
U.S. refusal to act against the PKK is a key motivator of Turkish-Iranian counterterrorism 
cooperation. Americans promised to eliminate the terror camps in Northern Iraq. However, the 
reverse has occurred. The PKK regained its strength thanks to American protection and 
assistance. Seizure of numerous American weapons at the hands of the PKK is a clear indicator 
of this.”197 A former military officer and analyst Celalettin Yavuz asserted that “American 
reluctance to cooperate against the PKK is a principal drive of Turkish-Iranian security 
rapprochement. This is quite natural… There are CIA agents in the PKK. Barzani has organic 
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ties with the PKK, even he provides a safe haven for the PKK operatives.”198 Nasuh Uslu, a 
prominent foreign policy analyst in Turkey, argued that the U.S. non-cooperation against the 
PKK has laid out the grounds for the ongoing partnership between Turkey and Iran. Uslu noted 
that, “If the Americans had been cooperative and if they had not instigated ethno-sectarian 
violence in Iraq we might not need security partnership with Iran.” 199 
Apart from the US position, the reluctance of the Iraqi government to cooperate against 
the PKK has been another pivotal incentive for the Turkish foreign policy makers to forge closer 
ties with Iran.200 In the post intervention period, the Turkish government frequently demanded 
the eradication of PKK operatives in Northern Iraq. In bilateral meetings Turkish governments 
provided necessary intelligence and the coordinates of the PKK camps, but the Iraqi government 
remained inactive.201 Ironically, Iraqi officials argued that they could not find the PKK camps in 
northern Iraq. But these camps were too easily found by numerous Western journalists who had 
never been to Iraq before. For instance, American Journalist Reese Erlich confirmed that “The 
Iraqi government says that they can’t possibly stop these people because they are so high up in 
the remote mountains. They claim that they don’t even know where they are located…Well, with 
two cell phones calls I set up an interview with the head guy of PJAK…Everybody in town 
knows where these PJAK camps are except the Iraqi government.202 Ali Babacan, then Turkish 
Foreign Minister responded that “If the journalists are able to find the camps, then you [Iraqi 
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government] can certainly find them too.”203 It was evident that almost none of the key foreign 
policy makers believed the statements of Iraqi officials. The mistrust towards the American 
occupation forces, the Iraqi government, the KDP and the PUK boosted  the search for 
alternative cooperative initiatives by the Turkey’s foreign policy machinery. In this context, Iran 
emerged as a more reliable partner in combating the PKK.  
3.3. Various crises between Washington and Ankara 
 
In the post Iraq occupation security landscape, the interrelationship between Ankara and 
Washington has undergone several crises that undermined the Erdogan Administration’s reliance 
on American occupation forces. Almost all the interviewees asserted that a chain of crises has 
been sparked by the March Resolution of 2003 (Mart Tezkeresi) that was a defining moment in 
Turkish-American relations. Most believe that the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the transfer 
of American troops overland through Turkish territories prompted a payback from the American 
government. The March Resolution was followed by three other crises; i) the bag incident, ii) the 
unraveling of the US-PJAK connection, and iii) redrawing of the regional map by Pentagon 
officials. My field research indicates that these crises undermined the intergovernmental trust 
between the Erdogan and Bush administrations. They consolidated the belief among the Turkish 
government officials that the U.S. was not a reliable partner against the PKK terror threat.  
3.3.1. March resolution (Mart Tezkeresi)  
 
According to the Turkish Constitution, deployment of foreign troops in the Turkish homeland 
rests on a majority decision by the Turkish Parliament. Before the Iraq war, the Bush 
administration requested permission to transfer American troops and logistics through Turkish 
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territories. This would facilitate a northern front in the Iraq war, where Saddam’s control was 
weakest. On March 1, 2003, however, the Turkish parliament rejected deployment and transfer 
of American forces through Turkish territories. Despite strong encouragement of the AKP 
leaders, the parliamentary voting process resulted in the defeat of the pro-resolution camp.  The 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Movement Party, Democratic Turkey Party 
(DTP), Motherlands Party (ANAP) and True Path Party (DYP) strongly rejected Turkey’s 
contribution to a highly unpopular war. Public surveys indicated that around 95 percent of the 
Turkish community was against the U.S. attack against Iraq and Turkey’s support for such an 
initiative.204 In this context, parliamentary rejection of the March 1, 2003 resolution ushered in 
an era of mistrust between Turkey and the United States.205 
During my field research, many interviewees traced back the roots of bilateral crisis to 
the March resolution. Many of them perceived the U.S. inaction against the PKK as retaliation 
against this resolution. According to Kaan Dilek, a senior foreign policy analyst at the Institute 
of Strategic Thinking, “The March Resolution is a turning point in Turkish-American relations. 
American refusal to deal with the PKK is a payback for the Turkish government’s failure to 
cooperate with the occupation forces.”206 Serdar Erdurmaz, a retired military officer, noted that 
“After the 1 March resolution, Americans implemented the plan B which rested on collaboration 
of the Kurds. They gave many promises to Talabani and Barzani including an independent 
Kurdistan. Quite naturally they rejected our demands in countering the PKK.”207 Mehmet Sahin, 
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a foreign policy analyst at the Gazi University, argued that “After the 1 March Resolution the 
Americans kept Turkey out of the negotiation table. As a response Turkey created an alternative 
diplomatic venue with the neighbors of Iraq. Participants in the new diplomatic setting have been 
Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Saudi Arabian governments. After a while, this platform has 
become the most revered diplomatic initiative, whereas the American table has been 
overshadowed with crisis of legitimacy.”208 Sahin notes that the crisis after this resolution 
sparked regional security partnerships to counterbalance the external forces of instability, mainly 
the foreign occupiers of Iraq.209   
  
3.3.2. Bag incident (arrest of a Turkish Special Forces squad by American 
troops)  
 
Another crisis emerged between Ankara and Washington when U.S. occupation forces arrested a 
dozen troops from the Turkish Special Forces in Sulaimaniya/ Northern Iraq. The Turkish 
Special Forces were coordinating intelligence and monitoring Kurdish movements in Iraq. The 
United States was informed about the team’s activities, and the arrest was a shocking incident for 
the Turkish government. It is considered as another payback for the “Mart Tezkeresi”. Serdar 
Erdurmaz claimed that, “The Americans knew that we had Special Forces in northern Iraq but 
they arrested our military officials in an indecent manner. They implied that there is no place for 
Turkey in Northern Iraq. They expelled our forces. Then the Americans began to support the 
PKK and PJAK. Their logistical support facilitated survival of both organizations.”210 Mumtaz 
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Soysal, a former foreign minister noted that “The event was considered by many Turks to be the 
gravest crisis between Turkey and the United States since the establishment of their alliance, 
although the arrested Turkish officers were freed 48 hours after their capture. The damage was 
already done. The confidence between the two allies had been eroded.”211  
3.3.3. Redrawing the map of the Middle East  
 
After the U.S. occupied Iraq, Turkish foreign policy elites become increasingly sensitive to 
possible partition of Iraq which was seriously discussed among American foreign policy elites.  
Key actors in the Erdogan Administration believed that an autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq could 
provoke Kurdish separatism in Turkey and become an irredentist magnet for the Kurds of 
Southeast Anatolia. In this context, several American think tanks in Washington released a 
redrawn map of the Middle East that showing an independent Kurdistan not only in Iraq but also 
in Southeastern parts of Turkey.  
One of these maps was published in a book by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, Never 
Quit the Fight.212 This map was also demonstrated in his article “Blood Borders: How a better 
Middle East would look”, in the U.S. Armed Forces Journal (See table Figure 3.4). 213 Apart 
from this map, several other redrawn maps have been released by prominent Think Tanks in 
Washington. These maps found broad coverage in Turkish media. Many interviewees noted that 
these maps exacerbated the view held by Turkish intellectuals that the U.S. had a “secret agenda” 
to reshape the Middle East in line with its “neo-imperial” interests. 214 Many Turkish government 
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officials voiced deep resentment against redrawn maps that showed large Turkish territories 
under “Free Kurdistan”.  
 
Figure 3.4: The redrawn map of the Middle East by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters 
 
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3882 [accessed April 
24, 2010] 
 
Some interviewees noted that there had been deep suspicions in governmental sphere 
about the stated goals of the U.S. government in Iraq. In their view, even though the U.S. 
publicly declares that occupation forces are dedicated to territorial integrity of Iraq, there is a 
“secret campaign” to enhance the autonomy of the Kurds.215 The enhanced autonomy would 
eventually give way to an independent Kurdish state. For Example, Suleyman Ozeren, director of 
International Terrorism and Transnational Crime Research Center, highlighted that “The Kurds 
have become semi-autonomous after the U.S. occupation of Iraq. We are pretty sure that the 
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Americans are clandestinely laying out the basis for an independent Kurdish state.”216  For many 
interviewees, the Turkish state began to see Iran as a critical ally in countering the “secret 
agenda” of Washington and preserving the regional status quo.   
 
3.3.4. Revealing of the U.S.‐PJAK connection  
 
The degree of resentment in the Turkish governmental sphere peaked when high ranking security 
officials, including General Edip Baser and former Director of Intelligence Bulent Orakoglu, 
revealed the connections between American officials and PJAK operatives. Many government 
officials have been extremely irritated with the American logistical support to various Kurdish 
groups particularly the PJAK. Within the security machinery of the state, the common perception 
is that the revival of the PKK was facilitated by the fertile ground after the American occupation 
of Iraq. Even though the higher echelons of the Erdogan Administration preserved their 
diplomatic discourse, the lower echelons of the bureaucratic institutions, independent analysts, 
and retired officials (both high and low ranking) were extremely critical of the U.S. policies in 
Iraq and the disclosed PJAK connection.  
Turkey’s security elites see no difference between the PKK and PJAK, because the latter 
is a subcontractor to the former even if it aims to undermine Iranian national security. In their 
view, providing logistics to the PJAK means backing up the PKK, because they are coexistent 
twin networks. 217 From the beginning, it was evident that the PKK and PJAK have been sharing 
the terror camps, logistics, equipment and ideological documents.218 Even though U.S. support 
for the PJAK was crafted to undermine the stability of Iran, the Turkish elites perceived it as an 
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attempt to undermine Turkish territorial integrity, because it became evident that the PJAK 
operatives shared resources with the PKK militants who attend the same training camps.219 
In 2007, The General Directorate of Security (EGM) reported that 14,000 American 
weapons had been diverted to the PKK and PJAK since the beginning of the Iraq war.220 
According to the report, these weapons consisted of RPG rocket launchers, sniper rifles, pistols 
and MP-5 automatic rifles. In his speech at the Commission on Foreign Relations, Prime 
Minister Erdogan asserted that “There are American made tanks, artillery, and other heavy 
weapons in the PKK camps. We have seized many American weapons from the arrested 
terrorists. American authorities admitted this eventually.”221 The Bush Administration sent an 
investigation team of 20 experts consisting of FBI, CIA and Pentagon officials to discuss the 
issue with the Turkish authorities. The joint commission revealed that 190,000 American 
weapons had been lost since the beginning of the Iraq war, many of which ended at the hands of 
the PKK/PJAK operatives.222  Even though the American authorities denied providing weapons 
to the terrorists, the institutional report of the General Directorate of Security was more than 
enough to convince the politicians and the society about the U.S.-PJAK connection.  
Many government officials voiced lack of trust to U.S. policies in Iraq and argued that 
the United States has been funding the KDP, PUK and PEJAK, which are closely affiliated with 
the PKK terrorists. Edip Baser, a retired four star general who represented the Turkish side on 
Counterterrorism Coordination Initiative, highlighted that “We have uncovered that the United 
States is supplying logistics to the PKK…We gave a CD to the American military authorities. In 
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this CD, there were all the evidences of US-PKK connection. One picture for example, was 
screening an American logistics vehicle in a PKK camp. There was an important American 
military officer in this vehicle.”223 One retired security official noted that “We demanded that the 
Americans crack down on the Qandil camps. They have never done this. On the contrary they 
began delivering logistical support to the PKK militants at the same camp.”224 Dogan Gunes, the 
former Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, asserted “We have identified that the 
American helicopters were delivering logistics to the PKK operatives. I immediately ordered to 
shoot them down. I told this to the American General in charge. They gave up delivering those 
logistics to the PKK camps.”225 In one of his interviews, Bulent Orakoglu, a former Director of 
Intelligence, argued that the PKK was backed up by the United States and Israel which he named 
the “rogue states” in the Middle East. 226 
Throughout these interviews, I observed that the Turkish government officials and 
security analysts were exceedingly convinced that a U.S-PJAK connection existed. Celalettin 
Yavuz, a retired high ranking military officer, noted that “Support of the PJAK means support of 
the PKK. They are training and sheltering in the same terror camps such as the Qandil enclaves. 
The only difference is that the PJAK directs its terror campaign against Iran, while the PKK 
remains focused on Turkey. I’m not the only one saying this. Everyone knows what is going on. 
Even the former American National Security adviser Brent Scowcroft admitted that the United 
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States was providing substantial amounts of logistics to the PJAK.” 227 During her interview, 
Arzu Celalifer Ekinci stated that “There is abundant evidence in our hands about the U.S. and 
PKK connection. We have many documents of the meetings between the PKK operatives and 
American officials. We have even seen them many times on the TV news. These kinds of 
information changed the threat perceptions of the Turkish foreign policy makers…I have to say 
that the Americans are in no position to prevent our security cooperation with the Iranians.”228  
Resentment in the Erdogan Administration’s security apparatus was accentuated by 
subsequent confessions of various American elites and the PKK leaders. Osman Ocalan, a high 
ranking PJAK leader and brother of Abdullah Ocalan, noted that the PJAK enjoys a “good 
relationship” with the U.S. occupation forces and receives “some military and economic 
assistance” in return for this “good” interrelationship.229 Ibrahim Polat, Osman Ocalan’s driver 
who surrendered to Turkish security forces, said that “A high ranking American commander 
used to visit our camps on a monthly basis. He talked with Murat Karayilan and sometimes 
rendered cash money loaded in large bags. This money was used for constructing three shelters 
to defend against Turkey’s air strikes.” 230 Semdin Sakik, PKK’s former second commander in 
chief, asserted that “Americans by no means want dissolution of the PKK because they want a 
Turkish-Kurdish war after which they can reshape the Middle East. Turkey’s governing elites 
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understood that the Americans never wanted to eliminate the PKK. They understood that the 
Americans want an armed confrontation between the Kurds and the Turks.”231  
Various American officials and journalists also draw attention to the U.S. support of 
PJAK in order to undermine Iran. Brent Scowcroft, the former National Security adviser and 
Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under George W. Bush, stated 
that “PKK and its PJAK branch were also operating against Iran. That is why we were giving 
support to and encouraging them. However, the situation has changed. We do not want to give 
harm to the people we want to get on well with. We want Iran beside us.”232 In a similar vein, 
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, asserted that the U.S. and Israel has been supporting the 
PJAK against Iran.233 Hersh noted that “in the past six months, Israel and the United States have 
been working together in support of a Kurdish resistance group known as the Party for Free Life 
in Kurdistan (PJAK). This group has been conducting clandestine cross border forays into 
Iran…The government consultant said that Israel is giving the Kurdish group equipment and 
training.”234 Robert Baer, a former CIA officer highlighted that “I understand that the U.S. 
provides intelligence to the PJAK so that they are better able to protect themselves in any 
conflict with the Iranians. This force protection intelligence is given to them through Delta 
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Forces.”235 Unraveling of this issue exacerbated the bitterness and grievances of Turkish elites 
toward the Bush Administration.  
However, not all the security and intelligence officers have negative perceptions about 
the United States in counterterrorism policy. Some key officials continue to appreciate provision 
of intelligence, weapons and ammunition by the United States in the fight against the PKK 
militants. The officials in this group argue that we should preserve security partnership with the 
United States and avoid acting on speculations. For instance, Hanefi Avci,236 former deputy 
director of intelligence at the General Directorate of Security, asserted that “When we think 
objectively we can see that the United States realy supports Turkey against the PKK. The United 
States sells us many weapons and ammunitions that we use in our counterterrorism operations. 
We could not bring Ocalan from Kenya without assistance of the Americans. They are allowing 
our air strikes in Iraq.”237 Avci maintained that “we should not wipe the positive things out 
depending on speculations… Some people may accuse me of being a pro-American, but 
objectively, we have really benefited from U.S. assistance in counterterrorism.” 238 
 
3.4. Collapse of the bilateral cooperation mechanism  
The Erdogan and Bush administrations forged a bilateral counterterrorism coordination 
mechanism in 2006 to overcome the growing mutual mistrust. On the Turkish side, General Edip 
Baser was appointed as the chief coordinator and on the American side this task fell to General 
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Joseph Ralston. Initially both sides made positive statements about the prospects for eliminating 
the reciprocated mistrust. General Ralston promised timely exchange of actionable intelligence 
against PKK activities in Iraq. In an interview with the CNN Turk correspondent, General 
Ralston noted that “First of all, the primary purpose of our mission is to counter the PKK. Let’s 
make no mistake about it. That is the primary focus. If in fact we are successful with that, then 
there is no question that will do much to fix the state of relations between the United States and 
Turkey, and make it stronger than what it has been in the recent past.  Turkey is a very, very 
valued ally of the United States.”239 
Over time, however, this coordination mechanism proved to be far less effective than the 
Erdogan administration anticipated. The mechanism was overshadowed by General Ralston’s 
statement that a military action against the PKK was the last option. The Turkish security 
officials were annoyed with these statements because military action had been the first option of 
the American government to neutralize terror threats against U.S. national security. 240 Ihsan Bal 
commented that “When the matter came to Turkish national security the American authorities 
were pronouncing the military action as the last resort but they immediately resort to military 
force when their interests are at stake.”241 As one terrorism analyst put it, over time, this 
coordination mechanism turned out to be exceedingly impractical, because the Americans did 
not provide actionable intelligence nor did they conduct operations against the PKK camps in 
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Northern Iraq.242 Turkish elites came to believe that the Coordination Mechanism was used as a 
“delay tactic” by the American’s to prevent Turkish intervention into northern Iraq.243  
Because the Erdogan Administration was completely at odds with the U.S. posture 
against the PKK, the Prime Minister demanded a right to intervene unilaterally. In various 
bilateral talks Erdogan warned the American officials that U.S. inaction would compel Turkey’s 
unilateral intervention into northern Iraq. Even though U.S. forces in Iraq began to provide 
intelligence against the PKK, Turkish security officials and analysts were not satisfied with the 
level of cooperation. Sedat Laciner, the director of the International Strategic Research 
Organization asserted that “after the Iraq war, the Americans promised so much but have done 
almost nothing…They complained about the difficulties of fighting against the PKK militants. 
They said that the mountains are too high, air is so cold and primarily you [Turkey] should tackle 
the terrorists in your territory first. However, they have not taken any measures in Iraq that 
would disturb the PKK.”244 According to Serdar Erdurmaz, a retired military officer:  
When the Americans understood that we were serious about incursion into Northern Iraq, 
they immediately began to provide some intelligence, which turned out to be quite 
useless against the PKK cadres. The Americans were just pretending to cooperate to 
prevent any Turkish intervention into the region, because they were preparing an 
independent state. The intelligence feedback was really superficial. It did not lead to any 
major counterterrorism operations.245  
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The disappointment with the U.S. refusal to take action against the PKK and subsequent 
crises shifted the perceptions of key Turkish foreign policy makers. Throughout the field 
research, a predominant majority of the persons that I interviewed noted that the Erdogan 
Administration does not perceive U.S. forces in Iraq as an instrumental partner in 
counterterrorism policy. Instead, many Turkish elites believe that the U.S. occupation forces set 
out to aid the establishment of a free Kurdistan. Many pro-American and pro-Western elites 
shifted their postures after the U.S. Occupation of Iraq and became increasingly critical of 
American policies. General Hilmi Ozkok, the former Chief of Staff of Turkish Military criticized 
the United States “I have difficulty understanding those [Americans] who claim there is a threat 
across the ocean and don’t believe us when we [Turkey] say that the same threat exists next door. 
This is unbelievable.”246  Sedat Laciner maintained that “As long as the United States does not 
take initiative and the PKK continues its attacks there will be permanent wound in the relations 
between Turkey and the United States.” 247 Concomitantly, public opinion increasingly turned 
against the United States after the invasion of Iraq. A majority of the Turkish people believes 
that the United States protects and nourishes the PKK terror organization.248  
In this context, political and military elites began to lay emphasis on the value of a 
regional security partnership with Iran and Russia, rather than remaining dependent on the 
“impractical” NATO framework.249 As the Americans proved to be over-reluctant in 
counterterrorism policy, Turkey began to develop new diplomatic overtures with Iraq’s 
neighbors to promote national security interests and preserve territorial integrity. Prime Minister 
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Erdogan asserted that “there is no positive progress in fight against terror. From now on we want 
concrete results. We cannot just sit and wait anymore.”250 Malfunctioning of the coordination 
mechanism and revelations of the connections between the U.S. officials and PJAK operatives 
deepened the mistrust among Turkish foreign policy elites in the Erdogan Administration and 
Turkish society. Even though Turkish security analysts agree that the US-PJAK connection was 
terminated by the Obama Administration, disclosure of this connection created grave and lasting 
mistrust against the American forces in the Middle East.  
 
3.5. Iran’s concerted campaign against the PKK/PJAK 
After the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iranian government skillfully exploited Turkey's relentless 
efforts to forge international alliances against resurgent PKK terrorism. Both the Khatami and 
Ahmadinejad Administrations sought to win the hearts and minds of Turkish foreign policy elites 
by executing a vigorous counterterrorism campaign against the PKK/PJAK. My field research 
indicates that the Iranian security authorities embarked on a four-tiered campaign against the 
PKK and PJAK terror networks. First, they attacked the PKK compounds in Iran and Iraq which 
killed numerous PKK operatives and disabled their operations.251 Second, many key PKK/PJAK 
operatives were executed for engagement into terrorism plots. Third, over 150 PKK terrorists 
were extradited to Turkey through the Bilateral Security Cooperation Commission. Fourth, 
Iranian security and intelligence institutions began to provide actionable intelligence to Turkish 
security institutions.252 Iran's new posture has been appreciated not only by the political 
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apparatus of the state but also by the security establishment which began to voice its 
appreciation.  
Since 2003, Iran’s geographic position has been an elemental advantage in the joint 
counterterrorism ventures of Ankara and Tehran. Many of the PKK/PJAK enclaves are 
positioned at the Qandil Mountains located on Iraq’s border with Iran (See figure 3.5). The 
mountain range extends over the Iranian territories. According to a recent strategy report of the 
International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), Turkish air fighters need to fly 456 
kilometers and Turkish land forces needs to traverse 90-150 kilometers over a highly 
mountainous terrain to reach the terror camps in the Qandil Mountains.253 In most circumstances, 
PKK operatives in the Qandil camps receive advance warnings from PKK cadres in Turkish 
territories before a military incursion is launched. Thanks to this pre-warning system, PKK 
operatives in Qandil camps immediately evacuate the camps and camouflage themselves in 
nearby villages. Turkish security experts agree that the Turkish air strikes do not inflict much 
damage on the Qandil camps that are well positioned in mountain caves and tunnels. According 
to one retired intelligence officer, “We know that there are at least three large PKK sanctuaries 
that could shelter thousands of PKK operatives. They are buried under deep ground. Air strikes 
do not inflict much damage unless we catch them off guard. Secondly, there is highly 
sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry at these camps… What I mean is that an air strike is not the 
best option to attack the terrorists in Qandil.”254 
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Figure 3.5: Location of the Qandil Terror Camps  
 
 
As seen in figure 3.5, Iran is located just a few miles from the Qandil Camps. The Iranian 
artillery easily strikes the PKK/PJAK operatives without transporting troops into Iraqi territories. 
Beginning in 2003, Iranian military constantly bombarded the Qandil camps. Many security 
experts claim that these attacks have been much more effective than Turkey’s long-range air 
strikes. According to the USAK report on transborder military incursions, one advantage of the 
Iranian security forces is their penetrating knowledge of the safeguards systems in the 
PKK/PJAK camps as they have frequently raided the terror compounds.255 For instance, in April 
16, 2010, a joint Turkish-Iranian counterterrorism incursion ended up kiling of 9 PKK/PJAK 
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operatives.256 Subsequent to the operation, three terrorists surrendered to Turkish security forces. 
In August 2008, Iranian security forces killed 11 PKK/PJAK operatives including Celil Kerima 
and Faruk Savasli, the top PJAK operatives in Iran.257 Seventeen other militants were arrested 
with all their equipments during the same operation. In the following month three of the terrorists 
were sentenced to death and executed in Tabriz Province. 258 These are only some examples of 
Iran’s active campaign against the PKK/PJAK terror networks. According to one Iran specialist, 
Turkish Iranian cooperation yielded very positive results such as surrendering of over 156 
terrorists only in 2009. 259 Iran’s frequent operations against the PKK were highly publicized by 
the Turkish media, which gradually melted down the resentment of Turkish elites towards Iran 
for its support of PKK during the 1990s.   
In this vein, the joint counterterrorism commission of Turkey and Iran met 12 times. High 
level of officials from the Ministry of Interior, Turkish Armed Forces, General Directorate of 
Security, National Intelligence Agency and General Command of Gendarmerie participated in 
the bilateral commission meetings.260 These meetings have been quite instrumental in 
eliminating reciprocal mistrust and facilitating further cooperation. One benefit of the 
Commission has been extradition of 150 PKK militants to Turkey from Iran. 261 Iran’s deputy 
foreign minister Abbas Muhtac, who participated in these meetings, asserted that “There is no 
difference between the PKK and PJAK…Turkey and Iran are fighting in close cooperation 
against this joint threat.”262 An Iranian diplomat noted that “We are equally concerned about 
Kurdish separatism. We think the PKK and PJAK are great threats to the territorial integrity of 
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both countries.  We are cooperating because this PKK terror is a mutual threat. Turkey’s security 
means Iran’s security…We have never supported the PKK in the past. This is a big lie”263  
Given such cooperation cases, Turkish security elites, including most of my interviewees, 
believe that Iran has turned into an invaluable partner in countering the PKK/PJAK threat from 
the Northern Iraq. One high ranking security official noted that “Iran has turned into a quite 
instrumental ally in Turkey’s counterterrorism policy…Iranians are not just talking but acting. 
American’s on the flipside keep promising but do nothing.”264 According to Soner Cagaptay, 
“The same country that had PKK camps in the 1990s is now actually combating against the 
PKK. By combating I really mean combating, not just providing intelligence against terror as 
Syria does but combating as in actually fighting and actually bombing PKK camps… And Iran is 
doing this masterfully.265 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, stated that “The PKK members can easily move 
from Turkey to Iran, then to Syria or Iraq. They have been doing it for a long time. Whenever 
they feel the threat in one country they immediately move to another. Therefore, it is quite 
natural that we are collaborating with the Iranians and Syrians. We have to do it because we are 
threatened by the same terror network.” 266 
 
3.6. Iran’s effective public diplomacy 
 
Iran’s efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Turkish government and society were not limited 
to the counterterrorism campaign against the PKK. As Bayram Sinkaya put it, when the 
American officials were deploying various delay tactics, the Iranian government initiated a 
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skillful public diplomacy campaign towards the Turkish government and society. 267 The 
Khatami and Ahmadinejad Administrations skillfully exploited growing anti-Americanism in 
Turkey emphasizing the connection between the U.S. officials and PJAK operatives. Arzu 
Celalifer Ekinci, an Iranian expatriate who works as a Middle East Specialist at USAK, reported 
that the Iranian media allocated broad coverage to the U.S.-PJAK relationship.268 Throughout my 
content analyses, I have found hundreds of newspaper articles in the Turkish media that focused 
on Iran’s achievements in counterterrorism and American reluctance to cooperate against the 
PKK. There has been a great deal of consistency between the statements of my interviewees and 
the contents of the newspaper articles from diverse Turkish media.  
Since 2003, Turkish and Iranian government officials frequently exchanged visits to 
develop a joint posture against the PKK/PJAK threat. After each bilateral meeting, Iranian 
officials/leaders delivered provoking statements to undermine Turkish-American relations. Iran 
claimed that the United States provided logistical support and protection to the PKK/PJAK 
militants in Northern Iraq. They asserted that the United States and Israel have a “secret agenda” 
to create a free Kurdistan that would undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. 
For instance, Ali Larijani, Director of Iran's National Security Council, visited Turkey on 
December 2008. During the reception at the Iranian Embassy, Larijani informed the Turkish 
authorities about the U.S.-PKK connection and stated that “American's are giving friendship 
signals to Turkey. But they are negotiating with the PKK leaders in Musul and Kirkuk. They are 
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fueling terrorism but claiming that they are the friends of Turkey.”269 This view was shared by 
many Turkish elites, particularly among the conservative nationalists, socialists and the Islamists.  
Concomitantly, Iranians used the fight against the PKK as a public diplomacy tool to win 
an ally against Western containment of Iran. President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 
2008 was an astutely designed attempt to loosen the containment of Iran. The timing of the visits 
was carefully selected when the Unied States and Israel took initiatives to tighten the economic 
sanctions against the Ahmadinejad Administration. In parallel, timing of the Iranian 
bombardments against the PKK camps was carefully selected in accordance with the public 
diplomacy strategy of the Iranian governments.270 Arif Keskin, a prominent Iran specialist at 
TURKSAM, observed that “Iran attacks the PKK terrorists whenever a Turkish government 
official visits Washington or whenever an American official comes to Turkey. Here Iran deploys 
astute public diplomacy. It sends a straight message to the Turkish community that they should 
be collaborating with Iran rather than the American government.”271 Soner Cagaptay, Director of 
the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, provided a 
penetrating insight into the timing of the Iranian counterterrorism operations:    
In February 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice goes to Ankara, because the 
Turks are so angry over the fact that PKK is in northern Iraq and Americans are not doing 
anything about the PKK in northern Iraq. Condoleezza Rice says all the right things in 
Ankara. She says we are together in the war on terror. Of course, we are going to support 
Turkey's struggle against the PKK but we can't truly do it now but we are in principle 
with you... The same day Secretary Rice was in Ankara, Iran was bombing PKK camps. 
So here is this piece of news on the front page of Turkish newspapers. What Secretary 
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Rice said and next to it is a piece of news about what Iranians are doing… As I said 
Iranians are really doing this masterfully because it realizes how importantly the PKK 
issue shapes Turkey's relation in the Middle East.272 
 
In this connection, a large majority of the Turkish elite has been appreciative of Iran’s 
counter terrorism policy. My interviews indicated that Iran’s public diplomacy has been effective 
in changing the perceptions of the Turkish elites and society. One analyst asserted that “Iran has 
been masterfully deploying various public diplomacy tools to change our perceptions. They 
intensively broadcast what they accomplish against the PKK…Iran does what we cannot do. We 
cannot even execute Apo [Abdullah Ocalan] while the Iranians are doing it for each terrorist 
regardless of their position in the organization.”273 According to Bayram Sinkaya, “Iranians 
became more cognizant of the functioning of Turkish security apparatus. They deployed the 
public diplomacy campaign to influence the decision making process within the security 
establishment. They acknowledged that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) was pretty influential 
in crafting of national security policy. Therefore they began to invest in relations with the 
military establishment. This helped the TSK to change the organizational posture against 
Iran.”274  
 
3.7. Convergence of the security interests of Iran and Turkey 
 
In the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the primary regional security concern for both 
the Turkish and Iranian foreign policy makers has been preserving the territorial integrity and 
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regional status quo.275 Both the Iranian government and the Erdogan administration saw foreign 
intervention as the principal catalyst of regional instability.276 In the convergent view, American 
intervention has fueled terrorism and sectarian violence throughout the region. Particularly after 
the U.S. occupation of Iraq various Iranian leaders voiced their commitment to cooperate with 
Turkey in preserving the regional status quo. During the 2004 D-8 Summit, former Iranian 
President Khatemi pronounced that Turkey and Iran share the same regional security concerns. 
He went further to say “Turkey’s security means Iran’s security.”277 In a similar way, in a press 
speech in Ankara, Iranian foreign minister Muttaki noted that “We consider threats against 
Turkey a threat against Iran” 278 Muhammed Hussein Lavasani, Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, 
commented that “Turkish Iranian relations have been developing on multiple policy areas…Our 
security ties have been strengthening. We share the same regional threat perceptions…I talked to 
General Kivrikoglu [former Chief of Staff of Turkish Military] two years ago. We talked about 
security partnership… I told him that we don’t want dissolution of Iraq because it will destabilize 
the region.”279     
The Kurdish problem remained at the epicenter of both countries’ regional security 
policy. The Erdogan Administration and the Iranian government share common apprehensions 
about the issue. Most interviewees indicated that Ankara and Tehran have been equally 
concerned about the disintegration of Iraq because they were afraid of the irredentist magnet of 
Kurdish separatism. Having a large Kurdish minority, the Iranian government was similarly 
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alarmed about PJAK’s efforts to revive Kurdish militant separatism. The Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad stated that “Everyone in this region is severely affected by the PKK’s terror 
campaign. The PKK is undermining the regional security and stability…The regional 
governments should collaborate against this shared threat.”280 According to Arif Keskin, an Iran 
Specialist at TURKSAM, “Resurgence of the PJAK’s terror campaign exacerbated the 
apprehensiveness of Iranian officials about the persistence of the revolutionary regime, because 
it coincided with internal uprise and international containment against the Ahmadinejad 
Administration. Iranian authorities therefore shifted their postures against the Kurdish 
separatism.”281 Keskin asserted that, the Iranian authorities perceive a potential independent 
Kurdistan as the “second Israel”, which would function as a “spy base” for American and Israeli 
covert operations in the region.282 This view became prevailing among Islamist and conservative 
nationalist elements of Turkish politics.  
Both governments believe that foreign intervention into the region has been the principal 
driver of terrorism and sectarian violence. The common view is that Western armies intervene 
with the promise of peace and democracy, but each intervention brings about catastrophic 
consequences for regional security. Iranian security authorities perceive the U.S. partnership with 
the Kurds as a coalition that is crafted to undermine the Iranian regime.283 According to 
Muhammed Nureddin, “Both Iran and Turkey stand against the Western, American and Israeli 
policies in the region. Revival of ethnic Kurdish activism after the American occupation of Iraq 
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threatens the territorial integrity of both countries.284 Ambassador Laloglu noted that “Iraqi 
Kurds have over 100,000 militias. This is even stronger than the army of the Iraq’s central 
government. If the Kurds bid for independence the central government is unlikely to stop it. ”285 
Murat Mercan, the chairman of the TBMM’s foreign relations committee, put it this way:  
We have exerted a great deal of diplomatic efforts against the PKK. We are now enjoying 
the fruits of these efforts. PKK has been declared a terrorist organization by the 
international community thanks to our diplomatic initiatives… Our cooperation with Iran 
is quite normal. We are attempting to overcome regional instability by collaborating with 
the Iranians. Iran sees PJAK as a principal threat and helps Turkish security institutions 
to neutralize a joint threat. This is quite natural. There is nothing wrong with that.286 
 
The Erdogan Administration perceived the Iranian government as an ally in 
reconstructing the post- Iraq war order in the Middle East. Celalettin Yavuz, a former high 
ranking military official noted that the “Americans will be leaving soon. They don’t care whether 
they left severe ethnic clashes or instability. They don’t care about the destruction of Iraq. All 
they wanted was the control of the Iraqi oil. We will be left with all the problems driven by the 
American intervention into the region. Iran will be our partner to deal with the remaining 
security problems.”287 As Nasuh Uslu put it, “Turkish foreign policy makers want to put an end 
to regional conflicts, because they believe that military interventions, terrorism, and sectarian 
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violence have been major predicaments for regional development…Iranians will be instrumental 
for us in settling the post Iraq war regional order.”288  
Both the Turks and the Iranians believe that the West puts overemphasis on the rivalry 
between Turkey and Iran. Iranian Ambassador Gholamreza Bagheir Moghaddam asserted that “it 
is irritating that the West continuously emphasizes the rivalry between Iran and Turkey. We no 
longer view each other from rival lenses. But we are seeking to enhance bilateral economic, 
political and security relations.”289 Iranian Foreign Minister Mutteki noted that, “We have 
common interests and concerns with Turkey. We share the same view on Iraq… We want 
stability and peace in northern Iraq… We have to uproot terrorism from this region. I’m telling 
this clearly, we should not let others destabilize the region. Turkish, Iranian and Syrian 
cooperation will eradicate the terror organizations in this region.” 290 Celalettin Yavuz 
emphasized that “Iranian and Turkish interests began to converge. The overlapping interests laid 
out the grounds for the ongoing rapprochement process on security”.291 
3.8. Shifting threat perceptions towards Iran 
 
The previous governments perceived post-revolutionary Iran as a principal threat to Turkey’s 
national security. The security establishment in particular perceived Iran as the center of global 
terrorism. The antagonism towards Iran peaked in 1997 when Iran was accused of supporting 
terrorism and attempting to export its revolutionary Islamist ideology. During the Erdogan 
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Administration however, the negative image of the Iranian governments dissipated in line with 
the shifting threat perceptions. Throughout my field research, I found that several developments 
characterized the new perceptions by Turkish elites toward Iran. First, Iran gave up the efforts to 
export its revolutionary Islamist ideology after the Khatami Administration. Second, the 
Ergenekon investigations convinced the ruling political elites that the Iranian government was 
not the mastermind of speculative plots against the secularist elites in Turkey.292 Third, 
statements of various intelligence officers and analysts indicated that Iran’s support for Turkish 
Hezbollah (THB) was exaggerated. For many of them, Iran-THB connection never existed. 
Fourth, Iran’s positive contributions to the war against the PKK wiped out the negative images of 
the precedent conflicts.    
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3.8.1. End of regime export 
 
In the post revolutionary era, Turkish governments had been highly concerned about Iranian 
efforts to export its fundamentalist regime. As one interviewee, Idris Bal put it, “Regime fear 
was a principal predicament of bilateral relations. This fear not only undermined relations with 
Iran but also with all other Muslim nations including the secular Baathist regimes.” 293 However, 
the Erdogan Administration feels less threatened by export of revolutionary regime by Iran.294 
Prevailing majority of the interviewees maintained that Turkish elites no longer fear transition to 
an Iran type regime for several reasons.  
First, the Iranian government gave up regime export policy to Turkey after Mohammad 
Khatami assumed the presidency in 1997. Kaan Dilek, an Iran specialist who had been observing 
Iranian politics in Tehran by then, noted that Khatami was aware of the fact that the Iranian 
regime’s export rhetoric was seriously damaging bilateral relations with the neighboring Muslim 
states. 295 Anti-Iranian sentiments in the region had been fueled by the threat of spreading 
Islamism as a governing ideology. From 1997 onwards, however, the political climate in Iran 
began to change. Indeed, most Iran experts have referred to this period as the "Second 
Republic".296 Khatami initiated a more liberal foreign policy and sought to overcome the 
conflicts with the Muslim World and the West. In one interview Celalettin Yavuz noted that 
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“Iran gave up regime exportation strategy after the election of Khatami in 1997. They attempted 
to revitalize neighborhood relations with Turkey and the Gulf states.” 297 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, 
an Iran born specialist at USAK, noted that “Because of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, Iran was 
contained not only by the West but also by its Muslim neighbors: Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States. Khatami understood that the efforts by Iran to export its fundamentalist regime 
had been undermining its bilateral relations with many Muslim countries. He therefore 
abondoned that policy.” 298 
Second, according to my interviewee Bayram Simkaya, Iran's primary target for regime 
export was not Turkey but the Muslim countries with substantial Shiite populations. These 
included the Gulf countries of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. 299 In his view, Turkey was a difficult 
task for regime export for several reasons: i) Turkey had a well established secular system, ii) 
Turkey had developed strong and sophisticated institutions. It is hard to overcome a strong state 
with minor terror networks such as Hezbollah, iii) Turkey is an overwhelmingly Sunni country. 
Turkey's religious elites pay no tribute to the Ayatollah’s hardliner approach in Islam. Similarly 
another interviewee Serdar Erdurmaz highlighted that “Iran cannot export its regime when the 
regime itself has been shaken by growing protests. The Iranian regime is experiencing a 
legitimacy problem.” 300 
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Third, Turkish governments are convinced that the Iranian regime does not appeal the 
Turkish citizens particularly the mainstream religious Sunni Schools such as the Naksibendi and 
Nurcular. Major religious scholars in Turkey have denounced Iran’s brutal conduct and human 
rights violations. Even some prominent religious leaders saw Iran as a serious threat to the Sunni 
world.301 Some Turkish elites believe that the regime export “threat” has been reversed 
particularly since early 2000s, because the Turkish model that integrated Islam and democracy 
appeals many Iranians.302 
3.8.2 Turkish Hezbollah connection disproven in the eyes of many elites and 
experts 
 
Another stumbling block of bilateral relations had been Iran’s alleged support to the Turkish 
Hezbollah (THB) terror organization.303 The National Security Council had presented the 
Turkish Hezbollah as a part of Iran’s regime export policy during the 1990s, and the THB 
became a principal issue in Turkish national security, particularly after the assassination of 
Gaffar Okkan, who had been a highly revered police commissioner of the Diyarbakir province.  
Even though there was no reliable intelligence, secularist elites asserted that the Turkish 
Hezbollah received ideological and logistical support from Iran. This view had been shared 
among the key security actors including members of the National Security Council before the 
AKP government.   
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However, this perception changed even more dramatically after 2003. The predominant 
majority of the liberal, neo-Marxist, conservative nationalist and Islamist elites concur that Iran’s 
support for the Turkish Hezbollah was insignificant and overly exaggerated by the traditional 
pro-Western elites.304 According to Suleyman Ozeren, a former security official and subsequent 
director of the International Terrorism and Transnational Crime Research Center, “Iran’s 
connection with the Turkish Hezbollah is much less important than the Ergenekon or Turkish 
Gladio. During the 1990s, Huseyin Velioglu told the militants that he would visit Iran. But each 
time he was going to Istanbul to meet Ergenekon executives rather than going to Iran. So, he was 
deceiving the grassroots militants about the Iran connection.”305 Bayram Sinkaya stated that 
“After Khatami took over the government; Iran developed a policy of dialogue with her 
neighbors. Iran gave up supporting extremist organizations such as the Turkish Hezbollah.”306 
During my interview, a retired intelligence officer, described the situation in this way:  
The Turkish Hezbollah was established by the Ergenekon to fight against the PKK. Later 
on, the Ergenekon began to use it for other purposes such as destabilization of Turkey to 
justify military coups. Iran’s connection to the Turkish Hezbollah has been really 
exaggerated. Initially the post-revolutionary Iranian governments thought they might use 
the Turkish Hezbollah as their proxy in Turkey. However, Iran’s connection to Hezbollah 
ended by 1995, when the Iranian intelligence officers demanded sharing of Hezbollah s 
‘great archive’. Huseyin Velioglu [Leader of Turkish Hezbollah] rejected this demand. 
Then the Iranian intelligence organizations abandoned their relations with Turkish 
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Hezbollah. Since then we don’t have any evidence of connection between Iran and 
Turkish Hezbollah operatives.307   
  
Some interviewees believed that the Turkish Hezbollah was not affiliated with the Iranian 
government but had functioned as a manipulation tool of Ergenekon.308 Suleyman Ozeren, 
Director of International Terrorism and Transnational Crime Research Center, asserted that “The 
Turkish Hezbollah was a fabricated organization. It had no connections with the Lebanese 
Hezbollah or the Iranian government. It was established by the Turkish Special Forces to fight 
against the PKK in Southeast Anatolia. Later on its operational field was expanded. It was used 
as a suicide machine of Turkish Gladio.”309 According to Nasuh Uslu, a prominent foreign policy 
analyst in Turkey, “The diehard secularists needed external threats during the 28 Subat process 
to justify tightening of control over Turkish politics. They immediately found it. Iran! They 
sought to legitimize their conduct through demonizing the Iranians. They said that Iran was 
attempting to export regime and supporting the Hezbollah. But none of these claims turned out to 
be true.”310  
A parallel view was voiced by several top intelligence officers after their retirement. 
Bulent Orakoglu, a former Director of Intelligence at the General Directorate of Security, 
explicated that “While I was the Police Commissioner of Hatay Province, we had a lunch with 
General T.C. and Colonel V. B.. There was a tall guy standing next to our table…The general 
invited him to sit with us…Later I understood that this guy was Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of 
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the Turkish Hezbollah… He was under the command of special forces.”311 According to 
Hezbollah specialist Kursat Atalar, the organization was intensively infiltrated by the state’s 
security institutions and came under the control of Turkish intelligence instititutions rather than 
the Iranians. 312 
3.8.3. Operation Ergenekon and assassinations of the secularist elites  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, pro-American elites in Turkey accused Iran of the 
assassination of several secularist elites including Bahriye Ucok (October 6, 1990), Muammer 
Aksoy (January 31 1991), Ugur Mumcu (January 24 1993), Ahmet Taner Kislali (October 21 
1999) and Gaffar Okkan (January 24, 2001).313 In parallel with these claims, the Turkish security 
establishment accused Iran of killing over 200 Iranian expatriates who played key roles in 
opposing the post-revolutionary Iranian regime.314 Ultra secularist Turkish elites presented these 
assassinations as a fundamentalist strategy to undermine the stability of a Kemalist state. These 
assassinations fueled anti-Iranian sentiments in the government machinery and led to the 
deportation of the Iranian Ambassador in 1997. The Islamists, neo-Marxists, conservative 
nationalists and liberals did not share the Kemalist idea that Iran was behind these assassinations. 
Particularly in the eyes of the Islamist elites, these assassinations were “vicious plots” by the 
CIA and the MOSSAD to undermine Turkish-Iranian relations. 315 Nevertheless, arguments of 
both sides remained unsubstantiated until recently because the homicide investigators could not 
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find any evidence of the connections of the CIA, MOSSAD or the Iranian intelligence 
organizations with these cases.   
Even though the Iranian government strictly denied involvement in these plots, pro-
Western Turkish media continued to present negative images of the Iranian mullahs throughout 
the 1990s. Public protests were organized by Kemalist NGOs to demonstrate domestic 
resentment against the alleged Iranian plots to undermine the secularist regime in Turkey. The 
Iranian media responded that “making a commotion about these murders and accusing Iran of 
involvement at this junction is due to the pressure from the Zionist regime, which is trying to 
diver the world’s public attention from the trial of the Iranian Jews who have confessed to spying 
for the Zionist regime.”316 As a retribution for the Turkish governmental claims, the Iranian 
government accused Turkey of sheltering the regime opponents, particularly the Mujahedin al 
Khalq.  
Assassinations of some regime opponents in Turkey were implicitly admitted by Iran's 
minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahim, who noted that “We track them [opposition forces] outside 
the country, too. We have them under surveillance… We have succeeded in dealing blows to 
many of those groups outside the country and at the borders. Last year we succeeded in striking 
fundamental blows to their top members.”317 One of the interviewees elucidated that throughout 
the 1990s Iran's intelligence agencies conducted frequent covert operations in Turkey.318 He 
noted that these operations targeted over 200 regime opponents who played key roles in the 
coalition against the Mullah regime.  
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Testimonies of numerous witnesses and security officials during the Ergenekon 
Investigations (2006-2010) revealed that even though Iranian intelligence agencies had 
conducted several covert operations to silence dissident expatriates in Turkey, they were not 
involved with assassinations of Ugur Mumcu, Bahriye Ucok, Gaffar Okkan and Ahmet Taner 
Kislali.319 After the Ergenekon operation, many civilian (particularly Islamist and conservative 
nationalist) elites concluded that these intellecturals had been killed by the Ergenekon Terror 
Organization (ETO). This belief is substantiated by tactical and methododological similarities 
with latter assassinations by the organization. Mehmet Sahin noted that “When the secularist 
elites were killed, some media organs accused Iran right away. Later we learned that Iran killed 
none of them. Instead, they were assassinated by the Ergenekon terror network. The purpose was 
simple. They wanted to undermine Turkish-Iranian relations through a set of false 
accusations.”320 According to Nasuh Uslu, “Among those assassinated intellectuals Ugur Mumcu 
was investigating PKK- Ergenekon connection… He was immediately killed. I don’t think Iran 
had any issue with him. Neither had he any issues with Iran.”321 According to Suleyman Ozeren, 
director of the International Terrorism and Transnational Crime Research Center (UTSAM), the 
Ergenekon investigations revealed that many terror organizations in Italy, Turkey and other 
European countries did not really go after the proclaimed ideology.322 Instead, they were used as 
a subcontractor of the “Gladio” to manipulate domestic politics and foreign policy.323 
The Turkish Hezbollah was accused of killing Gaffar Okkan in 2001.  He had been a 
highly respected police commissioner of Diyarbakir province. Many analysts argued that the 
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Hezbollah militants were trained and funded by the Iranian government. However, none of these 
analysts could present convincing evidence about the connection between Turkish Hezbollah and 
Iran. During the Ergenekon investigations, many witnesses testified that neither Iran nor Turkish 
Hezbollah played any role in Gaffar Okkan’s assassination. Indeed some witnesses testified that 
he was assassinated by the Ergenekon Terror Organization (ETO). For instance, Yildirim Begler, 
who worked as an interpreter for the ETO’s key operatives, asserted that this plot was organized 
by an ETO executive, L.G. 324 According to Begler, L.G. later sent the assassination team to Iraq 
to avoid detection, but on their return to Turkey all 20 assassins died in a plane crash in Malatya 
province. Kemal Burkay, a Kurdish politician conjectured that “these 18 targeted assassinations 
were carried out by the Ergenekon terror network to destabilize Turkey and create a fertile 
ground for a military coup”.325 
As Bayram Sinkaya put it, the Ergenekon investigations eliminated the mistrust against 
Iran among the ruling political elites.326 Most liberals, Islamists, neo-Marxists and conservative 
nationalists believe that none of those sensational assassinations were conducted either by the 
Iranians or by their alleged associates such as Turkish Hezbollah. Instead, a large majority of the 
Turkish civilian elites and the society believe that the assassinations were the work of Ergenekon 
or the Turkish Gladio. Many of the persons that I interviewed indicated that Iran’s acquittal of 
these assassination charges in the eyes of the new elites diminished the mistrust towards the 
Iranian government, which had been the principal impediment for bilateral security relations.  
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3.9. Legitimization of bilateral relations with Iran  
 
During the Erdogan Administration bilateral relations with post-revolutionary Iran regained 
legitimacy because of shifting threat perceptions in the governmental and societal realm. 
Statements of key security officials and the Ergenekon investigations revealed that Iran’s support 
for terrorism against Turkey had been exaggerated. It became more apparent that Iran was no 
longer attempting to export its fundamentalist regime into Turkey. Contemporary public surveys 
indicate that the Turkish community no longer viewed Iran as a major threat to national security. 
In its place, the United States and Israel took on public perceptions as foreign threat to Turkey’s 
national security (See figure 3.6). By 2010, neither the Erdogan Administration nor the wide 
society anticipated a serious threat from the Iranian governments.327  
 
Figure 3.6: Public perceptions of top threats against Turkey 
 
Source: USAK’s survey on Turkish foreign policy 2009 
 
                                                      
327 Apart from Author’s interviews with the elites, I interviewed over 100 people from various spheres of the society. 
Author’s interviews revealed a similar trend. Predominant portion of the Turkish people perceive the U.S. and Israel 
as the principal threat to global and national security. Iran is not seen a major threat 
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As Bayram Sinkaya commented, “There was a strong positive correlation between the 
rise of anti-Americanism and sympathy towards Iran. Turkish community came to see the United 
States and Israel as much more dangerous than Iran. They anticipated no threats from Iran but 
they began to accuse Americans and Israelis for every conflict and sensational assassination in 
this region.”328 According to the USAK’s highly respected Foreign Policy Perception Survey 
(2009), only one percent of the respondents perceived Iran as the top national security threat, 
whereas 25.45 percent of the Turkish citizens perceived the United States as the principal threat 
(see figure 3.6).329 The United States is followed by Israel with 23 percent.  
The shift in threat perception catalyzed a reevaluation of Turkish-Iranian relations. Many 
security analysts argued that the Turkish state put disproportionate emphasis on Iran’s support 
for Turkish/Kurdish terror organizations.330  Bayram Sinkaya noted that “Our guys always 
accused Iran for supporting the PKK. Iran always denied it. When we make some self criticism 
we see that there were terror camps in mountainous districts of the Southeastern Anatolia 
[Turkey]. Why did we accuse them when we failed to eliminate terror camps in the Turkish 
homeland?” 331 Bulent Aras, director of SETAV, stated that that “Iran is larger than 
Turkey…Iran’s Kurdish regions are covered with high mountains and deep valleys. 
Geographical conditions did not allow complete control of terror activities. During the 1990s, 
Iran was providing intelligence to the Turkish state. It also extradited several PKK members but 
the Turkish authorities did not really publicize it.”332   
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intelligence officers provided training and equipment to the PKK cadres in Iran. 
331 Author's interview with Bayram Sinkaya on January 8, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. 
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Several interviewees contended that previous Turkish governments accused external 
forces; including Iran, Greece, Armenia and Russia, because they failed to confront terrorism at 
home. In other words, previous governments blamed foreign governments to divert attention 
from their incompetence and failures in counterterrorism policy. Arif Keskin, an Iran specialist at 
TURKSAM, noted that “When the terror problems began to emerge, incompetent governments 
began to accuse others to save the future of their political carers. Yes, the PKK was acting as a 
destabilizer on behalf of the foreign intelligence services. Yes, Iran may have supported the 
PKK, but it was really exaggerated.”333 Suleyman Ozeren, Director of UTSAM, highlighted that 
“During the mid 1990s, the PKK became very strong. 4500-5000 militants had been 
conglomerating in terror camps at the mountainous districts of southeastern Turkey. Our 
National Security Council unduly accused the Iranians. Instead of developing an efficient 
strategy, the governments accused the Iranians, Syrians or Russians. Iran may have provided 
some logistics but it is really insignificant.”334 One retired high-ranking security official noted 
that “The roots of the Kurdish and Islamist problem have been embedded in domestic politics. 
But the previous governments and the MGK sought external scapegoats to reduce the domestic 
pressure…They presented the Iranians, Russians and Syrians as the principal enemies on the 
grounds that they were supporting terrorism. In this way they found a pretext for their failures, 
misconducts and incapabilities.”335 According to Bulent Aras, “Some Turkish governments were 
incapable of suppressing the PKK. But they had to come up with an explanation to convince the 
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tax payers. They claimed that the external forces were stimulating the PKK. This was the easy 
option.”336  
My field research indicated that the shift of threat perceptions paved the way for 
enhanced intergovernmental counterterrorism cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Cuneyt 
Gurer, a security analyst at UTSAM, put it this way, “We don’t consider Iran as a threat 
anymore. We are not enemies but friends. Iranians understood that they cannot export their 
Islamic regime into Turkey. Thus they gave up covert operations. We no longer anticipate that 
Iran would support Hezbollah and other radical groups against Turkey… The shift in the threat 
perceptions laid the grounds for counterterrorism partnership.”337 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci 
reinforced this view, “The rapprochement is partly due to shifting threat perceptions of both 
Turkish government and society. Revival of the PKK and PJAK attacks against both countries 
drew Ankara and Tehran closer. We can talk about rapprochement based on mutual threat 
perception.”338  
3.10. Consensus among the key foreign policy makers  
Prior to the Erdogan Administration, there had been strong opposition in domestic politics to 
developing a security partnership with Iran. Counterterrorism cooperation was considered 
impossible with a state that “harbored” terrorism. Particularly the military, diplomatic and 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state preserved their anti-Iran stance until the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq. Iran’s image as a fundamentalist Islamist regime was another reason for secularist elites to 
reject cooperation. During the Erdogan Administration however, key actors largely reached a 
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consensus to forge a counterterrorism partnership with the Iranian government.339 Despite minor 
objections, the Erdogan administration deployed all relevant institutions for the ongoing 
counterterrorism partnership (see figure 3.7). A broad-based consensus emerged among the key 
security actors to conduct a new counterterrorism campaign against the PKK.  
As seen in figure 3.7, there are eight principle actors in Turkey’s counterterrorism policy: 
The President, Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Chief of 
Staff of the Military, General Directorate of Security, National Intelligence Agency and General 
Command of Gendarmerie. The latter four are the active combatant institutions against the PKK 
and other terror threats. They put into practice the decisions that are made by the National 
Security Council (MGK).  
Figure 3.7: Key Actors in Turkey’s Counterterrorism Policy  
 
 
                                                      
339 Author's interview with Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, on  December 24, 2009. This view is also stated by several 
other interviewees including Murat Mercan, the Chairman of Turkish Parliament’s foreign relations committed 
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The pillars of the national counterterrorism strategy are shaped in the National Security 
Council (MGK) Summits. These summits are the ideal platforms to understand the concerns of 
the key actors. However, article 10 of the Law on National Security Council (2945) strictly bans 
release of the documents, statements and files about the MGK summits.340 Release of MGK 
materials are perceived as “national treason” by the state’s security machinery. The public is 
only informed about the outcome of the meetings or the ultimate MGK decisions. Therefore, my 
arguments about the postures of the key actors depend on interviews with high/mid ranking 
government officials and media content analysis. The statements of the mid level officials 
provided penetrating insights on the issue because many MGK files or draft recommendations 
are prepared by mid level officials rather than the top institutional executives.  
My field research indicated that there has been a broad consensus among the key foreign 
policy elites about the counterterrorism partnership with Iran. Even though the ultra-secularist 
military elites preserve negative images of the Iranians, they compromised with the Erdogan 
Administration’s new counterterrorism deal with Iran for two reasons. First, there was a major 
disappointment with the U.S. failure to cooperate against the PKK threat. This disappointment 
was exacerbated by the disclosure that the United States assisted the PJAK. In many of their 
statements General Hilmi Oksuz, General Yasar Buyukanit and General Ilker Basbug, three 
consecutive Chiefs of Staff in the Turkish Armed Forces criticized U.S. inaction against the PKK 
camps in Northern Iraq. In June 2008, general Basbug reiterated this resentment and declared 
that Turkey and Iran has forged a counterterrorism partnership against their mutual enemies, the 
PKK and the PJAK.341 Statements of General Basbug clearly indicate the shift of the institutional 
posture of the Turkish Armed Forces in counterterrorism policy.  
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Other interviewees confirmed this phenomenon. Even though the acting officers hesitated 
to speak about their resentments against a NATO ally, the retired officers overtly expressed their 
concerns about the unjustified American intervention in Iraq and reluctance to cooperate against 
the PKK. Celalettin Yavuz, a retired military official, asserted that a growing array of Turkish 
military officers had become increasingly resentful about U.S. policies in the Middle East.342 
Another Military officer, Serdar Erdurmaz, intimated that the U.S. occupation of Iraq was a 
turning point for the threat perceptions of Turkish military and other members of the National 
Security Council.343 Erdurmaz noted that “Since then [2003] the military has been supportive of 
the Erdogan Administration’s efforts to forge a closer security partnership with the Iranian 
government, because the military leaders are highly disappointed with the American posture in 
Iraq.”344 Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, who served in the Advisory board of Foreign Ministry, 
noted that “The soldiers do not oppose improvement of bilateral relations with Iran, because they 
think that Iran has become a quite instrumental partner in counterterrorism strategy.”345 Tuncer 
Kilinc, the former Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, pointed that 
Turkey’s alliance with the West turned out to be quite impractical against regional security 
threats such as terrorism. He therefore proposed that Turkey should forge closer security 
relations with Iran and Russia to stand against regional security threats.346 Murat Mercan, the 
chairman of Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, posited that the bureaucratic 
and political actors of the Erdogan Administration are by and large agreed about the desirability 
of closer security relations with the Iranian government.347 However, he warned that 
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“cooperation with Iran and cooperation with the United States are not mutually exclusive. We 
can do both simultaneously. We are preserving our diplomatic relations with both countries.”348 
 
3.11. Critiques of the New Security Posture  
 
Despite the ongoing honeymoon period between the Erdogan and Ahmadinejad administrations, 
not all Turkish elites believe that the Iranians are reliable partners in counterterrorism policy for 
several reasons. There are still many pro-Western elites in Turkey, who argue that Turkey should 
preserve its strategic ties with the United States and NATO. It is hard to classify these elites into 
a single party or institution. They exist in the military, bureaucracy, security institutions, 
diplomatic spheres, press, academia, think thanks and various political parties including the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). These elites presented several criticism of the Turkish-
Iranian counterterrorism partnership.  
First, many critics believe that Iran is not a trustworthy ally against Kurdish separatism. 
In their view, Iran is using their fight against the PKK to win the hearts and minds of Turkey’s 
governing elites, because they feel increasingly contained by the West. Ambassador Faruk 
Laloglu, noted that “Iran felt contained by the United States after the occupation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. American military bases surround Iran. As the Mullahs feel further contained 
owing to the nuclear program, they seek new economic and political partners. Supporting 
counterterrorism operations against the PKK is a very astute policy to make common cause with 
Turkish foreign policy makers.”349 Mehmet Sahin asserted that the “Iranians are fully aware that 
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they are contained by American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are American forces all 
around the Gulf. The only way to get out the siege is Turkey. Ahmadinejad uses counterterrorism 
against the PKK as a bribe to win over Turkey. At least he wants to make sure that Turkey does 
not join the anti-Iranian coalition.”350 Arif Keskin, a senior Iran strategist at TURKSAM, argued 
that Iran cooperates against terrorism because Ahmadinejad wants to ensure access to the 
European energy markets through Turkey if Western containment tightens. In a similar vein, the 
USAK report on Northern Iraq criticizes Iran for being an unreliable partner in 
counterterrorism.351 According to the report, Turkish elites; particularly the upper echelons of the 
security establishment; are concerned that Iran might discontinue cooperation once the United 
States withdraws troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.  
According to several analysts, Iran’s shifting counterterrorism policy is designed to 
undermine Turkish-American relations. Iran supports the counterterrorism policy with a skilful 
public diplomacy that presents the United States as the principal promoter of regional instability 
and terrorism. Bayram Sinkaya postulated that “Iran’s security cooperation with Turkey is partly 
crafted to undercut the Turkish-American alliance. Mutteki [Iran’s foreign minister] explicitly 
stated this. He kept on saying that that the Americans are the real patrons of terrorism in this 
region.”352 Another interviewee Arif Keskin, noted that, “Iran’s shifted posture against the PKK 
is a shrewd strategy and a tool of public diplomacy to undermine Turkey’s bilateral relations 
with the United States. Quite interestingly Iran attacks the PKK whenever a Turkish politician 
visits Washington. When the Turkish politician returns with an empty hand, the Iranians began to 
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publicize their operations and disseminate the message that Americans are the real masters of the 
PKK.” 353    
Many Turkish foreign policy elites are not sure that the Iranians will continue to 
cooperate against the PKK once the American military withdraws from Iraq. Some argued that 
Iran will give up counterterrorism cooperation because it could benefit from partition of Iraq. In 
this view, Iran will have great influence on the partitioned Shiite society once Iraq disintegrates. 
Kaan Dilek, an Iran specialist at the Institute of Strategic Thinking, argued that “I don’t think 
Iran is a good partner in counterterrorism, because Iran will benefit from dissolution of Iraq. 
They will take over the control of Shiite territories at the east. Over the long term Iraqi Shiites 
may be annexed by Iranians… Tehran has a plan B. If Iraq disintegrates they know what to do. 
Our plan A is designed to preserve the status quo, but we do not have a plan B. In other words 
we don’t really know what to do if the Kurds declare independence. 354 
Some interviewees noted that security cooperation between Iran and Turkey is not mature 
in several respects. First, Turkey’s law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies are used 
to run joint operations with their Western counterparts. Turkish institutions are designed to 
function optimally with Western standards. One security official noted that “Even though we 
began to exchange intelligence extensively this does not mean that we will run joint operations 
as we have been doing with the Western institutions over the past six decades. We are gradually 
overcoming the trust problem, but there are other problems such as the language, divergences in 
operational codes of conduct and legislative disharmony.”355  
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Second, Iran’s image as fundamentalist Islamic regime remains a major handicap in 
developing a deep and abiding security alliance. Turkish law enforcement, intelligence and 
military organizations refrain from publicizing their cooperation with Iranian institutions. One 
interviewee noted that “Iranian revolutionary guards are listed as a terrorist organization by the 
Bush Administration. Americans are our NATO ally. Our military institutions cannot run joint 
practices with an organization [Iranian revolutionary guards] that is perceived as a terrorist 
network by our strategic allies.”356 Even though there is an ongoing partnership against the 
PKK/PJAK, Turkish security institutions continue to oppose further joint military practices that 
would be perceived as a military realignment of Turkey.   
  
3.12. Conclusions of the Chapter 
 
The Erdogan Administration forged an unprecedented counterterrorism partnership with the 
Iranian government after 2003.  Growing intergovernmental security cooperation appears to be at 
odds with long-established patterns of alliances in the Middle East. Many critics argued that the 
new security posture is driven by Islamic sentiments and indicate realignment of Turkey. My 
field research, however, indicates that Erdogan Administration’s alliance policy in regional 
security and counterterrorism is not driven by the Islamic identity of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). Instead, this policy is the result of rational calculations and practical 
considerations to neutralize the PKK and preserve the regional status quo. By and large state 
actors are in consensus on this policy regardless of their ideological background or institutional 
affiliation. Throughout the interviews and content analysis, I found that nine reasons motivated 
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the Erdogan Administration to forge a counterterrorism partnership with the Iranian 
governments.   
First, the resurgence of terrorism after the U.S. led coalition’s invasion and occupation of 
Iraq has pushed Ankara and Tehran closer as both countries feel increasingly threatened about 
the growing PKK/PJAK threat and growing Kurdish nationalism.  The common perception of 
Turkey’s governing elites is that the U.S. intervention into Northern Iraq created a safe haven for 
the survival and flourishing of the PKK. The Erdogan Administration came under intensive 
public pressure after various sensational PKK attacks. The “Kurdish Problem” and the PKK 
became the most important agenda in domestic politics and foreign policy of the Erdogan 
Administration.  
Second, unsatisfactory U.S. cooperation against the PKK motivated the Erdogan 
Administration to forge alternative practical security partnerships. After the initial invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, the political and security apparatus of the Turkish state consistently demanded the 
Bush Administration cooperate in defeating revitalized PKK terror. Even though American 
officials gave alluring promises, none of the PKK camps in Northern Iraq have been eliminated.  
Much of the intelligence feedback was out of date and inaccurate. The U.S. inaction created a 
strong resentment throughout the government and Turkish Society. The disappointment with the 
major NATO ally compelled the Erdogan Administration to forge alternative practical 
counterterrorism partnerships with Iraq’s neighbors (mainly Iran and Syria) that were exposed to 
the same ethnic Kurdish terror.  
Third, various crises between Ankara and Washington undermined the bilateral trust 
between the two Cold War allies. The Turkish parliament’s rejection of transfer of American 
forces through Turkish territories ushered in an era of mistrust between Turkey and the United 
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States. The stress in bilateral relations was exacerbated by three consecutive crises: First, a 
Turkish Special Forces Unit was arrested by American occupation forces in Sulaimaniya. 
Second, various prominent think tanks in Washington released a redrawn map of the Middle East 
depicting an independent Kurdistan, not only in Iraq but also in Southeastern parts of Turkey.  
Third, disclosure of the U.S.-PJAK connection created a strong resentment among Turkish 
foreign and security policy elites. These crises downgraded the strategic value of the American 
coalition forces in Turkey’s counterterrorism policy.  
Fourth, the Iranian government was highly cooperative against the mutual PKK/PJAK 
threat after 2003. This cooperation included intelligence exchange and joint operations against 
PKK/PJAK compounds. Iranian governments neutralized many PKK/PJAK operatives through 
military attacks and court ordered executions. Moreover, Iran extradited numerous PKK 
militants to Turkish authorities. Under these circumstances, Iran emerged as an ally of the 
Erdogan Administration against micronationalist Kurdish separatism that threatened the regional 
status quo. Iran’s new policy was highly appreciated by almost all echelons of the Erdogan 
administration.  
Fifth, the Iranian government’s public diplomacy was quite successful in shifting the 
perceptions of Turkish citizens and the government. Iranian media and officials skillfully 
exploited the U.S. reluctance to cooperate against the PKK and revealed connections of 
American officials with PJAK operatives. Iranians propagandized that the U.S. had been fueling 
ethnic separatism and undermining regional security. Iran conducted frequent counterterrorism 
operations against the PKK when the Turkish resentment against the Bush Administration 
peaked after 2003. These politico-military operations intensified whenever Turkish officials 
visited Washington or an American official visited Ankara. Iranian public diplomacy maintained 
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that while the United States remained inactive against the PKK, the Iranian government has been 
fully supportive of Turkey’s campaign against the PKK. This view was shared by a majority of  
Turkey’s security elites. The Erdogan Administration became convinced that the U.S. 
government had used various delaying tactics to retard Turkish intervention into Northern Iraq.   
Sixth, regional threat perceptions of Ankara and Tehran converged. Both wanted to 
preserve the status quo because disintegration of Iraq would stir up the Kurdish independence 
movements in Iran and Turkey. The Erdogan and Ahmadinejad administrations see each other as 
allies in reconstructing the post Iraq war landscape of the Middle East.  
Seventh, Iran’s new posture has been quite instrumental in shifting the threat perceptions 
of both the Erdogan Administration and Turkish society. Turkey’s governing elites no longer 
anticipate a regime threat or support of terrorism from the post-revolutionary Iranian 
governments. Public surveys indicate that only one percent of the Turkish people perceive Iran 
as a principal threat. Instead, the U.S. and Israel became the most dangerous states in the eyes of 
the Turkish citizens.  
Eighth, bilateral relations with Iran have been re-legitimized as a result of shifting threat 
perceptions. The Erdogan Administration and the Turkish community no longer perceive Iran as 
an “evil next door”.  The shift in threat perceptions gradually eroded the negative image of Iran 
among both Turkish elites and mass society. Accordingly, domestic opposition to relations with 
post-revolutionary Iran has been replaced by strong nationwide support particularly after the Iraq 
war.   
Finaly, the consensus among the key actors of foreign and security policy strengthened 
the hand of Erdogan Administration. The traditional resistance of the ultra-secularist military 
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elites gradually disappeared after the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The resentment with U.S. 
behaviors in Iraq undercut the adherence to pro-Western security platforms.   
Even though there is a broad consensus among the actors of the Erdogan Administration, 
the Turkish-Iranian security rapprochement has been criticized by Turkish intellectuals.  Many 
critics believe that Iran is not a trustworthy ally in countering the PKK, because Iran’s policy is 
forged to win the hearts and minds of members of the Turkish government when they feel 
increasingly contained by the West. The critics suspect that Iran will abandon cooperation once 
the Obama Administration withdraws troops from the region. Other critics argue that Iran is 
fighting against the PKK to undermine Turkish-American relations. Iran supports the 
counterterrorism policy with a skilful public diplomacy that presents the United States as the 
principal promoter of regional instability and terrorism. Some critics argued that Turkish 
institutions are designed to function optimally by Western standards. Even though Iran and 
Turkey began to exchange information, Turkey’s security institutions will not sustain the 
partnership due to lack of joint standards of operation.  Even though there is a partnership with 
Iran against terrorism, the Turkish security institutions will resist further alliances with Iran that 
would be perceived as military realignment of Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 4: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION:  
 
 
WHY TURKEY DOES NOT SUPORT THE SANCTIONS ON IRAN?  
 
The Iranian nuclear program became a serious foreign policy question for the Erdogan 
Administration after 2003, as the conflict moved towards the forefront of international politics. 
As well as nuclearization of a neighbor, Western economic sanctions and plans for possible 
military engagement have significant implications for the Turkish government. In this context, 
the U.S government demanded that the Erdogan Administration collaborate in containment of 
Iran's nuclear program. This demand has been reiterated by various U.S. government officials, 
including the Former President George W. Bush, The former Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice and Ambassador Ross Wilson. The security approach assumes that states will balance 
against the emergence of neighboring nuclear powers, because the spread of nuclear weapons 
radically shifts the balances of power/threat in the region. However, the Prime Minister and 
many other key foreign policy actors made clear that, Turkey will endorse neither economic 
containment nor military intervention. In the United Nations Security Council meetings Turkey 
consistently voted against the sanctions on Iran. On June 9, 2010, Turkey voted against the UN 
Security Council resolution 1929 that was proposed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 
Prime Minister Erdogan and other members of the cabinet underwrite Iran’s efforts to develop 
nuclear energy. In this context, Turkish government’s policy towards Iran’s nuclear program 
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astonished many of the Western powers and Israel that had been Turkey’s military allies during 
the Cold War and beyond.  
Decision making regarding Iran's nuclear program is not highly compartmentalized in 
Turkey. The key actors in this process are the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The 
President, Minister of Energy, military leaders, parliamentary commission of foreign affairs, and 
opposition parties play secondary roles. However, the actions of the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister are constrained by the recommendations of the National Security Council and 
negotiations in the Council of Ministers. Throughout the interviews and content analysis I found 
that the key political actors of the Erdogan Administration are in broad consensus over the 
Iranian nuclear program.  
Figure 4.1:  8 key perceptions that shaped the Erdogan Administration’s policy  
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As seen in figure 4.1,  my field research revealed that Turkey's leniency towards Iranian 
position stems from eight perceptions of the policy makers: i) Iran has a right to develop nuclear 
energy under the NPT, ii) Iranians are not developing weapons but energy, ii) the Iranian nuclear 
program poses no significant threat to Turkey’s national security, iii) military intervention would 
bring catastrophic consequences, iv) economic sanctions will not work, v) disrespect for the NPT 
regime and American nonproliferation policy, vii) denuclearization of the region should start 
with eliminating Israel’s nuclear weapons, and viii) conflicts should be resolved with diplomatic 
initiatives. After discussing the impact of these eight perceptions, I present the critical views and 
dissenting opinions among the Turkish elites. I also discuss how Turkey would likely react if 
Iran tested a nuclear weapon.  
4.1. Iran has a right to develop nuclear energy under the NPT 
The prevailing view among the political elites in Turkey is that Iran has a right to develop 
nuclear energy that is granted by the article 4 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT). In their view, Iranian government has rightfully pursued peaceful nuclear 
technology as do other non-nuclear state parties to the NPT. President Gul, Prime Minister 
Erdogan, Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Energy Ministers Guler and Yildiz have all stated that 
Turkey supports Iranian efforts to attain nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Even as the 
Turkish elites stand against Western initiatives to contain Iran's nuclear program, they call on the 
Iranian government to provide full transparency and compliance with the IAEA safeguards.   
In their various speeches after 2003, these key political actors presented convergent 
views on Iran’s nuclear program and voiced support for nuclear energy generation of Iran. In his 
interview with the Die Presse Newspaper, President Abdullah Gul asserted that “Peaceful use of 
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nuclear energy and weapons of mass destruction are two different subjects. Iran has the right to 
develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes.” 357 In another statement, President Gul noted 
that “Iran is a member of the NPT regime and the IAEA. Therefore, it is entitled to develop 
nuclear energy and they can benefit from the experiences of the IAEA.  In return for this, Iran 
should be fully transparent towards the IAEA safeguard inspections.”358 Correspondingly, Prime 
Minister Erdogan asserted that “As we have said many times we are supporting Iran’s nuclear 
energy production but we oppose development of nuclear weapons… Iran has no weapons 
program but they are trying to produce energy. The West brings this issue to international agenda 
incessantly. This is quite unjust.”359 In one of his latter statements Erdogan noted that “Some 
criticize Iran for continuing nuclear enrichment. It is quite natural that they enrich uranium to 
generate electric power. This is what the Iranians are doing…They are not developing nuclear 
warheads as the West argues.”360 Foreign Minister Davutoglu noted that “Like everyone else, 
Iran has a right to develop nuclear energy. However, Iran should avoid developing nuclear 
weapons. We are against it.”361  In his speech at Washington SETA conference, Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu noted that “We have three main principles on the nuclear issue. First, every country 
can have access to nuclear energy production technology. There can be no monopoly in 
technology. Regardless of the country, whether Iran, Israel or Turkey, all have an right to access 
to nuclear energy.” 362 
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Many analysts presented parallel views on Iran’s rights to develop peaceful nuclear 
energy. For some analysts, Turkey supports Iran’s initiative because the foreign policy elites are 
concerned that Turkey might be exposed to similar sanctions once it begins to run nuclear power 
plants. According to Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, Chair of Iran Studies at ISRO-USAK, “The Turkish 
government endorses Iran’s nuclear energy program, because the elites are concerned that the 
same double standards may be imposed on Turkey once we make progress on production of 
nuclear energy.  We support Iran’s initiative because we don’t want to ossify the double 
standards and nuclear caste system.”363 According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, a prominent Turkish 
analyst on nuclear security, “As long as the Iranian nuclear program remains restricted to nuclear 
energy we cannot oppose it. If the Iranian leaders are claiming that they are not developing 
nuclear weapons, our President or Prime Minister cannot argue that Iranian government is lying. 
It is against our diplomatic codes...The same double standards may be imposed on us when we 
began to produce nuclear energy.”364 Similar views have been presented by some of my other 
interviewees.  
  Many Western experts criticized the Iranian nuclear program on the grounds that an 
energy rich country does not need nuclear power plants.  My interviewees did not support this 
argument claiming that Iran’s natural resources will soon be depleted and nuclear energy is a 
major alternative to replace hydrocarbon resources.  According to Mehmet Sahin, “Iran’s 
petroleum and gas reserves will soon deplete. Hydrocarbon fired power plants are losing their 
comparative efficiency. Therefore, Iran is compelled to diversify its energy sources. There is 
nothing wrong with it. There are over 400 existing nuclear power plants in the world. It would be 
                                                      
363 Author's interviewwith Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, on January 14, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. 
364 Interview with Mustafa Kibaroglu, by Middle East Strategic Research Institute, July 2009 
126 
 
ridiculous to claim that all these power plants are less dangerous than Iran’s nuclear reactors.” 365 
Another energy specialist noted that “The West forgets about the peak oil theory when the matter 
comes to Iran. In the best scenario we will run out of oil and gas by 2050. So, when the West is 
attempting to diversify energy resources, they are putting pressure on Iran to keep it dependent 
on hydrocarbon resources. This indicates the hypocrisy of the Western efforts.”366 The 
statements of government officials and analysts clearly indicate that the Turkish government 
does not embrace the nuclear threat projections of the West and supports Iran’s initiatives to 
develop nuclear energy.  
4.2. Iran is not developing nuclear weapons but energy 
There are multiple competing arguments about the extent of the Iranian nuclear program and the 
intentions of the Iranian government. The hawks in the Bush Administration and Netanyahu 
government claimed that Iran’s nuclear program is much advanced and on the verge of 
developing nuclear weapons. A preemptive strike was on the table if necessary to prevent it from 
attaining nuclear weapons. Critics of the hawkish posture argued that there is no sound evidence 
of diversion into weapons grade enrichment and that diplomatic overtures might still work in 
resolving the conflict. The Erdogan administration embraced the second posture. Turkish 
government officials and analysts referred to the IAEA reports maintaining that the West is 
putting unnecessary pressure on Iran.   
The prevailing view among the key political actors of the Erdogan Administration was 
that Iran was developing nuclear technology and materials for civil energy purposes. This belief 
was substantiated through bilateral talks with key Iranian officials and IAEA inspectors. On 
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numerous occasions, Prime Minister Erdogan noted that there was no evidence of Iran's 
militarization of its nuclear program. Erdogan stated that Turkey has developed very good 
relations with Iran and is unwilling to undermine bilateral relations when there is no evidence of 
nuclear weapons program. Erdogan perceived extensive Western press coverage of Iranian 
nuclear program as international public diplomacy and psychological propaganda. After his visit 
to Tehran in October 2009, Erdogan stated that “I have talked about the nuclear issue with key 
Iranian officials. I'm convinced that Iran is only developing nuclear energy, not weapons.”367 At 
the Munich security conference in 2008, a journalist asked Erdogan why Turkey appears to be 
unconcerned about the Iranian nuclear program. Erdogan responded that “Our Iranian colleagues 
tell us that they want energy for peaceful purposes to satisfy their energy needs not for nuclear 
weapons. I'm afraid some people may accuse us [Turkey] in the future of having ambitions for 
weapons of mass destruction.”368 Foreign Minister Davutoglu, the architect of contemporary 
Turkish foreign policy, confirmed this view. He asserted that constant drumbeats of IAEA 
reports clearly indicate that the Iranian nuclear program is just designed to develop nuclear 
energy.369 An important interviewee, Murat Mercan, Chairman of Parliament’s Foreign Relations 
committee noted “I do not believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Iranians need more 
time to gain this capacity. The Western non-proliferation efforts are not sincere and credible. I 
also don’t think that the UN Security Council will be able to enact a resolution for economic 
containment or military engagement. Russia and China will not allow that. We won’t go with the 
sanctions either.”370 
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Even though many Western foreign policy elites questioned the statements of Iranian 
leaders, key political actors in the Erdogan Administration appeared to take them at face value. 
According to Prime Minister Erdogan “Iran’s nuclear power plants are designed to produce 
energy not weapons. If someone says Iran cannot do it, he is not an honest fellow. Those 
countries who oppose the Iranian nuclear program have nuclear power plants themselves. In 
addition there are other countries in the region that have nuclear plants and weapons. Therefore 
putting pressure on Iran and disregarding the others is truly an unjust conduct.” 371 On an 
interview to the Guardian Newspaper, Prime Minister Erdogan referred to Iranians as “friends” 
of Turkey and reiterated that he believed the statements of Iran’s leaders.372 He suggested that 
Western allegations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons are no more than “gossip”. He 
added that a Western attack against Iran would be “madness” and would have catastrophic 
consequences. 373 Erdogan believes in the statements of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei who maintains 
that there is no countervalue targeting [attacking civilian populations] in Islam as it strictly 
forbids collateral damage to innocent civilians. Before leaving for a visit to Tehran, Erdogan told 
the guardian correspondent that;  
The top authority on Iranian nuclear program made a press speech recently. He said that 
countervalue weapons are forbidden by Islam. He added that Iran is only developing 
nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons. It will be pretty wrong to accuse them of lying. In 
our religion, countervalue weapons are forbidden. No collateral damage that would kill 
innocent people is permitted…Instead of believing the gossips and speculations; I prefer 
obtaining the information from the source [Iranian authorities]. We will evaluate this 
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issue [with Iranians] in a brotherhood environment. I believe that we will take most 
auspicious decisions for the future of our region.374   
One common perception among the security elites is lack of trust of American or Israeli 
intelligence estimates. Many government officials and security analysts asserted that American 
threat projections on Iranian nuclear program are “fabricated” by team B intelligence 
professionals. In their view, none of the existing threat projections is based on sound evidence; it 
is speculation to create fear among the American people. A common argument was that, these 
exaggerated threat estimates were designed to shift the perceptions of anti-war elements of 
democratic Western societies. For instance, one Iran specialist noted that “Americans are 
occupying countries based on fabricated evidence and faulty intelligence estimates. Now they 
want us believe in similar fabricated information about Iran… Iraq did not have any nukes. They 
killed over a million innocent Iraqi citizens but they have not stopped yet. After destruction of 
Iraq, they said they could not find any WMD. What? You destroy two countries [Iraq, 
Afghanistan] depending on cooked intelligence and try to fool the international community 
again.”375  
 However, this view is not shared by all the elites in Turkey. Many military analysts and 
diplomats argue that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Turkey will 
soon have to make a very strategic decision. They believe that if Turkey does not assist in the 
Western containment strategy it will lose strategic superiority in the region. In their view, a 
nuclear armed Iran would obtain substantial strategic advantages at the expense of Turkey. 
Concomitant development of Iranian ballistic missiles would boost Iran's power projection 
capabilities in the region. Many military experts are more reserved in their support for Iran’s 
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right to develop nuclear power. General Hilmi Ozkok, the former Chief of Staff of the Turkish 
Military, noted that “unless the crisis over nuclear weapons is resolved diplomatically, Turkey 
would soon be faced with important strategic choices. Otherwise we would be faced with the 
possibility of losing our strategic superiority in the region.”376 Current Chief of General Staff 
Basbug, stated in Washington that the Turkish military is following the developments on Iranian 
nuclear program with “apprehension” and opposes attainment of nuclear weapons by a 
neighbor.377 General Buyukanit, the former Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) 
commented that “Iran is under the spotlight of Turkey and the rest of the World. Iran's nuclear 
program should be limited to civilian purposes and Iran should assure the international 
community about its intentions. It is important for a nuclear free, peaceful and stable Middle East 
to follow commonsense policies to avoid new problems.”378  
Some military officials believe that Iran has a “secret agenda” and is seeking to develop 
nuclear weapons. Serdar Erdurmaz, Director of the Disarmament Institute at TURKSAM, noted 
“Iran’s words and deeds do not match. They claim that their nuclear program is peaceful but they 
are not fully transparent. They are hiding nuclear facilities under mountains such as the one in 
Kum Province. They have been able to enrich uranium up to five percent. This indicates that Iran 
will be able to enrich fissile material up to weapons grade. The IAEA has been unable to inspect 
all nuclear facilities in Iran. The inspectors are not allowed to visit all facilities. We are not quite 
sure about what is hidden behind the restricted zone.”379 Gunduz Aktan, a retired senior diplomat 
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and a current MP from the Nationalist Movements Party (MHP), noted that “Iran's being on the 
path to producing nuclear weapons is a secret everybody knows”. 380  
Many elites in this camp, however, argue that Turkey should not oppose Iran’s attainment 
of nuclear weapons, because it is the only way to deter an apocalyptic war in the Middle East. 
According to this perspective, the United States and Israel are determined to attack Iran sooner or 
later, which would have dramatic consequences on Turkey’s national interests. For them, Iran 
can only prevent a potential American or Israeli encroachment through developing a nuclear 
deterrence capacity. In their view, having a pro-status quo nuclear neighbor is preferable over 
experiencing another wave of war and destruction in the Middle East.   
4.3. Iranian nuclear program is not a major threat  
Unlike the Americans and Israelis, Turkish foreign policy makers believe that the Iranian nuclear 
program poses no substantial threat to the national security of Turkey. This belief is driven by 
two perceptions. First, there is no evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Second, 
even if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Iran will not use them aggressively, particularly against 
Turkey. Turkish security elites believe that Iranian authorities are rational and deterrable. In their 
view, the West is unduly concerned that Iran might initiate a preemptive nuclear assault. They 
believe that, even if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it will only use them to deter a potential 
encroachment by either Israel or the United States, which are much more aggressive actors in 
international politics in the eyes of the majority of Turkish citizenry.    
Turkish elites do not perceive Iran as a principal threat as the government anticipates no 
confrontational or adversarial interrelationship in the foreseeable future. A large majority of 
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Turkish government officials and security analysts does not share Western threat perceptions on 
Iran. Indeed, many Turkish analysts argue that Iran has been a pro-status quo regional power and 
has avoided aggressive military ventures. The prevailing view among the Turkish elite is that 
Israel and the United States are much more aggressive than the Iranians. Many government 
officials observed that Iran has not attacked a single country over the past century and has been 
on defensive posture against attacks by the Russians, British, Americans and Iraqis. During his 
interview with the Guardian Newspaper, Prime Minister Erdogan noted that, “Israel is no less 
aggressive than Iran. Israel’s foreign minister threatened to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. 
What threat do the Palestinians pose against Israel? The Israeli Coalition leader talks about 
enjoying destruction of Palestinians by tanks. The world should take these things into 
account.”381 One former high ranking security official noted that, “Iran has not occupied a single 
country or did not spark a major war over the past century. However, the American’s attacked 
and occupied many countries with ridiculous pretexts. Here I can count some of them: Vietnam, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cuba and many others”.382 He added that “Now they [Americans] 
are threatening to attack Iran. They are the only ones that used nukes. Then the American leaders 
appear in the media and accuse Iran of being an aggressive evil regime. They want us to believe 
in these ridiculous arguments.” 383 Omer Ersun, a former Ambassador, noted that “Iran feels 
under serious threat. They feel contained by the West. Their regime is being threatened by the 
Americans. There is no guarantee that they [Americans] won’t conduct air strikes against Iran… 
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Iranians are right to be concerned with [an American or Israeli] attack. It is quite natural that they 
want nuclear weapons to stop enemy aggression.”384   
` A broad consensus developed among the elites that even if Iran develops nuclear 
weapons, Turkey will not be a target. Iranian nuclear weapons will be designed to 
counterbalance the United States and Israel’s unconventional attack capabilities. According to 
foreign Minister Davutoglu, “Iran is not a threat to us. We do not feel threatened by the Iranian 
missiles either. We do not want another Cold War around us. We want this region free of 
sanctions and military interventions. Sanctions turned out to be futile in the past.”385 Many of my 
interviewees presented similar views. One diplomat observed that “When we meet Americans 
they warn us that one morning we might wake up with a nuclear neighbor. It may be true but 
even if Iran develops nuclear weapons Turkey will not be its target. Iranians will use it to deter 
potential American or Israeli aggression.”386 The security establishment does not feel threatened 
about a nuclear assault by Iran but they see the Iranian nuclear program as a strategic move to 
gain the upper hand in regional politics. Put another way, the military is more concerned with 
loss of strategic superiority than a nuclear attack.  One security official argued that “The notion 
of Iranian nuclear program will pose grave threats to Turkish security is propagated by American 
and Israeli officials. They argue that Turkey might be a target for Iran's unconventional weapons. 
This argument remains unsubstantiated. We have no enmity with Iran. We do not anticipate an 
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Iranian nuclear assault. Nevertheless, we don’t want Iran to acquire nukes because we don’t want 
them to gain military and strategic superiority in the region.”387 
 Turkish elites also believe that even a nuclear armed Iran would pose no imminent threat 
to the United States and Israel, because both nations have highly developed nuclear arsenals. 
Moreover, both nations have sophisticated and accurate delivery vehicles. Iranians are rational 
enough not to attempt a nuclear attack against rivals with second strike capabilities as well as 
superior unconventional forces. In their perception, Iran is aware that sparking a nuclear 
confrontation assures total annihilation of the country. In this view, the United States is unduly 
concerned about Iranian aggression and there is no reason to believe that deterrence will not 
work against the Iranians. According to Celalettin Yavuz, a former military officer, “If Iran 
wanted nuclear weapons it would be for deterrence. They may obtain nukes to deter Israeli or 
American encroachment. Iranians are fully aware that Israel is under American protection in case 
of a nuclear assault. One cannot separate Israel's nuclear capabilities from the Americans.”388 
Another security official argued that:  
The Americans frequently forget the lessons from five decades of deterrence experience. 
We all know that if two rivals have nuclear weapons, they are less likely to fight even a 
conventional war. Deterrence worked against a symmetric power [USSR], it will 
definitely work against asymmetric powers [i.e Iran]. There is one question we need to 
answer here. Why are the Americans allowing Israel to develop nuclear weapons but 
pressuring the Iranians to stop its nuclear activities? I think this is about preserving the 
U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. Americans do not want anyone to challenge their 
control. They think they have the right to intervene anywhere with unsubstantiated 
pretexts. We cannot accuse the Iranians if they are developing nukes, because it is the 
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only way to keep the Americans out of their country. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, Iranian nuclear weapons may bring more peace to the Middle East. 389 
Many of my civilian interviewees also argued that Iranian leaders are as rational and 
deterrable as the existing nuclear powers. They do not share the belief that Iranian leaders are 
predetermined to attack Israel or the United States. In their eyes also, the deterrence mechanism 
against Iran will work even if Iran develops nuclear warheads. Mehmet Sahin observed that, 
“The West claims that Iran is precarious and undeterrable on the nuclear issue. Turkey asks them 
how do you know Iran is undeterrable and what is your evidence? We ask the West why don’t 
you first start with disarmament of existing nuclear powers, and then the Western officials 
remain silent.”390 Idris Bal, a prominent foreign policy analyst in Turkey, noted that “The West 
tries to sell weapons and missile defense systems to the Gulf States and Turkey. To be able to 
sell these weapons they exaggerate the Iran threat. They present Iran as a potential nuclear bully 
…governed by irrational leaders. This is not true. Iranian leaders are as rational as foreign policy 
makers in the Western countries. Iran has not pursued an aggressive foreign policy over the past 
century.”391 Ambassador Omer Ersun noted that, “Iranians are rationally concerned with 
security. Americans should first stop covert activities to topple the Iranian regime. We should 
first give them a security guarantee. I mean they should not worry about American attack.”392 
Ersun maintained that “I’m quite sure that the Iranians seek deterrence capacity against the 
American aggression. They have many quite rational concerns in this matter. As long as their 
security concerns are not addressed, they will continue to behave in this way.”393 
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4.4. Economic sanctions will not work 
Most Turkish elites believe that economic sanctions will not work against an energy rich country 
particularly when world energy demand follows a continuous upward trend. In many cases, 
Turkish foreign policy elites stated that they would not support economic sanctions against Iran 
unless there is objective evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Despite pressure from 
the Bush Administration, the Erdogan Administration signed bilateral trade agreements with Iran 
and continues to expand bilateral trade relations. Turkish foreign policy elites believe that even if 
Turkey endorses economic sanctions, many other countries such as Russia, China and India are 
unlikely to take part in the U.S. propelled economic embargo.   
Many key foreign policy actors also maintained that economic sanctions would not 
compel the Iranian governments to surrender the Western demands. They believe that in the new 
global context the Obama Administration is unlikely to convince a sufficient number of states in 
containment of Iran. On his return from the UN Security Council meeting, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu noted that “We don’t believe that economic sanctions will work [against 
Iran]. The sanctions against the Saddam regime did not hurt his dictatorship but eroded Iraqi 
society which suffered from growing poverty. In the same way, the economic sanctions against 
Iran will not weaken the government but it will damage the Iranian society. Moreover, Turkey 
will be adversely affected by economic embargos against Iran.”394 Prime Minister Erdogan 
asserted that “The West could not isolate Iran so far. Economic containment did not work. 
Therefore, we can say that the sanctions have been unofficially abandoned. Some American 
companies seem to be complying with governmental policies but others are indirectly selling 
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products to Iran. You can see many German, French and British products in Iran.”395 Most of my 
interviewees presented converging views about the economic sanctions. Ambassador Faruk 
Laloglu, one of my diplomat interviewees, argued that “It is almost impossible to force Iran to 
stop its nuclear activities. The entire nation is behind this scheme. Americans cannot discourage 
the Iranians to stop nuclear enrichment. I don’t think the economic sanctions will work.”396 
According to another interviewee Huseyin Bagci, who escorted Prime Minister Erdogan during 
his visit to Tehran, “unless there is a UN Security Council resolution, Turkey is unlikely to go 
along with the Western containment of Iran. An extensive UN sanction is quite unlikely under 
the existing circumstances.”397 Bagci added that:  
Iran’s nuclear program has become an issue of national honor. All Iranians embrace this 
program. It is impossible to prevent it. Turkey can do nothing substantial to stop Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment. I have attended some of Prime Minister Erdogan’s negotiations in 
Tehran. I participated in many other bilateral talks. I have talked to Ali Larijani and other 
key officials. I’m still keeping in touch with them. After so many interactions I have 
concluded that Iranians will not give up nuclear enrichment. Sanctions, economic 
containment or even a military strike will not work. Iranians will eventually get what they 
want.398 
In various speeches, Prime Minister Erdogan and other key members of his 
administration made it clear that Turkey will not support international economic sanctions 
against Iran. They asserted that Turkey will continue to expand bilateral trade with Iran in line 
with Turkey’s national interests. In his speech at European Politics Center at Brussels, Erdogan 
indignantly responded to a question about Turkey’s participation into anti-Iranian sanctions, “We 
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will never cut our economic relations with Iran! None can define our policy. Turkey is not a 
tribal state. We are a nation of great history. We decide what to do in an independent manner. No 
one can tell us whom we will trade with.”399  
Turkish foreign policy makers accuse the European governments of hypocrisy with 
respect to the Iranian nuclear program. The Prime Minister and many other key officials draw 
attention to the growing trade volume among the major European powers and Iran that coincide 
with the EU3 initiative. Prime Minister Erdogan noted that “On the one hand the West is trying 
to impose sanctions, on the other they are clandestinely attempting to develop trade relations 
with Iran. They should not do it… If they continue this policy, it would be naiveté to anticipate 
that the sanctions will work.”400 Erdogan suggested “Let’s wait and see the proposed economic 
sanctions…But we [already] see that American, German, British and French products are 
entering the Iranian market through different channels. They cannot deny it. They should be 
more sincere if they want to impose sanctions.”401 One interviewee, Murat Mercan, Chairman of 
the Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, asserted that “Some Western countries are not 
sincere in economic containment of Iran. In front of the press they seem committed to pressure 
Iran, but behind the scenes they have been continuously increasing their bilateral trade with the 
so called “rogue regime”. They are not credible. We cannot rely on them in our Iran policy. I’m 
distancing myself from existing Iran analyses in the Western media.”402 Similar views have been 
reported by the Iranian dissidents. Jahangir Amuzegar, a former Iranian finance minister, 
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reported that the trade between Iran and the EU grew 29 percent between 2001 and 2005.403 For 
Amuzegar, economic sanctions against the Iranian regime are unlikely to achieve the desired 
outcome as the major European countries continue to expand clandestine trade with Iran.  
Apart from the growing European trade with Iran, some interviewees drew attention to 
Iran’s economic partnership with the major Asian states. Because it has become evident that all-
encompassing economic sanctions against Iran are unlikely, Turkish foreign policy makers see 
no point in restricted U.S. led economic sanctions. In their view, Russia, India and China are 
unlikely to pass a UN Security Council resolution that would impose heavy economic sanctions 
on Iran. One interviewee, Serdar Erdurmaz pointed out that “Iran is an energy rich country that 
has the second largest natural gas resources and third largest oil reserves. In an increasingly 
energy hungry world, there will be strong demand for Iranian gas and oil for the foreseeable 
future. China has made over $120 billion investment in Iran. China is a leading customer of 
Iranian hydrocarbon resources. They don’t want to undermine these investments by complying 
with the Western containment strategy.” 404 According to Ambassador Laloglu, “The sanctions 
against Iran do not work. I don’t anticipate that they will work in the future. There is only one 
way to stop Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons. It is Washington’s direct negotiation with 
Tehran. Both sides should explicate their concerns and propose their solutions.”405 He added that 
“Here is the problem. Americans never really seek a diplomatic solution… Even the Obama 
administration disregards diplomatic settlement.”406 
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Some of interviewees laid emphasis on the economic hazards of U.S. containment 
policies to the Turkish economy. Nasuh Uslu, a prominent foreign policy analyst in Turkey, 
noted that “We have been suffering from the aftereffects of the embargos against Iraq, Iran and 
Libya. We have lost over a hundred billion dollars because of the embargo against Saddam. 
Americans promised to reimburse our costs but have never done so. Now they want the same 
against Iran. We will not make this mistake again.”407 According to Suleyman Ozeren, director 
of UTSAM, “Turkey has been seriously affected by the previous American embargos in the 
region. An economic Embargo against Iran will not just thump the Iranians; it will also 
undermine our economic interests. It will cut down our trade not only with Iran but also with 
Central Asia. What do the Americans offer us in return if we support sanctions? They offer 
nothing tangible. We might end up losing hundreds of billions dollars.”408 Given these concerns, 
Turkey, as a member of the UN Security Council, is determined to vote against any sanctions 
against Iran.  In accordance with these perceptions, Turkey voted against the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1929 on June 09, 2010, that proposed economic sanctions against Iran.  
 
4.5. Military intervention would bring catastrophic consequences  
The prevailing view among the Turkish elites and analysts is that military intervention either by 
the United States or Israel is unlikely to achieve a positive outcome. Because Iran’s nuclear 
facilities are widely dispersed and buried under the ground, short/sharp surgical air strikes could 
not completely destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Moreover, it may bring catastrophic 
consequences to Iran, the United States, Israel and the people of the region. In their view, a war 
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against Iran could have unforeseen collateral damage engulfing the entire region. The Turkish 
President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and many other key actors have taken the position 
that Turkey opposes a military strike. They have made it clear that Turkey will not provide 
logistical or strategic support for military aggression against Iran. 
These officials and experts have indicated that Turkey would not only condemn a 
military intervention but it might also launch an active campaign to stop Israeli or American 
aggression. In his various speeches and interviews, President Gul has made it clear that Turkey 
will not allow use of Turkish bases for an attack against Iran, a country that is now an important 
trade and security partner.409 This view is shared by Prime Minister Erdogan and other members 
of the Council of Ministers. Prime Minister Erdogan pointed that, “an attack against Iran would 
be madness. We will not remain silent against a military strike, because this will hurt us deeply.” 
410 Erdogan suggested that an-Israeli or American strike against the Iran would bring 
unforeseeable consequences for the regional stability. 411 In another speech, Prime Minister 
Erdogan stated that “We don’t want a military solution. This would be a great mistake. We are 
all observing what is going on in Iraq. Over a million people died and a civilization collapsed. 
But nothing has been accomplished. Now we are seeing similar intervention rhetoric against 
Iran.  The only pretext is alleged nuclear weapons. Many other countries have nuclear warheads, 
why don’t we talk about sanctions against them?”412 Other key officials gave parallel statements 
suggesting that an American or Israeli attack against Iran will bring about calamitous costs to 
regional security. Hilmi Ozkok, the former Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Military, 
maintained that an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would entail catastrophic 
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consequences for regional security and stability.413 Therefore, he noted, Americans and Israelis 
should resort to diplomatic tools rather than military engagement. 414 
In general, Turkish government officials and security analysts believe that a military 
attack against Iran is unlikely to achieve the desired outcome for several reasons:  
i. Iran has learned profound lessons from Israel’s surgical air strike against 
Osiraq.415 Iranian nuclear facilities are dispersed over 400 different locations. 
Many sorties would be required to to destroy all the nuclear sites.  As interviewee 
Serdar Erdurmaz put it, “They need to hit the same point seven or eight times to 
have an impact on underground infrastructure. Israel cannot achieve this without 
substantial assistance from the Americans.416 The attack aircraft would be 
vulnerable to the Iranian defense systems.417  According to Erhan Basyurt, “Israel 
needs at least 90 aircraft to hit dispersed targets in Iran and it should supply fuel 
during the operations. The best option to supply fuel is Turkey. However, the 
Turkish government is adamant not to allow the Israelis to use Turkish facilities.” 
418            
ii. The likelihood of success for a surgical air strike remains limited as many of the 
nuclear facilities are hidden under the ground. The United States or Israel will 
need ground forces to destroy nuclear facilities, but this would be a disaster for 
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the United States. Iran has a powerful army and nearly 13 million paramilitary 
forces. An invasion of Iran is unlikely to succeed without tremendous costs. 419 
iii. Even if the county is invaded, Iran is almost four times larger and three times 
more populous than Iraq. It is also mountainous and hard to control even with a 
large scale invasion force. 420 
iv. Already bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, a land war would be a great 
strategic mistake for the United States. 421 The Pentagon would not want another 
war with a much tougher enemy.  
v. The United States and Israel lack human intelligence support to provide 
coordinates to precision guided missiles. Satellite intelligence is unlikely to 
provide actionable information unless it is verified by the human intelligence 
sources.422 
vi. Iran has developed a sophisticated missile program that includes ballistic missiles 
such as Shabab 3 (1400 km), Shabab 5 (4600km) and Shabab 6 (ICBM range).423 
This means that the U.S. homeland might be vulnerable to those missiles. If the 
United States attacks, Iran will definitely respond. The response could be 
destroying Israel with chemical and biological weapons. 424 
vii. The United States will not enjoy the coalitions that are crafted against 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The international community has become more cautious 
about the intelligence estimates of the United States after the Iraq experience. 
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Russia, China, India, Japan, Turkey and the EU are unlikely to support a military 
strike because their energy security would be threatened. 425 
viii. Muslim societies would be outraged by a military attack against Iran.426 Several 
recent military interventions of the United States were deployed against Muslim 
Countries. Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya and Lebanon (Syria and Egypt 
indirect involvement). A military strike against Iran would lead credence to 
arguments that a “Jewish-Christian crusade” is determined to destroy the Muslim 
countries step by step under various pretexts. 427 
ix. A military attack would unite the Iranians and strengthen Iran’s fundamentalist 
rulers, unifying the entire nation 428 
According to my primary research interviewees, a war against Iran would undermine 
Turkey’s national interests in several respects. First, it could destabilize the entire region and 
might lead to dissolution of Iran along ethnic lines.429 Micronationalist movements could spill 
over and a separatist Kurdish campaign might undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey. 
Second, a potential war will undercut Turkey’s bilateral trade with Iran.430 Turkish exports and 
imports from Iran would likely decline sharply. Fourth, major energy supply disruptions would 
certainly follow, driving up the price of oil and gas for an energy dependent country. 431 Soaring 
energy prices would have negative consequences for national industry and commerce. Fifth, 
military action against Iran could disrupt Turkey’s access to Central Asian markets that are the 
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major consumers for Turkish products.432 Finally, a U.S. strike against Iran would stir up anti-
Americanism and Anti-Semitism among the Turkish community. Turkish governments would 
have hard time in preserving the ties with the West and Israel.   
Many Turkish elites believe that the real target of the United States is not nuclear 
weapons but the Iranian regime. Therefore, a military intervention could not be limited to 
destroying the nuclear facilities but it would also expand to overthrow the fundamentalist regime 
in Tehran. According to this perspective, the United States wants to implant a puppet regime in 
Tehran that would allow privatization of natural resources so that American companies would 
get the lion’s share from extraction and marketing of the Iranian oil and natural gas. In this 
context, the American threat consolidates the hardliner regime in Tehran, retarding the domestic 
opposition movements. One of the interviewees Kaan Dilek asserted that “The American 
strategy is completely wrong. Their ultimate goal is not eradication of nuclear weapons but a 
regime change. We all know it. By putting military intervention on the table, the Americans 
escalate the tensions.”433 Dilek maintained that “Under these circumstances, Iranian radicals are 
more likely to remain in power. Ahmadinejad is not a really capable man. He is not really skillful 
leader. He can only stay in power as long as foreign threats remain.”434 
 
4.6. Growing disrespect to the NPT regime and American nonproliferation policy 
Statements of key government officials and experts indicate a profound disrespect both for the 
NPT regime and American nonproliferation policy. The common perception is that the NPT 
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upholds the nuclear status quo and serves the interests of the existing nuclear powers. It sets forth 
a de facto class system in international politics as it prevents non-nuclear states from joining the 
prestigious club. Another common perception is that the NPT is enforced selectively with 
profound double standards. There are no sanctions against pro-Western regimes but anti-Western 
administrations are exposed to varying degrees of sanctions that include economic containment 
and military intervention. At the same time, existing nuclear powers avoid denuclearization and 
make dedicated efforts to preserve nuclear hegemony. As in the case of Iraq, Turkish elites 
believe that the existing nuclear powers put forward unsubstantiated contentions of proliferation 
to justify military intervention and regime change.  
In his various speeches Prime Minister Erdogan characterized the global non-
proliferation regime as “unjust” treatment.  In his response to a Guardian correspondent, Erdogan 
noted, “I can definitely tell there is an unjust treatment [of Iran’s nuclear program]. The five 
members of the UN Security Council have large nuclear arsenals… Some non-members of the 
NPT also have nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it is the nuclear powers that are placing pressure 
on Iran. I find their attitudes quite unjust. I don’t feel that they have the right to campaign against 
the Iranian nuclear program.”435 In another statement Erdogan highlighted that, “Those who 
criticize Iran's nuclear program continue to possess the same weaponry… Those who want these 
arrogant sanctions need to give up these weapons first. We shared this opinion with our Iranian 
friends.”436 In a third speech Erdogan said, “Those who counsel Iran not to acquire nuclear 
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weapons, should not have these weapons in the first place… They should undergo nuclear 
disarmament before pressuring Iran.” 437 
Most Turkish foreign policy elites believe that the West imposes a double standard with 
regard to nuclear proliferation. On the one hand, the West provides clandestine support for some 
nuclear states (Israel, Pakistan and India); on the other, they make disproportionate efforts to 
prevent other suspected nuclear energy initiatives (i.e. Iran and Iraq) that have no proven 
diversification to weapons grade enrichment. Ambassador Omer Arsun asserted that, “The IAEA 
is the guardian of injustice. But they are working to prevent the worst case. It is true that five 
members of the UN Security Council have created a caste system. They are pressuring the others 
not to attain the same power. Al Baradei’s position is really tough. God bless him for having the 
guts to be able to tell things that Americans don’t enjoy. He looks like a good diplomat. It is not 
easy. You have Bush on the one side and Ahmadinejad on the other.”438 One interviewee, Idris 
Bal noted that, “Turkey has experienced many double standards from the West. As a result, the 
Turkish community has become quite sensitive against double standards. They immediately take 
an anti-Western stance when they feel those double standards even against others. This is true for 
the Iranian nuclear program.”439 Arzu Cealifer Ekinci, another one of my key interviewees, 
propounded that “The Turkish government is equally concerned that the West may use some 
double standards against Turkey when we want to build our nuclear power plants. Turkey 
supports Iranian nuclear program because it is afraid that the West may impose similar 
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containment strategies when Turkey begins to construct nuclear power plants.” 440 Similar views 
have been projected by various security officials. According to one security official: 
American nuclear policy is entirely unrespectable. It is full of double standards. Yes we 
should prevent nuclear proliferation but we should also eliminate the existing nuclear 
arsenal that has been stationed in the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, 
Pakistan and Israel. Existing nuclear powers never compromise on their nuclear capacity. 
All SALT and START agreements turned out to be useless. If you are a friend of 
America you can develop nuclear weapons, even use NBC against your non-Western 
enemies. Nothing will happen. No one will penalize you. If you are anti-Western, their 
posture immediately changes. In this case, your country may be exposed to the harshest 
sanctions including a military occupation.441  
A predominant majority of Turkish elites believe that non-proliferation is enforced 
selectively. In their view, the major powers never castigate pro-Western regimes but they 
immediately ignite various overtures to stop nuclear enrichment in unfriendly regimes. Serdar 
Erdurmaz, chair of the Disarmament Institute at TURKSAM, noted that “it was the Americans 
who established a nuclear research reactor in Iran in 1967. America was highly supportive of the 
Shah Administration's efforts to develop nuclear power. What happened? A pro-American 
puppet government was overthrown by the fundamentalists. Americans immediately changed 
their threat perceptions toward Iran. Iran became the most dangerous regime and the Iranian 
nuclear program became the primary target of U.S. non-proliferation efforts” 442 Another security 
official noted that “the same Americans who played a key role in development of Iran's nuclear 
capacity are now taking the lead in containment of Iran.  Dick Cheney was the Chief of Staff in 
the White House and Rumsfeld was secretary of defense in 1976 when President Ford signed an 
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agreement to process plutonium in Iran.”443 According to interviewee Kaan Dilek, “Turkish 
elites do not respect the United Nations Security Council thoroughly. Everyone knows that the 
institution is under heavy American influence. We don’t anticipate that UN Security Council 
resolutions serve the global peace. Instead, they help the major powers to preserve the status 
quo.” 444 Dilek maintained that “With respect to nuclear proliferation, the institution functions as 
a manipulation tool of the existing nuclear powers to prevent others from attaining the nuclear 
power status.”445 Many other interivewees came up with similar arguments against the UN 
Security Council.  
One common view among the Turkish elites is that the United States has used the 
allegation of nuclear enrichment as a pretext to intervene in unfriendly regimes. According to 
this understanding, once the United States is determined to change an anti-American regime, 
Washington launches an astute public diplomacy that puts special emphasis on WMD. My 
interviewee Suleyman Ozeren noted that “Americans are pursuing a neo-imperialist grand 
strategy. They are fabricating pretexts to occupy other countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Now there are rumors about an occupation of Yemen. They would immediately devour Iran if it 
had been a digestible morsel.”446 One non-proliferation expert noted that “everyone knows that 
the enmity between the two nations [U.S. and Iran] extends beyond the nuclear issue. The current 
crisis is a product of over three decades of negative interaction between the two nations. The 
enmity exacerbated after the revolution. Even if the Iranians stop nuclear proliferation it will 
continue to be the target of American governments that are now using Iran’s nuclear program as 
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a pretext to change the unfriendly regime in Tehran.”447 According to Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, 
“The 2007 intelligence estimate of the CIA disproved the arguments that Iran is on the verge of 
becoming a nuclear state, but Bush preserved his hardliner stance and crusade rhetoric. He 
wanted to get the job done once and for all. He didn’t really care about the nukes. All he cared 
was toppling an anti-American regime in the Gulf region that projects increasing power.”448 
Iran’s non compliance with the IAEA safeguards was justified by some analysts in the following 
way. Sedat Laciner, Director of ISRO-USAK, noted that “Iran is right not to grant full 
transparency. Because they know that Israel previously bombed the Osiraq reactor in Iraq. They 
know that the Israelis or the Americans will bomb if they reveal the coordinates of the 
facilities… The West is no more reliable than the Iranians.” 449 
In general, Turkey's non-proliferation experts believe that American and Israeli officials 
are determined to project Iran's nuclear program as a military threat even if they don't have sound 
evidence. Many security analysts in Turkey do not believe in the threat projections of the 
American and Israeli intelligence agencies. Some of them claim that the “Neocons” in the Bush 
Administration pushed the intelligence agencies to fabricate intelligence to justify an attack 
against Iran.450 Suleyman Ozeren, Director of UTSAM, asserted that “Americans are fabricating 
various pretexts to justify military interventions and occupations. There is no cause-effect 
relationship between existence of American forces in Iraq and pre-war discourse... So we do not 
trust the statements of American officials about Iran. None of their so called security projects is 
making the region more secure. Every intervention has had catastrophic consequences for the 
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people of region”451 One security official asserted that “Those Israelis and neocons have been 
claiming for the past 15 years that Iran is very close to nuclear weapons. After 15 years we have 
learned that Iran is far away from that capacity. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence 
whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, American and Israeli threat projections 
have lost their reliability. We cannot take action depending on cooked intelligence.” 452 Murat 
Mercan, Chairman of Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committe, argued that; 
Americans have been undermining their credibility with false statements. They claimed 
that Iraq had WMD but it turned out that this was entirely wrong. Second, they claimed 
that Iran is developing nukes but the IAEA reports refuted the intelligence estimates of 
the White House. Many reliable sources report that Iranian nuclear program is restricted 
to energy generation.  Americans are quite sensitive about Iranian nukes but they did 
nothing when the Israelis used WMD against the Palestinians. Even the UN Security 
Council remained silent. Under these circumstances none can expect us to trust American 
non-proliferation policy. There is a crisis of trust.” 453 
Almost all of my subjects, particularly politicians and the analysts, were concerned that 
U.S. Iran policy has been highly influenced by the pro-Israeli lobby. In their view, Iran could 
pose no threat to the United States that has incomparably stronger conventional and non-
conventional weapons capabilities. They perceive the Israeli lobby as the main promoter of 
diplomatic gridlock and a militaristic attitude toward Iran. Interviewee Nasuh Uslu noted that, 
“Many Turks, particularly the elites, are cognizant that America’s policy towards Iran is crafted 
by pro-Israeli officials and the Neocons. Everyone knows that the pro-Israeli lobby in 
Washington has been pushing hard for a military strike against Iran. They don’t want a 
diplomatic solution. They want to overthrow the Iranian regime. Therefore the Turkish 
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community has no respect for Washington’s nuclear proliferation policy.”454 According to 
another nonproliferation expert, “The hardliner stance, avoiding diplomatic talks and consistent 
false intelligence estimates indicates that pro-Israeli spheres of influence are determined to attack 
Iran. Sooner or later they will come up with another fabricated intelligence estimate to justify a 
military strike.”455 
One major criticism is that the United States exaggerates the Iran threat in order to sell 
weapons to the Gulf States. According to this view, the Americans are putting too much 
emphasis on the conflict between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to extract petrodollar 
surplus. This view gained more gravity after Hillary Clinton’s visit to various Gulf States in the 
summer of 2009, when Clinton offered a nuclear umbrella to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. In this perspective, American public diplomacy continuously 
promotes aggressive images of Iran to shift the threat perceptions of the Gulf Arab states. In this 
way, the United States will be able to sell more weapons and defense systems in exchange for 
petroleum imports.    
At the far right, diehard Turkish nationalists and Islamists believe that it is all about the 
“Great Israel Project”. Although this view is extreme and a classic conspiracy theory, they 
constitute significant portion of the electorates of the Saadet Partisi (SP) and Milliyetci Hareket 
Partisi (MHP). In their view, Iran is not a target because of its nuclear program, but for its strong 
resistance against establishment of the “Great Israel”.456 They argue that the “Jewish lobbies” are 
fabricating threats to crush their enemies with American power, without even using the Israeli 
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military. For them, the occupation of Iraq was a stage in the establishment of “Great Israel”. 
Now the focus is on the second largest; Iran. According to their perception, after Iran has fallen 
they will turn to the dissolution of Turkey. They believe that the current revival of the PKK is an 
Israeli project as they want to use Kurdistan to stage a dvide and conquer strategy. For them, 
once the Kurds declare independence, Northern Iraq will be an easy target for the Israelis.  
Although they are more mainstream, many highly influential Islamist intellectuals 
perceive the current non-proliferation regime as discriminating against Muslim countries. In their 
discernments, the West and Israel are determined to prevent nuclearization of the Muslim World 
due to civilizational conflicts along the lines set forth by Huntington.  Concomitantly, the 
Western campaign against Iran is considered as an integral part of Western discrimination policy. 
Ibrahim Karagul, a prominent Islamist columnist at Yenisafak Newspaper, asserted that “The 
Israelis and the Americans are acting as if they are the victims of Iranian aggression. The axis of 
US/UK/Israel has launched a region-wide war to divide larger countries and establish small 
puppet states... Israel has a large nuclear arsenal, but they are getting prepared to attack Iran 
claiming that it has a nuclear weapons program. Once they eliminate the “threat from Islam” they 
can establish a colonial empire throughout the region.” 457 Fehmi Koru another prominent 
Islamist columnist wrote that “unfortunately we are not living in an equal world.  Yesterday neo-
imperial America destroyed Iraq; today they are planning the same vicious plot against Iran. 
They want to destroy another Muslim country. Nuclear proliferation is just a pretext.”458 
Many Turkish security analysts have argued that the NPT has been weakened and 
delegitimized. It could not stop the nuclear armament of North Korea, Pakistan, India, South 
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Africa and Israel. The North Korean test of a nuclear device received only a minor response from 
the existing nuclear powers. Throughout the interviews, I observed that particularly Islamist 
officials and analysts are quite resentful about selective enforcement of the non-proliferation 
regime. In their view, the enforcement of the NPT towards Iraq and Iran was instigated by the 
anti-Islamist lobby. For them, the pre-war public diplomacy against Iran is identical to that 
before the Iraq War. Some Turkish elites believe that if the West pushes too hard, Iranians may 
leave the Non-proliferation Treaty. According to Ambassador Omer Arsun, “Everyone is afraid 
that Iran may leave NPT. Iran would leave now, if it was not afraid of surgical air strikes. The 
North Koreans did it. Then they wanted higher bribes. The unjust nuclear order is providing 
opportunities for rogue states. Technology is rapidly advancing. I see a darker future for  
humankind.”459  
4.7. Non Nuclear Middle East: start with eliminating Israel’s nukes  
The key foreign policy actors of the Turkish state made it explicit that they want no nuclear 
weapons in the region. They strongly reject Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons as well as 
Israel’s preservation of its nuclear arsenal. They argue that Israel should undergo nuclear 
disarmament if the Israelis want Iran not to develop nuclear weapons. Even though everyone 
knows that Israel has a significant arsenal, Israeli government officials follow a policy of 
opacity, neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons. Turkish government 
officials have become resentful of Israel’s posture and accuse the Israelis of deceiving the 
international community. In their perception, Israel is far more aggressive than the Iranian 
regime. Therefore, the Turkish elites propound that the international community should deal with 
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Israel’s existing nuclear weapons rather than imposing sanctions on Iran that has no proven 
weapons grade enrichment.  
Various government officials clearly indicated that Turkey strongly resists all nuclear 
weapons in the region. In his interview with Al Arabia TV, President Abdullah Gul noted that 
“We are against any nuclear weapons in the region and we are against other types of weapons of 
mass destructions as well. Especially we don’t want nuclear neighbors. It’s not about Iran. We 
feel the same about the others. Nuclear energy is an inalienable right of Iran. But acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is a different issue.” 460 In another interview, President Gul emphasized that 
“Not a single country in the region, Including Israel, should have weapons of mass destruction.... 
The entire Middle East should be free of nuclear weapons. As a member of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the NPT, Iran is obligated to grant complete transparency. Iran lacks 
this transparency.”461 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu agreed “We are against any nuclear 
weapons in this region. Not as a Foreign Minister but as a Turkish citizen, I’m saying that 
nothing can justify use of nuclear weapons… We do not differentiate Iran or Israel. We want 
eradication of nuclear weapons in the conflict prone Middle East.”462 General Hilmi Ozkok noted 
that creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East is Turkey's policy and Turkey 
will oppose nuclear armament in any countries regardless of the type of regime.463 Murat Mercan 
concurred, “We don’t want nuclear weapons in this region. We want no country to preserve 
nuclear assault capacity. Existing nuclear powers should disarm themselves instead of pressuring 
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the countries that have no proven nuclear weapons program.”464 Prime Minister Erdogan noted 
that “We will not let diversion of Iranian nuclear reactors to weapons program, because we don’t 
want any neighbor with nuclear weapons. We have told this many times to our Iranian 
colleagues. But if Iran would give up nuclear weapons, Israel should not have them too.”465 On 
his speech to after the UN Security Council Meeting at New York (September 25, 2009), Prime 
Minister Erdogan maintained that;   
We have talked about non-proliferation at the UN Security Council. Our wish is to 
annihilate all nuclear weapons in the world. To be able to do that the permanent members 
of the United Nations should first start with terminating their nuclear arsenals. Those who 
give advice to others [Iran] should implement it first. If they don’t behave accordingly, 
they don’t have a right to give advice to others. They cannot pressure others for not doing 
so. Nuclear weapons pose existential threats to human security. We never know who can 
use it against whom. Humankind should not live under the threat of total destruction. If 
we want global security, we should destroy all nuclear warheads. You can spend lots of 
money on nuclear weapons but you can never claim that it gives prosperity to your 
citizens.466  
In this context, rather than Iran’s nuclear power plants, Israel’s possession of nuclear 
weapons has become a greater concern for the Turkish elites. In their eyes, Iran may only 
develop nuclear weapons to deter Israeli or American aggression. They see Israel’s nuclear 
weapons as a provocation for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Therefore, the Erdogan 
Administration asserts that the international community should first eliminate Israel’s nuclear 
arsenal rather than focusing on Iran’s nuclear program when there is no evidence of enrichment 
                                                      
464 Author's interview with Murat Mercan on January 4, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. 
465 Prime Minister Erdogan’s speech to Turkish citizens at Marriot Hotel, September 26, 2009, available at 
www.internethaber.com/news_id=208695, [accessed February 23, 2010]  
466 Prime Minister Erdogan’s speech to Turkish citizens at Marriot Hotel, September 26, 2009, available at 
www.internethaber.com/news_id=208695, [accessed February 23, 2010] 
157 
 
uranium up to weapons grade. Prime Minister Erdogan noted that, “We don’t want nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East. But if one country [Israel] has nuclear weapons in the region and if 
you don’t impose any sanctions on the existing nuclear states it would be a truly unjust endeavor. 
If those powerful states do not provide justice we cannot talk about global peace. We are seeking 
global peace and working for it. We should render Iran its right to develop nuclear energy.”467 
During the press speech with President Hariri, Prime Minister Erdogan took the position that 
“Those who are putting great pressure on Iran, turn to a blind eye towards the Israeli Nuclear 
Program. Iran is the victim of unjust non-proliferation regime. We will always be with the 
victims. Our policy will be designed to protect the victims from oppression of the great 
powers.”468 
 Contrary to the previous Turkish governments, the key actors in the ruling Justice and 
Development Party believe that Israel is much more aggressive than Iran and more likely to use 
Weapons of Mass Destruction when its interests or survival are at stake. In a speech at Marriot 
Hotel at New York, on September 26, 2009, Erdogan criticized Israel for embracing an 
aggressive posture, using phosphorous bombs and threatening to use nuclear weapons against the 
Arabs. 469 Interviewee Arif Keskin noted that, “Prime Minister Erdogan is quite angry with Israel 
because Netanyahu deceived him. On his visit to Ankara, Netanyahu never talked about 
attacking Gaza. He pretended that he was leaning towards a peaceful solution. Two days after his 
return, Israel attacked Gaza and brutally massacred the Palestinians. Israel abuses the existing 
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military alliance with Turkey.”470  Iranian president Ahmadinejad praised Erdogan’s posture 
towards Israel’s nuclear arsenal many times. For instance, during Erdogan’s visit to Tehran, 
Ahmadinejad told him that “When an illegitimate regime owns nuclear weapons, none else can 
speak about other nation’s rights to develop nuclear energy…Your unambiguous stance against 
Israel has created very positive effects on the Muslim World and everyone is happy about it.”471  
Similar to the Turkish elites, a majority of the Turkish public also believes that Israel is a 
graver threat to regional security than Iran.  Interwiewee Arzu Celalifer Ekinci reported that 
during her field research people immediately and without hesitation declared the United States 
and Israel as the gravest threats to the peace and stability in the world.472  According to foreign 
policy analysts Erhan Basyurt, who works as the chief editor of Bugun Newspaper, “Israel 
behaves like a mischievous son of the region. It fights against the Syrians. It hits Palestine and 
Lebanon. It wants to attack the Iranian nuclear facilities. It pushes the Americans to destroy and 
occupy Iran. They are the chief anarchist in the region.” 473 According to interviwee Kaan Dilek, 
who stayed in Iran for over a decade, “Israel behaves more irrationally than Iran. They look like 
an unbridled bully in the Near East. None of their nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA 
safeguard inspections. Only Americans could inspect their nuclear infrastructure but they will 
not do it. You know why. You know the lobbies in Washington. I think Israel is much more 
serious threat to regional security than Iran.”474  
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4.8. The conflict should be resolved with diplomacy 
One might ask if the Turkish government opposes both economic sanctions and military 
intervention, how they plan to resolve the growing conflict between Iran and the West. The 
answer is diplomacy. Many key government officials reiterated their commitments to resolve the 
conflict with diplomatic overtures. They believe that diplomatic solutions are still viable and 
there is no need to rush to military intervention. The Turkish government has been critical of 
both the Iranian and the American diplomatic posture. They criticize Iran for not being truly 
transparent and they criticize the American government for not engaging in direct negotiations 
with Iran. Many Turkish elites believe that a solution is unlikely if the United States continues to 
avoid talking directly with the Iranian government officials. The major diplomatic initiative of 
Turkey has been the joint Swap Agreement in May 2010 that was drafted in collaboration with 
the Brazilians and the Iranians. This agreement proposes exchange of low/high enriched uranium 
in Turkey.   
The Erdogan government believes that the conflict over uranium enrichment with Iran 
should be resolved through diplomatic means.  In its view, multilateral diplomatic initiatives and 
implementation of IAEA safeguards will be sufficient to stop Iran’s nuclear armament. Both 
Erdogan and Davutoglu have made relentless efforts to persuade Iran and the West to negotiate a 
settlement. In one of his interviews, Erdogan made his position clear, “an attack over Iranian 
nuclear facilities will bring catastrophic consequences. It will lead to irrecoverable 
damages….We have very important relations with Iran. We have strategic ties. This conflict 
should be resolved through diplomatic channels. No one should leave the negotiations. We 
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should continue until we find a peaceful settlement.”475 In his interview with Al Arabia TV, 
President Gul stated that “We highly value diplomatic dialog to resolve the conflicts on Iran’s 
nuclear program. War is not an easy thing. It is a destruction and death. Therefore, particularly 
the soldiers hate war. We should focus on diplomatic solutions and dialogue. Iran should take 
advantage of the diplomatic opportunities. When there is call for diplomacy, I believe that 
Iranians will behave accordingly.”476 On his return from the UN Security Council meeting, 
foreign Minister Davutoglu propounded that, “the conflict should be resolved through diplomatic 
channels. We should not be discussing military intervention at this stage.”477 Prime Minister 
Erdogan, the principal actor in Turkey’s Iran policy, asserted that:  
From the beginning we wanted to resolve this issue through a negotiated diplomatic 
settlement between Iran and the West. We have helped the Americans and Western 
friends to convince the Iranians. They demanded help and we worked on this together. 
We took over another initiative in October. We have exerted a great deal of effort but we 
could not resolve this issue. The West does not keep its promises. They can go nowhere 
with this intermittent pressure. Instead, they should pay more attention to multilateral 
negotiations. They should build mutual trust and confidence. I’m against the Western 
initiatives to isolate or annihilate Iran, because we want a world with enduring peace. On 
the one hand the West claims that they are serving the global peace, on the other hand 
they maintain this ridiculous approach towards on Iran that has perennial state 
experience. It’s impossible to embrace the Western policies on this issue. We now live in 
a completely different world. We should build global peace together.478 
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During my field research, I found that Turkish elites have been highly critical of 
American and Israeli diplomacy throughout Iran’s nuclear crisis. They believe that the United 
States and Israel have a “secret agenda” for the following reasons. i) they don't talk with the 
Iranians directly,479 ii) they ignore IAEA inspection reports,480 and iii) they continuously publish 
false intelligence reports that demonstrate Iran as an irrational and aggressive power that is 
determined to use nuclear weapons against Israel.481  
Turkish elites believe that the only way to achieve a diplomatic solution is direct talks 
between the Americans and Iranians. My diplomat interviewees recommended that the United 
States should approach Iran with respect on basis of equality. For Instance, Ambassador Faruk 
Laloglu noted that “Israel feels threatened by the Iranian nukes. On the flipside, Iranians feel 
threatened by a potential preemptive strike by the Israelis or the Americans. In this case, the only 
solution is direct diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Iran. If we want to 
dissuade Iranians from nuclear program we should spread it over a long time. If unwanted 
pressures are sustained, Iran will be forced to develop nuclear weapons rather than contending 
with nuclear energy.” 482Another diplomat commented that “Iran is the inheritor of a glorious 
culture and history. So, a respectful approach is very important for them. They feel that the West 
shows no respect for the Iranian government. We know their psychology and approach them 
accordingly. We have been able to establish very good relations with the Iranian government 
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officials. We know that the West and Iran could hardly understand each other. Therefore, we are 
trying to mediate and transmit each other’s message.”483  
Some of my non-diplomat interviewees presented similar views on this issue. Celalettin 
Yavuz recommended that “If I were the Americans, I would seek an entente with Iran, because 
Iran lies at a very strategic location, at the conjunction of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Middle East. It is a vast and underinvested market. I would take opportunity rather than 
continuing this ridiculous containment strategy.” 484 According to Nasuh Uslu “The Persians 
have been a great nation throughout the history. The current Iranians have this pride. 
Nevertheless the Western officials offend the Iranians by pretending as if they were dealing with 
a third world state.”485  One security official noted that, “We are trying to lower the tensions but 
the Americans are pretty skillful in escalating the conflicts. General Petraus said that they had 
prepared an invasion plan against Iran. He said that the Pentagon was ready for such an action. 
Hardliner Americans don’t really like a diplomatic solution. They want to get the job done.”486 
Mustafa Kibaroglu argued that “The West missed the opportunity of solving the problem 
between 2003 and 2005. At the later years of President Khatami, the IAEA could fully inspect 
Iranian nuclear program with a strong support by the UK, Germany and France. This became 
unlikely after President Ahmadinejad assumed power in 2005. Since then Iran’s technological 
capacity is much improved.”487 
Turkish non-proliferation experts have been highly critical of U.S. diplomacy and believe 
that the American posture is not helping the Iranians to stop nuclear activities. They think that 
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the U.S. preconditions for direct bilateral negotiations are unrealistic and that has become a 
brinkmanship game for both parties. According to the prevailing view, even if the United States 
and Israel destroy Iran's nuclear power plants, they are unlikely to eradicate Iran's long term 
experiences, scientific know how and blueprints of nuclear scientists. Iranians will rebuild the 
power plants in deeper clandestine locations.  Turkish elites criticized the American 
governments, particularly the Bush Administration, for never really trying diplomatic tools. One 
retired diplomat noted that “Americans don’t want Iran’s attainment of nuclear enrichment 
technology. They propose abolishment of all enrichment as a precondition for direct bilateral 
talks. This makes a diplomatic solution impossible. It leads to diplomatic gridlock.”488 
Ambassador Omer Ersun summarized the situation in this way, “Americans should first stop 
underground activities to topple the Iranian regime. The United States should give Iran a security 
guarantee so that they no longer have to worry about an American attack.” 489  He went on to say 
“I’m quite sure that the Iranians aspire to nuclear power status to attain a deterrence capacity 
against the Americans. They have many rightful concerns for this. As long as their security 
concerns are not addressed through diplomatic channels, Iran will continue in this way.”490   
Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s shuttle diplomacy is an obvious indicator of Turkey’s 
efforts to resolve the Iran conflict without war and destruction. After he assumed office in 2009, 
Davutoglu frequently visited Tehran, Washington, Moscow, Brussels and Brasilia to reach a 
negotiated settlement. Davutoglu developed a mutual trust with key Iranian politicians including 
President Ahmadinejad, foreign minister Manucehr Muttaki, Chairman of Parliament Ali 
Larijani and Sectetary General of National Security Council and Chief Negotiator Said Jelili. 
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Davutoglu believes that “there is a substantiated common ground on this issue. There is always a 
diplomatic solution; there are always opportunities to resolve this conflict.”491 Before his 
departure to meet Iranian authorities, Davutoglu noted that:  
We have been closely following the developments on the Iranian nuclear program and 
Turkey was involved in all critical negotiations over the past 3-4 years, especially during 
the past three months. We are helping the parties to understand each other. We are trying 
to solve diplomatic deadlocks. As you know, Turkey started the initiative on October 13 
before Iran-5+1 meeting. Since then, we have closely observed the developments. Before 
then, we met the delegates from both side in the Munich Conference. In this context, we 
have some alternative proposals on uranium enrichment. I’m going to Iran to discuss new 
steps… Our efforts are to keep Iranian nuclear program focused on energy generation and 
prevent weapons production.”492     
Turkey’s major diplomatic initiative regarding Iran’s nuclear program has been a joint 
proposal with Brazil on swapping low enriched uranium (LEU) with fuel grade material. The 
agreement was signed in Tehran among top executives in three countries; Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  The joint deal on May 17, 2010, proposed that Iran would hand 
over 1200 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey for further enrichment in either 
Russia or France.493  This constitutes 58 percent of Iran’s LEU stockpiles.494 The Turkey-Brazil-
Iran deal initially seemed promising as it achieved a significant breakthrough in eliminating the 
trust gap. Resolution of the Iran conflict with the swap agreement would grant enormous prestige 
to Turkey and Brazil, which are the two rising powers and non-permanent members of the UN 
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Security Council. A prominent Iran expert Trita Parsi noted that “The Brazilian-Turkish 
diplomatic breakthrough with Iran has taken Washington by surprise. Clearly, the geopolitical 
center of gravity has shifted -- five years of EU-led negotiations led nowhere while the new 
emerging powers Brazil and Turkey only needed a few months to produce a breakthrough.”495 
Figure 4.2: The content of the swap agreement 
 
Source: Financial Times, “Iran agrees to send uranium to Turkey”, May 17, 2010 
As Brazilian President Luiz Silva put it, the initial impression was that “diplomacy 
emerged victorious. It showed that it is possible to build peace and development with 
dialogue.”496 Turkish government officials noted that the swap agreement would eliminate the 
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pretexts for sanctions and military intervention. Foreign Minister Davutoglu noted that “For us, 
now there are no grounds anymore for new sanctions or measures.”497  
However, the joint Turkish and Brazilian overture did not appeal to Western foreign 
policy makers, who continued to call for sanctions.498 On May 18, 2010, a day after the Turkish-
Iranian-Brazilian deal was announced, Washington applied to the UN Security Council with a 
new proposal for sanctions.  These sanctions were approved by the UN Security council with 
resolution 1929 even though Turkey and Brazil voted “no”. The Turkey-Brazil-Iran agreement 
was similar to the Western proposal in October 2009, which was rejected by the Iranian 
government. Even though Washington was initially sympathetic to swap agreements, American 
foreign policy makers later backtracked as Iran has gained more centrifuges and stockpiles of 
LEU since 2006. According to Western critics, the remaining half of Iran’s LEU stockpile will 
be sufficient for weapons grade enrichment. White House Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs,  
remarked that “While it would be a positive step for Iran to transfer low-enriched uranium off of 
its soil as it agreed to do last October, Iran said today that it would continue its 20 percent 
enrichment, which is a direct violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.”499 The 
U.S. government officials were angered with the Turkish-Brazilian deal as they thought the 
agreement was just another delaying tactic.  
The Western, particularly the American, posture towards the Turkish-Brazilian overture 
undermined the Turkish elite’s trust in the containment policy. The idea that hardliner Americans 
oppose diplomatic solution gained more gravity among both the Turkish statesman and the 
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public. This view was consolidated after Brazilian President’s release of President Obama’s 
letter on May 31, 2010, regarding Iran’s nuclear program that had proposed an identical solution 
to the Swap Agreement. Washington’s denial of even a peaceful nuclear enrichment is perceived 
by the Turkish elites as a mischievous double standard when there are over 400 nuclear reactors 
around the world. Moreover, Washington’s disrespect to Turkish initiatives fueled the 
commitment of Turkish elites not to comply with sanctions against Iran. Many Turkish elites 
believe that Washington will only stop sanctions if Iran completely acquiesces. Sedat Laciner, 
Director of ISRO-USAK, asserted that “Americans did not like the agreement because they were 
just getting prepared for a military strike. We held the American fist on air before it landed on 
Iran’s face. The agreement does not really meet the demands of the West, but it gave the 
impression that diplomatic solutions are still viable. The American government became 
indignant about the deal because it undermined the legitimacy of their aggression.”500 One 
security official noted that “the American posture after the Swap Agreement clearly indicates 
that the United States does not really want a diplomatic solution. Indeed, they get angry 
whenever a diplomatic opportunity emerges. From now on it is really hard for us to join 
American policies against Iran.”501 According to Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, “None of the existing 
nuclear powers are importing enriched uranium. All have their own enrichment plants. So we 
cannot expect that the Iranians would go along with this offer. Quite naturally they want to gain 
full control of the nuclear energy cycle.”502 
The Iranian government expressed its appreciation for Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the crisis between Iran and the West. Ramin Mehmanperest, the spokesperson of the 
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Iranian foreign ministry noted that “we will not backdown from our right to develop nuclear 
energy…friendly countries like Turkey are exerting relentless efforts to defend Iran's rights to 
develop nuclear energy. We really appreciate it.” 503 
 
4.10. What if Iran develops nuclear weapons or IAEA finds enough evidence?  
Despite the Turkish political actors’ belief that Iran’s nuclear program is constrained with energy 
generation, Iran may develop nuclear warheads once it obtains a surge capacity. If Tehran tests 
nuclear weapons or the IAEA inspectors find sound evidences of weapons grade enrichment, 
there are several policy options for the Turkish government:  i) Turkey might seek extension of 
the NATO nuclear shield.  Turkey can forge closer ties with the United States and acquire more 
sophisticated missile defense system, ii) Turkey might develop its own nuclear weaponry over 
the long term. Given the existing nuclear capacity, Turkey is unlikely to develop nuclear 
warheads in the near term. An open nuclear enterprise might well alienate Turkey from the West. 
iii) Turkey might join the United States, EU, and Israel in containment of Iran.   
One common view among the Turkish elites is that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability 
would radically shift the balance of power in the region and development of its own nuclear 
deterrent is a viable option for Turkey to counterbalance the power projection of Tehran. As one 
interviewee put it, “It is true that Iran’s attainment of nukes will shift the regional balances of 
power in favor of Tehran. It is true that Iranian nuclear program creates a strategic vulnerability 
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for Turkey. But think the other side. We can use it as a pretext to develop our own nukes.” 504 
My field research indicates that Turkey may choose to develop nuclear weapons for several 
reasons; i) to deter potential attacks by existing nuclear powers, ii)  to attain strategic superiority 
in the region, iii) to preserve the balance of power with its neighbors, iv) to protect the territorial 
integrity and unity of the Turkish homeland, and v) to enhance national prestige.   
A growing array of prominent Turkish government officials and security analysts argue 
that Iran’s nuclear program will be an impetus for nuclearization of Turkey. According to this 
view, Iran’s nuclear armament will compel Turkey to revise the existing defense capabilities. 
Even though Turkey has a large conventional army, it will not be sufficient to counterbalance 
Iran’s power projection capabilities. According to Umit Ozdag, the former director of ASAM, 
“Turkey is unlikely to live alongside a nuclear neighbor for a long term. Iran’s self confidence 
and power projection will be enhanced… We have to produce our own nuclear weapons to 
preserve the balance of power.”505 Celalettin Yavuz, a senior military strategist at TURKSAM, 
argued that Turkey should make enormous investments to nuclear technology as it lays out the 
bedrock of unconventional weapons capability that would make substantial contributions to 
Turkey's deterrence capability.506 According to General Ergin Celasin, “If Iran develops nuclear 
weapons Turkey should do the same to be able to preserve the balance of power between the two 
countries and also in the region.”507 Vehbi Dincerler, a former minister of state, noted that 
“Turkey should not only develop nuclear weapons, but the quantity as well as the quality of 
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Turkey's nuclear arsenal should be on a par with those of the nations in the region”508 Col. Taner 
Altinok, Director of the Institute for Defense Studies, maintains that “Turkey should definitely 
follow the path that Iran walked over the years, both for energy generation purposes so as to 
meet Turkey's growing demand for energy and also for attaining a nuclear weapons capability to 
better protect Turkey's national interests. Regional balances and conjectural developments 
compel Turkey to do so”509 Suleyman Sensoy, director of Turkasia Strategic Research Center 
(TASAM), noted that “Turkey has been late in nuclear proliferation. Turkey should immediately 
build nuclear power plants. We should immediately start generating nuclear energy. Turkey’s 
nuclear investment will not prompt suspicion because we are an energy dependent country. 
Energy is always important. We are 80 percent dependent.”510 Dogan Heper, a well known 
journalist at Milliyet Newspaper argued that nuclear armament would have three main benefits 
for Turkey.511 First, nuclear weapons would deter foreign encroachment and help preserving the 
political/territorial integrity of Turkey. Second, it would enhance the power and prestige of a 
Turkish military that could function as a mediator in conflicts among the countries of the region. 
Third, it would boost the self confidence of Turkish citizens whose ancestors used to be the 
people of great empires.  
The second option is more integration into Western defense organizations to ensure 
preservation of a nuclear umbrella. In this case, Turkey could choose purchasing state-of-the-art 
missile defense systems to deter a potential Iranian encroachment. However, my field research 
has made it clear that the second option is unlikely at least during the Erdogan Administration, 
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because this will compel Turkey to comply with the Western sanctions.  In other words, even if 
diplomacy fails, the Erdogan Administration is unlikely to endorse the American campaign 
against Iran. This became increasingly evident after May 2010, when the Turkish-Brazilian joint 
bid for a solution was disdainfully ignored by Washington. According interviewee Arif Keskin, 
“Erdogan Administration thinks that Iran’s nuclear problem can be resolved with diplomatic 
means. However, even if diplomacy fails, Turkey will stand against American non-diplomatic 
initiatives, particularly military intervention.”512 
 Since the Gulf War (1991), a growing array of Turkish elites began to question the 
NATO/US nuclear umbrella. In many cases, the reluctance and sluggishness of the Western 
response reinforced mistrust about the security guarantee of Western allies. Moreover, increasing 
anti-Westernism has been undermining the reliability and legitimacy of security partnerships 
with the traditional allies. One former Ambassador suggested that “If Iran develops nuclear 
weapons, Turkey will be compelled to develop its own nuclear arsenal, because the Turkish 
government officials do not really trust the U.S nuclear umbrella.” 513 Celalettin Yavuz argued 
that “before the first Gulf War, we demanded ABMs from NATO, because we did not have 
sufficient defensive missiles. The Germans and the Dutch resisted it on the grounds that NATO 
commitments were against the Soviets. They argued that since Iraq was not the USSR, the 
Turkish demand for ABMs should be refused.”514 According to Kaan Dilek, “Turkey’s 
membership to NATO no longer helps to protect us from external security threats. NATO cannot 
help Turkey if Iran attacks us with nuclear weapons. NATO cannot help our terrorism problem. 
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Therefore, the Turkish security apparatus needs a more practical security platform to meet 
contemporary security challenges.”515 
Even though the elites have been critical of the existing nuclear shield, Turkey’s potential 
quest for nuclear weapons is opposed by various non-proliferation experts. First, some argue that 
a nuclear program may bear negative consequences for Turkey in international politics as it may 
be exposed to economic and political containment. 516 Second, nuclear weapons are unnecessary 
as Turkey has no imminent enemy or upcoming great conflict that would necessitate exploitation 
of WMD.517 Turkey has constructed highly positive relations will all neighbors and bilateral 
relations have been desecuritized.518 Therefore, investment in nuclear weapons would be wasting 
national resources. Third, Turkey needs cooperation with either an existing nuclear state or 
compatible non-state individuals to build a nuclear enrichment infrastructure.519 As none of the 
existing nuclear powers will give open support, any potential nuclear program would need 
clandestine support. This could prompt the international community to name Turkey another 
“rogue state” that would undermine Turkey’s international prestige and economic prosperity.  
Only a limited number of experts believe that Turkey will participate in American and 
Israeli containment of Iran. In their view, this might happen because Prime Minister Erdogan 
will feel deceived by the Iranians if they develop nuclear weapons. Arif Keskin noted that, “If 
diplomatic efforts fail, and Iran continues to reject full safeguard inspections by the IAEA, 
Turkey may began pursuing a tougher policy towards Iran. It may have to join the West and 
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Israel in containment policy.”520 Keskin maintained that “Currently Erdogan believes in the 
statements of Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. He is convinced that Iran is not developing 
nuclear weapons. However, if the inspectors find evidence of weapons grade enrichment 
Erdogan would be very upset about the Iranian leaders. He will feel cheated and be tougher than 
the Americans against the Iranian government.”521 Arzu Celalifer Ekinci maintained that “If Iran 
tests nuclear weapons, Erdogan will be very angry. By angry, I mean he will go really mad, 
because he will feel deceived by the Iranians. As everyone knows Turkey is a member of the 
United Nations Security Council. Turkey will be harsher than the Europeans once Erdogan feels 
deceived.” 522 
4.11. Critiques and dissenting opinions  
Even though a significant majority of the Turkish political community supports the Erdogan 
Administration’s posture towards the Iranian nuclear program, this position  has drawn major 
criticism from pro-Western and pro-Israeli elites. The AKP government was accused of 
protecting a fundamentalist regime from international sanctions and helping Iran to attain nuclear 
weapons that would radically shift the balances of power in the region. Moreover, this posture 
undermines Turkey’s intergovernmental relations with traditional allies, mainly the United 
States, Israel and the European Union.   
One major criticism is the Erdogan Administration’s protection of the Iranian 
government from the international sanctions. Turkey not only rejects sanctions, but uses 
diplomatic overture to prevent economic sanctions or military intervention into Iran.  This was 
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evident in the joint Swap Agreement initiative with Brazil in May 17, 2010. Mehmet Ali Birand, 
a prominent pro-Israeli journalist made the accusation that “Ankara is protecting Iran in its 
nuclear program”. 523 For Birand, Erdogan and Ahmadinejad call each other “brother”, therefore 
Ankara is inherently supportive of Iran’s position in the nuclear debate.  One interviewee, Arif 
Keskin notes that “Turkish elites know that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Until recently, 
Turkey was not really involved in international initiatives on Iranian nuclear matters. Why did 
Turkey change its mood? Because the Erdogan Administration feared that weakening of the 
Iranian regime may impel American or Israeli intervention. Turkey is actively engaging in this 
process because we do not want another war in this region.”524 Many analysts, however, claim 
that the AKP’s posture helps Iran to progress towards acquisition of nuclear weapons. The 
Erdogan Administration lends a hand to Iranian delaying tactics until Iran obtains a surge 
capacity.525 Faruk  Laloglu, a former Ambassador to Washington and Undersecretary of Foreign 
Ministry, noted that Iran is inexorably moving towards nuclear weapons unless the international 
community exerts greater pressure.526 
Another group of critics argue that Iran's nuclear program may catalyze an armament race 
in the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab states may attempt to develop nuclear arsenals 
as they experience a heightened threat from the Iranian WMD warheads and missile technology. 
Author’s interviewee Serdar Erdurmaz, director of the Disarmament Institute at TURKSAM, 
noted that “As soon as Iran develops nuclear weapons, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will 
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have a pretext to develop their own nuclear arsenal.” 527 According to Mustafa Kibaroglu “The 
Turkish government is really concerned that Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons would 
instigate the Arab governments to obtain nuclear arsenal as soon as possible. We are concerned 
that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria could go nuclear after that.”528 Kibaroglu added that, “one of 
the pillars of current Turkish foreign policy is clearing nuclear weapons out the region. We want 
Israel to get rid of its nuclear arsenal in order to have a nuclear free Middle East.” 529 
Iran’s missile program aroused parallel concerns among dissident disarmament experts 
with military and diplomatic backgrounds. Contrary to the politicians, these experts were more 
worried about Iran’s attainment of both nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
One of my retired military interviewees Serdar Erdurmaz noted that “recently Iranians tested a 
new generation of missiles. It is capable of hitting targets at 2000 km distance. They can increase 
the range because they learned how to do it. They resolved the reentry problem of the ballistic 
missiles into the atmosphere. They can easily hit Israel, Eastern Europe, Moscow and every 
destination in the Arab peninsula.”530  Another disarmament expert noted that, “There is 
intelligence available through Arabic documents that Iranians are working on trigger 
mechanisms for nuclear warheads. At this point we have to be more serious about Iran’s nuclear 
program. In summary they are enriching uranium, they have been developing long range ballistic 
missiles and now they are working on trigger mechanisms. These all indicate that Iran is on the 
verge of becoming a nuclear power.” 531 
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According to some interviewees Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons would radically 
shift the balance of power and balance of threats in the region.  Iran will gain the upper hand in 
regional power projection and may blackmail Turkey in regional conflicts. Ozdem Sanberk, a 
former Ambassador to Washington, noted that “Iran with nuclear production will be the 
dominant power in the region…There will be an asymmetrical relationship.”532 For Huseyin 
Bagci, “Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons will radically shift the balance of power. Iran will 
gain the status of a nuclear power. We will have a nuclear zone from the Persian Gulf to China. I 
know the difference between a nuclear power and a conventional one. We may never be sure 
about the level of Iran’s aggressiveness. They haven’t attacked us over the past few centuries. 
But it doesn’t necessarily mean that they will always remain peaceful.” 533 Serdar Erdurmaz 
maintained that “Iran does not pose any threat to Turkey now, but if they attain nuclear weapons, 
they will be able to project asymmetric power in this region. They will join the prestigious 
nuclear club. Then Turkey will be concerned about the Iranian nuclear program as much as the 
Europeans and the Americans.” 534 According to former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, “Attaining 
nuclear weapons will elevate Iran to the status of regional power, which it does not deserve 
considering its political regime and economic development level.”535 Prof. Umit Ozdag, the 
former director of ASAM, stated that “Iranian attainment of nuclear weapons could cause Iran to 
gain gravity in regional developments in the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus at the 
expense of Turkey. For example, a nuclear Iran will have more influence over Azerbaijan.”536  
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 Some critics argue that Iran has been using Turkey to open a loophole in the Western 
containment policy. For them, Iran has been manipulating the process as a delaying tactic and 
might adopt a completely different stance against Turkey it obtains nuclear weapons or the West 
gives up its containment policy.  Interviewee Huseyin Bagci wrote several articles 
recommending that the Erdogan Administration should give up its absolute support of the Iranian 
nuclear program. Bagci escorted Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu during 
their visit to Tehran and closely observed the bilateral negotiations. During his interview he 
noted that “One Iranian journalist told me that Turkey depends on Iran and is really benefiting 
from the growing partnership. I interrupted him straightly and told him that it is the Iranians who 
are really benefiting from this partnership. We are saving you from an international containment. 
You should be really appreciative of this Issue. I think we should implement a more balanced 
approach towards Iran. We should not allow them to manipulate our partnership.”537  
4.12. Conclusions of the Chapter  
Iran’s nuclear program has become a principal issue for Turkish foreign policy makers. Contrary 
to Western containment strategy, the Erdogan Administration opposes international sanctions as 
well as military intervention. The key government officials believe that the conflict over Iranian 
nuclear enrichment should be resolved with diplomatic overtures. My field research indicated 
that the AKP government’s posture towards Iran has been driven by several perceptions of the 
governing elites. 
Fist, Turkish government authorities believe that Iran has an absolute right to develop 
nuclear energy that is warranted by the non-proliferation treaty. For them, the West puts  undue 
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pressure on Iran when there are over 400 nuclear reactors in the world. Even though Iran 
possesses one of the largest reserves of hydrocarbon resources, Iranian authorities are rationally 
concerned about depletion of natural resources within next three decades. Therefore, Turkish 
elites believe that Iran has a right to develop nuclear energy to diversify energy supply.  
Second, my interviews and content analysis of leader statements indicated that the 
prevailing view in the Erdogan Administration is that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, 
only civilian nuclear energy. Key government authorities asserted that there is no evidence of 
diversion to weapons grade enrichment.  This view is embraced particularly by the political wing 
of the government and a majority of Turks. The security establishment and diplomats are more 
reserved in claiming that Iran's nuclear program is only designed for energy production. Some 
military officials, including my military interviewees, asserted that Iran is clandestinely 
developing nuclear warheads and using diplomacy as a delaying tactic.  
Third, even if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Turkish elites believe that neither Turkey 
nor the United States and Israel will be targeted by the Iranian government. In their view, Turkey 
will not be the target of Iran because it has no ongoing conflict with the Iranians. Iranian nuclear 
warheads will be used to deter a potential American or Israeli strike or invasion. Turkish elites 
believe that Iranians are as rational and deterrable as the existing nuclear powers. Iranians will 
never attack the United States preemptively because they are fully aware of the asymmetry of 
destruction capability. Iranians will not attack Israel preemptively either because Israel has 
nuclear superiority and protection of the United States. Therefore, the Turkish government is not 
as concerned about Iran’s attainment of nuclear warheads as its Western counterparts.  
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Fourth, Turkish elites believe that economic sanctions against Iran are unlikely to compel 
the Iranians to surrender to Western demands. My interviews with government officials and 
analysts revealed that Turkey's foreign policy elites do not believe that economic sanctions will 
be effective. They believe that Western efforts are futile and economic sanctions will not work 
for several reasons explained above. This view has deepened as Turkey, Russia, China, India, 
and major European countries sign bilateral trade agreements and increase investments in Iran. 
Turkish government officials accuse the Europeans of hypocrisy, because they overtly criticize 
the nuclear venture of the Ahmadinejad Administration, and at the same time rapidly increase 
bilateral trade.   
Fifth, the Erdogan Administration asserts that a military intervention against Iran would 
bring catastrophic consequences for Iran, the United States, Israel and other countries of the 
region. It would trigger ethno-sectarian war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would reduce regional 
energy supply and drive up the prices of oil and natural gas. The elites perceive American, 
British and Israeli intervention as the principal threat to regional security and stability. Moreover, 
a military campaign against Iran is unlikely to achieve the desired outcome as nuclear facilities 
are dispersed and buried underground. Elimination of Iran’s nuclear program would require 
invasion of Iran by land forces. Turkish security experts believe that a land war with Iran is 
unwinnable for both the United States and Israel, and would impose unacceptable costs on all 
parties to the conflict.  
Sixth, throughout my field research, I encountered a profound disrespect for the NPT 
regime and American non-proliferation policy. Turkish security analysts maintain that neither the 
Americans nor the Israelis could present any convincing evidence about Iran’s weapon’s grade 
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enrichment. Turkish intelligence and security officials believe that the American threat 
projections depend on “fabricated” intelligence estimates that have never been confirmed by 
HUMINT. Prime Minister Erdogan and other key members of the AKP government believe that 
the West maintains a double standard in enforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
They asserted that pro-Western governments never experience sanctions, whereas the anti-
Western regimes are selectively targeted by the existing nuclear powers. They assert that the 
IAEA and the UN Security Council are heavily influenced by the United States and these 
institutions are unlikely to behave in a just manner. Prime Minister Erdogan renewed his 
commitment to a nuclear weapons free world. To achieve this goal, five members of the UN 
Security Council should take the lead in eliminating their existing nuclear arsenals. For him, it is 
unjust to put pressure on Iran while the U.S., Russia, China, France, and UK have abundant 
nuclear weapons. According to many security analysts and government officials, U.S. non-
proliferation policy is the real problem in disarmament. For them, the United States wants to 
preserve the nuclear status quo and will use diplomatic and military power to prevent 
nuclearization of non-friendly regimes that could challenge American hegemony.  
Seventh, according to a prevailing majority of the Turkish elites all nuclear weapons 
should be eliminated from the region. Instead of focusing on “non-existent” weapons of Iran, the 
West should begin sanctioning Israel, a nuclear power that is not a member of the NPT. None of 
the key foreign policy makers want Iran to attain nuclear weapons. The president, prime 
minister, foreign minister, military officials and strategists are in agreement on this issue. 
According to the Turkish political elite, however, Israel is much more aggressive and likely to 
use WMD than Iran. Therefore, they assert that denuclearization of the region should start with 
Israel, the only country with a nuclear arsenal in the Middle East. The international community 
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puts disproportionate pressure on unproven nuclear activities of Iran when there is an existing 
nuclear power that shows no respect to the IAEA safeguards and UN Security Council 
resolutions.   
 Eighth, Turkish elites believe in the merits of multilateral diplomacy and assert that the 
conflict over Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved within diplomatic frameworks. The AKP 
government seeks to prevent exacerbation of the nuclear crisis. Turkey has begun to play a 
critical role in countering Iran's nuclear program. Turkey is currently functioning as a mediator 
between the West and Iran. Many Turkish elites believe that neither the United States nor Israel 
wants a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program. Turkish leaders have asserted that 
Americans and Israelis are determined to attack Iran not only to destroy nuclear facilities but also 
to change the anti-American and anti-Semitic regime. Statements made by Pentagon officials 
have aroused grave concerns among government officials in Turkey. They asserted that General 
Petraeus’s proclamation of U.S. preparation for a military strike against Iran undermined 
Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to preserve stability in the region.  
Contrary to the prevailing view, some military strategists and diplomats claim that Iran 
will eventually develop nuclear weapons. However, they are not concerned with a potential 
nuclear assault by the Iranian government. They are more concerned with the shift of power and 
emerging regional asymmetry in favor of Iran. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, its power 
projection could supersede Turkey's influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle 
East. Therefore, to overcome the emerging asymmetry they propose two options for the 
government; i) extension of the NATO nuclear umbrella, and ii) development of nuclear 
weapons.  Many security and foreign policy elites increasingly question the effectiveness of the 
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NATO/US nuclear shield.  The sluggishness and reluctance of its traditional allies is forcing 
Turkey to redefine its alliance structure in the new security environment. Therefore, some 
Turkish elites have begun to campaign for development of a national nuclear weapons arsenal.  
  The Erdogan Administration’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear program has received 
moderate criticism from pro-Western and pro-Israeli elites.   The AKP government was accused 
of protecting a fundamentalist regime from international sanctions. In this view, Turkey helps 
Iran to attain nuclear weapons that would radically shift the balance of power in the region. 
Moreover, this posture undermines Turkey’s intergovernmental relations with its traditional 
allies, mainly the United States, Israel and the European Union.  Some critics argued that Iran's 
nuclear program may stimulate a nuclear armament race in the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
other Arab states may attempt to develop nuclear arsenal as they experience a heightened threat 
from the Iranian nuclear capacity. Therefore the AKP government should go along with the 
United States and Israel to prevent nuclear proliferation throughout the region.   
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CHAPTER 5  
UNDERLYING REASONS FOR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP  
This chapter investigates the underlying reasons for the expanding Turkish-Iranian energy 
partnership between 2003 and 2010. As Iran’s nuclear program attracted more interest among the 
students of international security, the scrutiny over its energy exports intensified. During this 
period, Iran became a major energy partner of Turkey in two respects. First, Prime Minister 
Erdogan and Iranian President Ahmadinejad signed two Memoranda of Understandings in 2007 
and 2008. The amended bilateral energy agreement in 2008 proposes: i) transfer of 35 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas through Turkey annually (half will be diverted into domestic 
markets), ii) $12 billion investment by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in the South 
Pars field of Iran for natural gas extraction, iii) transfer of gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey via 
transit pipeline through Iran, and iv) construction of 2000 kilometers of pipelines from 
Turkmenistan to Turkey, through Iranian territory.538  
Prior to 2002, Turkey purchased less than four percent of its natural gas from Iran. The 
new contracts increased the overall volume of natural gas trade between Iran and Turkey over 
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800 percent.539 The Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) anticipated supplying 
over 19 percent of natural gas from Iran in 2010.540 Second, by 2009, Iran had replaced Russia as 
Turkey’s primary oil supplier, mainly because oil purchases from Iran increased nearly 80 
percent between 2002 and 2009.541 In 2010, energy officials asserted that that Turkey’s oil 
purchases from Iran would continue to increase within the immediate future.542 Apart from the 
burgeoning hydrocarbon trade, Ankara and Tehran agreed that bilateral energy trade will be 
conducted in Turkish-Iranian currencies rather than the U.S. dollar or Euro.  
The energy agreements were signed at a very critical time when the United States 
intensified efforts for economic containment of Iran’s “rogue regime”. This agreement was 
strongly opposed by American and Israeli officials as both countries were exerting relentless 
efforts to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear encrichment capability by imposing strict 
sanctions. These long term contracts not only allowed Iran to access Turkish consumers, but they 
also provide a gateway to vast European energy markets. The bilateral energy partnership 
provides substantial economic resources that could be used for Iran’s nuclear program, and 
helped Tehran to resist the U.S. led economic embargo. The Turkish-Iranian energy partnership 
contributed to the doubts about the effectiveness of the economic embargo and diplomatic 
initiatives against the Iranian nuclear program. In that case, a preemptive military strike seemed 
to be more likely to stop the Iranian nuclear program. The growing energy partnership between 
Iran and Turkey complicates the alliance patterns in the region. Many critics argue that it is an 
indicator of realignment of Turkey in the international system. 
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There are six key actors in Turkish Energy policy: the Prime Minister, the Energy 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Director of the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), the 
Director of Energy Markets Regulatory Authority (EPDK), and the Director of The Turkish 
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). My field research indicated that the key actors and prominent 
analysts were in broad consensus on the necessity of energy partnership with Iran. The core 
assumption of the energy security approach is that states seek alternative suppliers to reduce 
vulnerability to major supply disruptions, and the use of energy disruption as a coercive 
instrument in foreign policy. Throughout the field research, statements by government elites and 
analysts supported this assumption of the energy security approach. In general my field research 
identified five factors that drive the energy partnerhip between Ankara and Tehran: i) growing 
energy demand and increasing vulnerability, ii) attempts to reduce energy dependency on Russia, 
iii) supply disruptions in Iraq, iv) strategic gains and the Nabucco project, and v) cost efficiency 
and security of pipelines through Iran. After discussing the effects of these five factors, I will 
present the common perceptions among the Turkish elites that led to non-compliance with the 
U.S. demands to refrain from making major energy deals with Iran. Finally, I will present critical 
views and dissenting opinions against the energy partnership between the Erdogan and 
Ahmadinejad Administrations.  
5.1. Increasing demand, dependency and vulnerability  
Throughout the interviewing process, most government officials and analysts asserted that 
growing domestic energy consumption had been a principal reason for the Turkish government’s 
energy partnership with Iran. This phenomenon has also been voiced by the highest authorities 
on Turkish energy policy. For instance, Hasan Koktas, the Chairman of the EPDK, noted that, 
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“Turkey is one of the fastest growing energy markets. Particularly our demand for natural gas 
has been constantly increased as we use it for electric generation because of cost efficiency, ease 
of use and environmental reasons.” 543 As stated by Chairman Koktas, Natural gas is increasingly 
becoming a more important element in domestic energy markets. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show 
explose growth in natural gas and oil consumption, especially after 1995.  
Figures 5.1-2: Natural gas and oil consumptions in Turkey 1987-2008 
 
Sources: BOTAS (2009) and the BP Statistical review (2008)  
Apart from the elite statements, Turkey’s growing energy demand, foreign dependency 
and vulnerability to supply disruptions are clearly articulated in institutional reports of the 
Ministry of Energy, the EPDK, the TPAO and the BOTAS. Throughout the 1990s, domestic 
natural gas consumption increased over 300 percent thanks largely to a 460 percent expansion in 
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industrial energy consumption.544 This rapid increase continued after 2000, and it is expected to 
be much higher by 2030. According to the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, Turkey’s natural gas 
demand increased from 1.2 billion cubic feet to 37.5 billion cubic feet between 1988 and 2008.545  
The BP Annual Statistical Review indicates that domestic oil consumption in Turkey increased 
from 466,000 barrel per day to 677,000 barrels within the same period (See figure 5.2). Turkey 
pays over $10 billion each year to purchase natural gas. In 2009, the Energy Markets Regulatory 
Authority estimated that out of 37.5 billion cubic meters, 16.6 percent of natural gas is consumed 
in electric power plants, 7.2 percent in residences and 6.4 percent in industries.546 
Figure 5.3: Ratio of natural gas in domestic energy markets   
 
Source: EPDK, Yillik Dogalgaz Raporu, 2009, p.27 
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As figure 5.3 demonstrates, natural gas constituted less than one percent of domestic 
energy consumption in 1985.547 By 2010, however, over 30 percent of all domestic energy needs 
and 60 percent of electric generation was met by natural gas. The EPDK anticipated that natural 
gas would be an increaingly important component of Turkey’s energy market after 2010 as it is 
relatively cost efficient.548 The same upward trend is anticipated in use of natural gas in 
residential heating, industrial production and electric generation.   
According to the Turkish National Energy Security strategy, supply diversification is a 
principal method to reduce vulnerability to major disruptions. 549 Turkish governments are 
strongly encouraged to find alternative suppliers to prevent overdependency on certain energy 
providers. Nevertheless, Turkey remains over 70 percent dependent on foreign energy resources 
but the level of foreign dependency is expected to exceed 80 percent by the year 2030.550 Turkey 
is also highly vulnerable to major supply disruptions, because it is 98 percent dependent on 
foreign natural gas and 90 percent dependent on foreign oil.551 Turkish energy policy makers are 
gravely concerned with the looming energy crisis because both foreign dependency and the cost 
of energy are increaing rapidly. Bulent Aras, the Director of the Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Research (SETAV), noted that, “Energy dependency is a principal concern 
for foreign policy makers.  There are many industrializing provinces like Gaziantep and 
Erzurum. We have new bourgeois provinces like Kahramanmaras. They all demand much higher 
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energy every year. We can provide the cheapest and most secure energy from Russia and Iran. If 
we didn’t make these agreements with Iran we would be 90 percent dependent on Russia”.552 
My field research revealed that there are two major sources of physical energy 
vulnerability for Turkey. The major vulnerability is over dependency on Russia which has an 
increasing monopoly over the Caspian energy resources. According to one Energy official, 
Turkey remains roughly 65 percent dependent on Russian natural gas and 53 percent dependent 
on Russian oil. 553 For many energy analysts, Russia’s growing energy control over the Caspian 
energy resources increases the likelihood of the use of oil/gas for political leverage. The second 
source of vulnerability is supply disruption in Iraq owing to the prolonged ethnic war and 
insurgency.554 Turkey remains highly vulnerable to this. The joint pipelines (Kirkuk-Yumurtalik) 
between Iraq and Turkey ceased to function after the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003. Iraq’s 
proximity to Turkey reduces the cost of energy transportation but lack of pipeline security and 
unsustainable hydrocarbon flows downgraded Iraq’s reliability as an energy supplier.555 
By 2010, the predominant portion of Turkey’s gas purchases are transferred through the 
Blue Stream Pipeline that crosses under the Black Sea. This pipeline is the world’s longest 
underwater energy transportation system. Turkey’s energy security specialists are highly 
concerned about corrosion of deep water pipelines due to the sulfur rich ooze environment. 
556Apart from corrosion, supply disruptions could take place due to natural incidents such as 
volcanic eruption, earthquakes and methane seepages.557 Recovery from supply disruptions 
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would be extremely prolonged because the pipelines traverse 2200 meters under the surface of 
the water.  
Overdependency on natural gas in electric power plants is another serious energy 
vulnerability for Turkey. Turkey’s electric generation is 60 percent dependent on foreign natural 
gas supply.558 As Necdet Pamir put it, excessive foreign dependency on natural gas creates 
vulnerability not only for electric generation but also for industrial production that necessitates 
larger volumes of electric supply. The life cycle of Turkey’s many hydro-electric power plants 
will come to an end within the next three decades. Turkey’s nuclear power plants are still in the 
development stage. The government signed contracts with Russia in 2010 to construct nuclear 
power plants but nuclear electric generation will not be viable until 2017. Former Minister of 
Energy Hilmi Guler projected that Turkey should make over $100 billion investment into electric 
power plants by 2020, to avoid major supply disruptions.559 Thus, Turkey seems unlikely to 
reduce dependency on foreign natural gas supply in electric generation.  
Another point of vulnerability is Turkey’s lack of natural gas storage capacity. Domestic 
markets are immediately affected by supply disruptions in Russia and Iran. Major storage 
projects such as the Salt Lake Project and Silivri Storage facility remain in the planning stage. 
Gokhan Yardim, Director General of the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, cautioned “We have 
been talking about the Salt Lake Project since 1987. The first engineering contract was in 2000. 
But there were no substantial investments since then. If we had achieved this project, we would 
be less vulnerable to supply disruptions in Iran…Our existing storage capacity is 1.6 billion 
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cubic meters. We can only pump out 14.5 million cubic meters. This is less than 10 percent of 
domestic demand.”560 
5.2. Attempts to reduce dependency on Russia  
Russia has been the predominant energy supplier of Turkey both for natural gas and petroleum 
since the 1970s. According to the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Turkey’s 
dependency decreased from 62 percent to 56 percent between 2008 and 2009, but Russia still 
remains by far the most important natural gas supplier.561 As seen in figure 5.5, Turkey is 15 
percent dependent on Iran, 14 percent on Azerbaijan, 13 percent on Algeria and 3 percent on 
Nigeria. Apart from the natural gas, Turkey was 36 percent dependent on Russian oil in 2008 
when the Erdogan Administration signed energy agreements with Iran.562  
 
Figure 5.5: Turkey’s dependency on foreign natural gas  
 
Source: EPDK annual report 2009, Ankara/Turkey 
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A number of energy analysts reported that there are four potential hazards for Turkey of 
overdependence on Russian natural energy resources. First, for some of the analysts, the 
historical track record of Russian energy policy indicates a tendency to use oil/natural gas as a 
weapon of foreign policy.563 Second, Russia sets exorbitant pricing compared to the alternative 
energy suppliers in Central Asia.564 Third, take or pay agreements and lack of artificial reserves 
wastes substantial amounts of financial resources.565 Fourth, the Blue Stream Pipeline, which is 
the longest deep water pipeline in the world, is highly exposed to physical dangers. In the event 
of an accident, the repair will be costly and time consuming. 566 Fifth, large energy contracts with 
Russia, hinder the projected Trans-Caspian pipeline projects with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan.567  
 The Russian tendency to use oil/gas supply as a foreign policy weapon was frequently 
discussed by my interviewees. Many elites and analysts have argued that Turkish-Russian 
relations may not always experience the current honeymoon period, and substantial crises may 
erupt because of power projection policies in the Caspian region and Central Asia. According to 
this view, Russia might cut down supply of oil/gas in order to compel Turkey to behave in a 
compromising fashion. For instance, Ambassador Faruk Laloglu argued that “We should break 
the Russian monopoly on energy. Russia used energy as a weapon in the past. We have seen this 
against Georgia and Ukraine. In order to avoid potential coercion, we should diversify energy 
suppliers. We should have alternatives of major energy providers. We signed this agreement 
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[with Iran] for this reason.” 568 Sinan Ogan, the General Director of International Relations and 
Strategic Research Center, noted that “Turkey and Ukraine are different cases. Their relations 
with Russia are completely different. But we cannot say that Turkey is less prone to the risk of 
supply disruptions. Supply disruptions may not only occur as a result of political crisis but 
natural disasters may cut the flow of natural gas…We have to diversify suppliers and build large 
storage facilities to minimize the risk of supply diversification.”569 Nasuh Uslu, a senior foreign 
policy analyst, maintained that “It is true that we have no major conflicts with the Russians. But 
there are some nascent conflict nodes such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. If Turkey escalates the 
conflicts, the supply of natural gas will turn into an important tool for the Russians. They can use 
gas disruptions to punish us. We don’t want Putin or Medvedev to use energy as a coercion 
mechanism. Overdependence is not a healthy condition.” 570 
However, the people who are closer to the decision making process rejected the argument 
that Russia has an inherent tendency to use energy supply as a foreign policy tool. They 
acknowledge that Turkey is the second largest market for Russian gas after the European Union. 
In their perception, Russia is as dependent on Turkish markets as Turky is on Russian supplies. 
Therefore, Russian ruling elites are unlikely to use energy supply for political leverage. During 
his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Erdogan laid emphasis on Russia’s role as Turkey’s primary 
energy supplier and asserted that there is no expectation of supply disruptions due to political 
conflicts.571 One of my interviewees, Huseyin Bagci, accompanied Prime Minister Erdogan 
during his visit to Moscow. Bagci noted that “Russians will not want to irritate one of their 
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largest customers. I have talked with many important figures in Moscow, including Putin, 
Medvedev and Alexey Miller, who is the Chairman of Gazprom. In one of our conversations, I 
asked Alexey Miller whether Russia could use energy as a foreign policy tool against Turkey. He 
assured me that this will never happen. They have never done so. I don’t think they will do it in 
the future. 572  
Another prevailing argument is that Turkey’s over dependency on Russia undercuts its 
bargaining power in pricing. Russia sells the Turkmen gas to Turkey after tripling the price 
(Russia buys around $100 per 1000 cubic meter and sell it around $300 per 1000 cubic 
meters).573 There is a broad consensus among Turkish elites that Turkey should find alternative 
suppliers at least to promote competition and reduce the cost. The recent agreements with Iran 
and Turkmenistan link Turkey to Central Asian gas suppliers and allow direct purchases. Thus, 
Turkey partly eliminates Russian arbitrage [simultaneous buying and selling] and avoids paying 
excessive price for natural gas. Necdet Pamir, the former Director of Eurasian Strategic Research 
Center (ASAM), noted that “Turkey is now 65 percent dependent on Russia. This [Turkish-
Iranian agreement] can be seen as a major move against Russia. We are trying to cut down the 
prices of gas. We are making several moves for this. Mainly we are trying to diversify 
suppliers.”574 
Many Turkish elites voiced their objection to the monopolistic control of energy 
transportation networks by Gazprom. In their view, control of energy transportation undergirds 
Russia’s power projection in the Caspian region and Central Asia at the expense of Turkey. 
These concerns have been accentuated after the initiation of the South Stream Project in 2007. 
                                                      
572 During the interview, Huseyin Bagci, showed his photos with Putin, Medvedev and Alexey Miller. 
573 Authors interview with an Energy Analyst (X-29), January 18, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. 
574 Seda Bastug, “Turkiye Iran’la Anlasti Dogalgaz Koprusu Oldu”,  Yenisafak Newspaper, July 15, 2007 
195 
 
According to the South Stream agreement among Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
Gazprom will transport North Caspian natural gas resources through an alternative pipeline (see 
Appendix four for south stream pipeline chart).575 For Ilyas Kamalov, the Chair of the Russian 
Desk at the Eurasian Strategic Research Center, the South Stream project represents a 
“comeback” of Russian influence over the former Soviet territories.576 Although Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan have suffered from over dependency on former Soviet pipeline networks, they 
accepted the new offer from the Putin Administration. The South Stream pipeline will extend 
510 kilometers through Turkmen and Kazakh territories before reaching Russia.577 The 
agreement includes modernization and refurbishment of the pipelines remaining from the Soviet 
era. The project is expected to be inaugurated by 2012. After full implementation it will have the 
capacity to transfer 16 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe through Russia.578 Onder 
Karaduman, Director General of AK Energy, noted that “We had to do something to 
counterbalance Russian initiatives. This project [Turkish-Iranian agreement] will strengthen our 
hand. It indicates that Russia is not our only gas supplier.”579 Karaduman maintained that 
Turkey’s energy contracts with Iran are the main incentive to cut down our dependency to 
foreign energy resources. Therefore he argues, Turkey pays no attention to Western warnings to 
cut down bilateral trade relations with Iran.580 Arif Keskin, senior Iran analyst at the International 
Relations and Strategic Research Center, noted that Russia’s increasing control of natural gas 
pipelines has been shifting the regional distribution of power in favor of the former 
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superpower.581 For him, in addition to abundant domestic production, the transit fees on the 
Caspian energy pipelines have been empowering the Russian energy empire. According to 
Keskin, Turkey’s energy partnership with Iran has been formulated not only to reduce 
dependency on Russia but also to undercut the Russian preponderance over the transportation of 
Caspian energy resources.582 
5.3. Supply disruptions in Iraq  
During my field research, many Turkish elites and analysts argued that the Iraq War has changed 
the dynamics of regional energy security. Iraq had been a major energy supplier of Turkey since 
the early 1980s. After American interventions in 1991 and 2003, however, Turkish-Iraqi energy 
trade came to a halt because of the embargos, sanctions and destruction of oil transportation 
facilities. More recently, the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the ongoing insurgency have destroyed 
the Turkish-Iraqi pipelines and downgraded Iraq’s reliability as an energy partner. In this 
context, a growing array of analysts believe that supply disruptions in Iraq paved the way for 
enhanced energy partnership with Iran due to cost effectiveness and security of energy 
transportation. 
Iraq was a major energy supplier of Turkey until the Gulf War (1991) and the two 
neighbors were enjoying a rapidly growing economic interdependence. Iraq’s proximity to 
Turkey and existing pipelines reduced the cost of energy transportation. However, the positive 
trade relationship was reversed after Saddam Hussein cut down the oil supply to punish Turkey 
for assisting the coalition forces. The Turkish Ministry of Finance estimated that the cost of the 
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post Gulf War economic embargo against Iraq exceeded $100 billion for Turkey.583 After five 
years of mutual distress, the governments of Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement to to restore 
the energy trade, but the bilateral trade volume has never recovered to the level before the Gulf 
War. On the other hand, major supply disruptions occurred after the U.S. attack against Iraq in 
2003. As seen in figure 5.7, Turkey’s oil imports from Iraq waned after the U.S. intervention and 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipelines became almost inactive by 2007 due to prolonged insurgency 
and terrorism.  
     Figure 5.7: Oil imports from Iraq through pipelines (in 1000 tons) 584 
 
Source: Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) annual statistics, 2009 
 
The U.S occupation of Iraq dramatically changed the roles for the conventional energy 
actors in the region. The central government’s control on legal/illegal oil trade loosened in the 
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post intervention period. Insurgents, tribal leaders and transnational criminal networks began to 
pose greater threats to the regional pipeline networks. 585 Subsequent to de-nationalization of 
Iraqi oil and return to the U.S. dollar standard, most of the Iraqis including terrorists and 
insurgents, believe that U.S. intervention in Iraq was another “imperialist oil grab”.586 According 
to the radicalized elements, “usurpation” of the energy reserves by foreign companies provides 
justification for drilling of the pipelines and blowing up the petroleum facilities by the 
insurgents. 587 There appears to be two different types of insurgent behaviors against the oil 
facilities. While the first type of insurgent takes advantage of oil smuggling to finance their battle 
against the occupation forces, the second type of insurgents works for destruction of Iraqi 
pipelines and refineries to stop “ransacking” of Iraqi Oil.588  
Many Iraqi analysts and government officials indicated that the Iraqi insurgency is 
funded by oil smuggling, mainly to Turkey. Bilal Wahab, an Iraqi energy analyst, argues that the 
Iraqi insurgency is financed by oil smuggling in cooperation with transnational criminal 
networks.589 The former Iraqi Oil Minister Bahr al-Ulum commented that “oil and fuel 
smuggling networks have grown into a dangerous mafia threatening the lives of those in charge 
of fighting corruption”.590  According to Ali Allawi, Iraq’s former Minister of finance, “40 to 50 
percent of all oil-smuggling profits in the country are diverted away from the government. By 
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infiltrating senior management positions… and threatening truck drivers, insurgents have been 
able to tap into pipelines, empty trucks, and sell the oil or gas themselves.”591 
On the other hand, fundamentalist and terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, destroy 
energy facilities to prevent the “usurpation” of Iraqi oil by the foreign companies.592 According 
to Robert Mullen, insurgents carried out over 400 attacks against oil facilities in Iraq. Among 
those, 398 attacks were carried out against pipelines, 36 against oil wells, 18 against tanker 
trucks and 4 against storage tanks. 593 Hurriyet Newspaper (March 7, 2007), reported that 86 
Turkish oil truck drivers have been killed in Northern Iraq by terrorists between 2003 and 
2007.594 The central government of Iraq could not provide physical security for Iraq’s energy 
infrastructure. The Iraqi military forces and law enforcement agencies remains underequipped, 
poorly trained, corrupt and low of morale.595 Even so, they are somewhat ostracized for 
collaborating with the occupation forces. They have no real control on Iraqi society let alone the 
insurgents.596 Philip Shiskin of Wall Street Journal reported that drilling of oil pipelines 
substantially increased after the U.S. intervention, and even the Iraqi soldiers steal crude oil from 
the long ranging pipeline between Turkey and Iraq. Shiskin maintained that:  
In the second half of the last year [2006], one stretch of pipelines connecting Kirkuk with 
the Turkish Mediterranean port of  Ceyhan the main outlet for Iraq’s northern oil exports 
pumped oil only for 43 days . The rest of the time the pipes sat idle, leaking crude 
through dozens of holes drilled along their 200-mile run through the Iraqi desert. One 
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pipeline has been broken into 39 times so far this year…. The Iraqi government decided 
to integrate the tribal guards into the regular army…Several soldiers have been arrested 
stealing crude. In mid-April, an American patrol has caught an out-of uniform soldier 
planting a roadside bomb near the Cherry Hump.597  
After the U.S. occupation of Iraq, oil smuggling between Iraq and Turkey increased 
dramatically (see figure 5.8). The scope of the oil smuggling was summarized in the National 
Action Plan against Oil Smuggling: 7,814,000 tons of oil was smuggled into Turkey in 2005 and 
2006 and the aggregate amount of tax evasion was around $11 billion.598 
 
  Figure 5.8: Oil smuggling cases between Iraq and Turkey (2001-2008)  
 
Source: Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM), Annual Report, 2009 
 
As seen in figure 5.8, the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) 
reports an 87 percent increase in the number of offenders involved in oil smuggling in Turkey 
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between 2002 and 2008.599 According to the same KOM report, oil smuggling cases between 
Iraq and Turkey increased 98 percent within the same period.600 The Parliamentary Research 
Report on Oil Smuggling indicates that nearly 195 million liters of illicit oil have been seized by 
the national law enforcement agencies between 1995 and 2005.601 However, the experts believe 
that the seized amount constitute only a small percentage of what has actually been smuggled.602  
   The Turkish Parliamentary Commission Report on Oil Smuggling notes that major 
supply disruptions in Iraq enhanced Turkish efforts to seek alternative energy suppliers.603 In this 
context, energy officials exploited sustainable alternatives and Iran became the primary oil 
supplier for Turkey. Energy supply from Iran has two major comparative advantages over the 
Iraqi energy supply.  First, Iran is a relatively stable country with sophisticated energy and 
security institutions.  There is no significant opportunity for energy supply disruption due to 
insurgency, civil war or terrorist attack. Second, Iranian energy resources are controlled by a 
single authority. The Turkish government has to negotiate with only one authority. Conversely, 
Iraqi hydrocarbons are controlled by many entities such as the Central Government, Kurdish 
regional authorities, Occupation Forces, multinational energy companies, tribal leaders and the 
insurgents. The most irritating development for the Turkish government was the Kurdish attempt 
to export oil in 2007, independently of the Iraqi central government.604 The Turkish government 
refused to negotiate with the Kurdish groups (the KDP and the PUK) for oil. They are not 
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recognized as actors in bilateral negotiations on energy contracts. The Kurdish groups are 
unlikely to export regional petroleum independently since Iran, Syria, Turkey and Iraqi Arabs all 
oppose that initiative. Thus, smuggling remains the main option for Kurdish groups to benefit 
from the regional oil.  
 
5.5. Strategic gains and the Nabucco project  
Turkey is located adjacent to the countries that possess approximately 72 percent of the worlds 
proven gas reserves and 73 percent of oil reserves.605 It lies at the shortest distance between the 
Caspian and Middle Eastern Energy producers and the European Union which is the world’s 
largest energy importer. Turkey’s geographic location provides substantial advantages in 
overland pipeline transportation of hydrocarbon resources, particularly natural gas. Even though 
oil is a more fungible product and can be transported by sea, regional pipelines from landlocked 
destinations provide considerable advantages in transportation of petroleum. In particular, the 
pipelines from Azerbaijan and Iraq function as a gateway that makes landlocked regional 
resources available to the global markets. Turkish foreign policy makers and analysts perceive 
the interregional energy pipelines as a strategic tool to gain leverage in international politics.   
5.5.1. Aspiration to be an interregional energy hub  
A large majority of my interviewees indicated that the 2008 energy agreement with Iran would 
facilitate Turkey’s goal to be an interregional energy hub, as it provides access to Central Asian, 
Caspian and European energy markets. There are four existing pipeline projects that contribute to 
                                                      
605 John Roberts, “The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security Issues”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 3, 
Number 4 
203 
 
Turkey’s strategic aim to be an energy hub. These projects also allow implementation of a multi-
sourcing program to avoid major supply disruptions. First, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
project connects the Shah Deniz energy fields of Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean Ceyhan 
Port. BTC is the second longest pipeline in the world that has a one million barrel transfer 
capacity per day.606 Second, Blue Stream Project Connects Russia’s Izobilnoye gas plant to 
Ankara with a 1213 km pipeline, that carries 16 billion cubic meters per annum.607 Third, the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline connects Iraqi oil fields to Yumurtalik facilities on the 
Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Fourth, the Iran-Turkey pipeline connects Iranian gas fields in 
Tabriz to Turkish consumers in Ankara. This pipeline ranges over 2577 kilometers and meets 
nearly 20 percent of Turkey’s domestic gas demand.608 The new agreement in 2008 extends the 
natural gas flow for 25 years.   
Many energy officials and analysts argued that Turkey is determined to make strategic 
investments into transit energy pipelines that connect the Middle East, Caspian Region and 
Europe. Indeed Turkey is dedicated to be an interregional energy hub that will interlink the 
consumers and producers throughout much of the region. According to this view, being an 
energy hub will boost Turkey’s strategic value for both the West and the East. Prime Minister 
Erdogan emphasized that “Turkey is a natural bridge between the energy rich Caspian-Middle 
Eastern producers and energy hungry markets of Europe. We have operationalized the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipelines.  We have accomplished Turkey-Iran, 
Blue Stream and Baku-Tibilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines.  Our ongoing projects indicate the 
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strategic importance of Turkey for European energy security”.609 Former Energy Minister Guler 
noted that, a main pillar of Turkey’s energy policy is “to make sure that the oil and gas resources 
of the region are transferred to the European markets via this country”.610As Hakki Akil, Deputy 
Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put it, Turkey aspires to be the “fourth main 
artery” of European energy supply security through implementing a series of projects such as 
Nabucco and Shah Deniz.611 Arif Keskin, a senior Iran analyst at TURKSAM, asserted that, 
“After the full implementation of the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan project, Turkey is more actively 
seeking to be an energy terminal. Turkish Energy authorities seek to control the flow of gas and 
oil from the Middle East and Caucasus to the European markets.”612 Jeroen Vander Veer, the 
Chairman of Shell executive committee noted that “There were no pipelines over Turkey 10 
years before. In 30 years, Turkey will look like a spaghetti dish and covered with interwoven 
pipeline networks.”613 
According to my interviewees, Turkey confronts three major challenges in its bid to 
become an energy hub. First, Arif Keskin Asserted that Russia is not interested in supporting the 
pipelines through Turkey.614 Indeed, Russians have been attempting to undermine the emergence 
of alternative pipeline ranges. The South Stream project with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is a 
clear indicator of Gazprom’s efforts to preserve Russia’s pipeline monopoly. Second, Bayram 
Sinkaya reported that the Europeans hope to use Turkey’s pipelines for gas transportation and 
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oppose Turkey’s arbitrage on Middle Eastern and Caspian gas.615 They oppose Turkey’s bid for 
being an energy hub that provides extra manipulative power. Third, there is an increasing 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transportation from the Middle East to Europe, which undercuts 
the importance of pipelines. This indicates that Turkey’s energy partnership with Iran and 
Azerbaijan may not be sufficient to gain significant strategic leverage.  
5.5.2. The Nabucco project and access to European markets 
There are consistent institutional expectations that European energy demand will increase 
significantly over the next two decades. According to the International Energy Agency, 
European gas demand will increase 1.6 percent per year between 2010 and 2030.616 Many 
experts and institutions estimate that EU’s natural gas imports will increase dramatically as 
continental gas production is expected to follow a sharp decline. Currently Norway produces 25 
percent of the Europe’s natural gas but this production is anticipated to fall to 17 percent.617 The 
EU’s over-dependency on Russia is becoming an ever greater concern for European foreign 
policy makers. It is expected that the dependency will double in the next two decades. These 
facts have been voiced by Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of the Nabucco Project in the 
following way: “In the Next 10-15 years, our gas consumption will increase from 500 bcm to 
700 bcm…At the same time European Production will go down from 200 bcm to 100 bcm. So 
that leaves room for 600 bcm of gas imports compared to 300 bcm now. That means doubling of 
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the gas imports, therefore a huge necessity of transportation capacity.”618 For Mitchsckek, the 
EU has been increasingly concerned about dependency on Russia since the Putin Administration 
cut off gas supply to Ukraine in 2006.619 The supply disruptions in Ukraine led to a fall of 
pressure in the rest of Europe that put European consumers into a panicky mood about the future 
of energy security. Accordingly, supply diversification has become ever more important for 
European customers.  
Figure 5.9: Nabucco project and other pipelines through Turkey 
 
Source: Petroleum Pipeline Corporation Website, www.botas.gov.tr , June 25, 2010  
 
The Nabucco pipeline is the flagship project of the European supply diversification 
policy. At this junction, Turkish-European energy interests converge. As seen in Figure 5.9., The 
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Nabucco pipeline extends from eastern Turkey to the heart of Europe. It bypasses Russia that has 
been the dominant gas supplier of both Turkey and Europe. The project applies a multi-sourcing 
strategy to avoid supply disruptions and ensure abundant flow of gas. Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are expected to supply natural gas for the project, which is 
estimated to be completed by 2013. The Nabucco pipeline extends 3,300 kilometers from 
Eastern Turkey to Europe over Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. Its annual 
transportation capacity is around 31 million cubic meters. 620 The major stakeholder companies 
are Turkish BOTAS, Hungarian MOL, Bulgarian EAP, Austrian OMV-OGB, German RWE and 
Romanian Transgaz.621 
Turkey’s role as an alternative energy gateway to Europe is becoming increasingly more 
important, as the Europeans lay more emphasis on a multi-sourcing strategy. Many elites 
conceive the project as a critical opportunity to promote Turkey’s strategic gains and economic 
integration with Europe. For them, existing pipeline projects such as the Blue Stream, the Baku-
Tibilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), and the Greece- Italy Interconnector have already boosted Turkey’s role 
for European Energy Security. The Nabucco project will further enhance Turkey’s role in 
European Energy supply. Arif Keskin noted that “The Nabucco project is an important phase on 
Turkey’s strategy to be an interregional energy hub. Turkey economically benefits from the 
embittered relations between the Iranians and the West. Turkish companies are flooding into the 
Iranian market as they face minor competition from the Western corporations.”622  
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One major goal of Turkey’s energy policy makers is to extend the pipelines to Southern 
Europe, mainly towards Greece and Italy. A pipeline though Turkey is expected to be more cost 
competitive with the Russian pipelines. Following this logic, BOTAS, a leading Turkish state 
energy company, made an agreement with Greek DEPA Company in December 2003.623 The 
agreement proposed construction of a 36 inch joint pipeline under the Aegean Sea. Annual gas 
transportation through this pipeline is expected to be around three billion cubic meters. There are 
ongoing efforts to extend this pipeline 280 kilometers towards the Italian port of Otranto. In his 
speech at the Caspian and Black Sea Gas Conference, Hasan Akil, a Director General at the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, noted that the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector project will be a 
significant step in Turkeys energy strategy of becoming an interregional energy hub.624 Loyale 
De Placia, the former Vice President of European Commission, expressed his gratitude and noted 
that the project “will not only bolster peace and stability in the region but also it will make it 
possible to supply new gas resources from the Caspian basin and Iran to the internal gas market 
of the enlarged European Union and to the Balkans, thus improving security of the supply for all 
stakeholders concerned with this infrastructure.”625 
One major argument is that the Nabucco project will help Turkey’s further integration 
into the European Union and may lead to certain concessions in the accession process. Many 
analysts anticipate that convergence of European and Turkish energy interests will help eliminate 
trade barriers. Prime Minister Erdogan’s assessment was quite positive “I hope that this project 
[Nabucco] will open a new page in Turkey’s relations with the EU as we are go along the 
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accession process.”626 President Gul also noted that this project will strengthen Turkish-
European strategic ties since the interests converge on the energy supply. 627 However, my 
investigations revealed that this was not the major factor that motivated the Turkish government. 
The Turkish government is more interested in economic/strategic gains in Nabucco Project rather 
than the accession benefits. Indeed, a significant majority of the Turkish elites has become 
increasingly resentful towards EU accession policies. Many of them are convinced that the EU 
will never grant full accession to Turkey. Thus, Turkey is a major contributor to the Nabucco 
project but there is no apparent expectation of membership concession from the European Union. 
Moreover, many of the European energy officials reiterate that energy partnership with Turkey 
does not necessarily mean eliminating barriers for Turkey’s accession into the Union. 628 They 
oppose Turkey’s use of strategic location to get concessions on the accession process.  
Despite the commitment of Turkish government officials, full implementation of the 
Nabucco project rests on a complex assortment of factors. One major question is integration of 
Iran into the project. One group argues that Iran should take part in the project because it is the 
only stable supplier of gas and has the second largest reserves in the world. In this view, the 
project will not be viable without Iran’s participation. Bayram Sinkaya described the situation in 
this way “We are developing the Nabucco project in collaboration with our European colleagues. 
We have signed gas agreements with Greece, Italy and Austria. How can we supply gas without 
having gas reserves? The answer is easy. We will get it from Iran.”629 Another interviewee 
Huseyin Bagci claimed that, “Both Iran and Iraq are important for the Nabucco project. It seems 
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that we will use both states for our further energy projects”. 630 Another group argues that the 
project should bypass Iran and supply gas from other sources such as Azarbaijan, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Washington opposes the project because it integrates Iran as a 
principal gas supplier. However, particularly after the U.S. occupation of Iraq, even the analysts 
in the latter group changed their preferences and embraced Iran as an energy supplier despite 
strong opposition of the United States.   
Another discussion is whether the Nabucco Project will be worth more than the €5 billion 
investment. Some analysts argue that the cost of the project will outweigh the benefits as there is 
no anticipation of large supply from the Caspian providers. Others argue that the project will not 
only help supply diversification but will also reduce the price of gas. Therefore, the benefits will 
prevail over the costs. John Roberts, an energy specialist at Platts, argued that “If Nabucco 
prompted Russia to drop its prices by as little as €1 per thousand cubic meters, then even if not a 
single cubic meter of gas ever flowed through Nabucco, it would provide a good return for €5 
billion investment”.631  
Despite these various discussions concerning viability, the Nabucco Project Agreement 
was signed on July 14, 2009, by the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
Turkey and the President of the EU Commission. 632 At the inauguration speech, Prime Minister 
Erdogan stated that “Thanks to this project, a long term cooperative platform has been initiated 
among the energy suppliers, transit countries and the consumers. Turkey strongly supports the 
Nabucco project that this developed to meet energy demands of both Turkey and Europe. We 
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wish that this pipeline will not remain as an energy project but it will facilitate a dialog between 
the East and the West.”633 Taner Yildiz, Minister of Energy, noted that “Nabucco is not just an 
energy project between Turkey and the European Union. This project indicates that we can 
promote our strategic partnership”.634 Yildiz maintained that the Turkish-Iranian agreement in 
2008 will be an important step in the fulfillment of the Nabucco project.  He added that 
“Turkey’s natural gas extraction from South Pars field will exceed 35 billion cubic meters. 
Thanks to this agreement we will be able to transfer 31 billion cubic meters to Europe annually 
after 2018.”635 
 
5.5.3. Access to Caspian and Central Asian suppliers  
The Nabucco project and Turkish-Iranian energy agreements have deepened Turkey’s energy 
relationship with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  Azerbaijan will be a major supplier 
to the Nabucco project. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreement in May 2010 to link the 
Shah Deniz gas field with the Nabucco pipeline. Azerbaijan will not only be a supplier to 
Nabucco, but it will also function as a transit destination for the Kazakh and Turkmen gas 
through the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Mete Goknel, a former Director General of the Turkish 
Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, noted that “Azeris promised to provide 8-12 billion cubic 
meters of gas. The Nabucco project will not be viable without the Azerbaijani resources. We 
have to include Iraqi, Iranian and Turkmen gas as well.” 636 
                                                      
633 Zaman Newspaper, “Imzalar Ankara’da atildi: Nabucco ruya degil gercek”, July 14, 2009. 
634 Erhan Seven, “21. Yuzyilin Projesi Nabucco’da tarihi Imza”, Yenisafak Newspaper,  July 14, 2009. 
635 Zaman Newspaper, “Turkiye Gaz Buldu, Nabucco bir adim onde”,  October 30, 2009. 
636 Enerji Vadisi, “BOTAS Eski Genel Muduru Goknel: Nabucco, Irak ve Iran Gazina Muhtac”, June 11, 2010. 
212 
 
Two other potential suppliers are Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan which are determined to 
reduce dependency on Russian pipeline networks in transportation of national resources to 
Europe. Under the existing circumstances, Gazprom’s twofold profits irritate the Kazakh and 
Turkmen producers. The Central Asian leaders have become more reluctant to remain dependent 
on Russia and committed to diversification of transportation networks. Turkmenistan President 
Berdimuhamedov noted that “We have excessive gas. We are ready to sell this to available 
customers. This will help operationalization of the Nabucco Project”.637 Energy Minister Taner 
Yildiz, highlighted that “We want to transfer Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. I have 
discussed this issue with the Turkmen president. We have a 16 billion cubic meters gas contract 
with the Turkmens, but it has not yet been enacted. We are continuing our efforts to facilitate this 
project. This agreement [with Iran] will be an important step in the project”.638 The former 
Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler asserted that “We are going to bring Turkmen gas over Iran and 
Caspian Sea. This gas will be exported to Europe through the Nabucco pipeline.” 639 
Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco suggested that “One of the unique 
selling points of the project is the multi-sourcing approach. So we expect gas from Azerbaijan, 
from Turkmenistan, from Iraq, from Egypt, from Russia. Therefore we are not dependent on one 
of those sources because we expect a whole portfolio of gas supply sources. That is very 
attractive for the gas buyers in Europe.”640 The Turkish-Iranian gas agreement in 2008 allows 
transportation of Turkmen gas through Iranian territories. There is a need for a trans-Caspian 
pipeline to connect Kazakh resources with the rest of project. This pipeline will shorten the 
distance of pipelines, both from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.  
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5.5.4. The role of Turkey’s energy agreements with Iran  
Energy agreements with Iran serve Turkey’s strategic energy interests in several respects. First, 
Iran will be the principal supplier of the Nabucco project at least in the short run. The pipelines 
through Iraq, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will not be functional in the short run. According to 
many energy analysts, Iranian gas makes the Nabucco project viable despite strong opposition 
from Washington.641 Second, energy agreements with Iran facilitate Turkey’s access to Central 
Asian resources. The former Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler, who signed the agreements, noted 
that “Iranians will give us access to Turkmenistan and we provide them access for Europe.”642 
Tehran used to stand against Trans-Caspian project and transit of Turkmen pipelines through 
Iranian territories to prevent Turkey’s direct access to Northern Caspian resources. The 
agreement in 2008, however, indicated a profound shift in Iran’s energy stance. This agreement 
proposes construction of an approximately 2000 km pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey 
overland through Iran. Third, access to Turkmen and Kazakh natural gas would cut down the 
price of natural gas and increase the bargaining powers of both Turkey and the European Union. 
Fourth, this agreement facilitates Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Italy interlocutors, which are two 
components of the Nabucco project. It is anticipated that this will make substantial contribution 
to Turkey’s further integration into the European markets.  
Both Turkish and Iranian elites highlighted that this multifaceted energy agreement 
serves the interests of Turkey, Europe and Iran. For them, the agreement not only reduces 
European/Turkish dependency on Russia, but it undercuts Russian monopoly over energy 
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transportation networks. President Gul noted that, “We have been working for a long time for 
this agreement. Prime Minister talked this issue during his last visit to Tehran. There is nothing 
secret. There is a need for this agreement to facilitate the Nabucco project”643 Saltuk Duzyol, the 
Deputy Director of BOTAS, noted that Turkish-Iranian agreement has profound implications for 
Turkey’s energy policy and overturns the conventional patterns of strategic energy 
partnerships.644 Duzyol maintained that “Iran is the most viable alternative to Russia.  Our 
agreement proposes transportation of Iranian gas to Europe. Turkey will obtain a great role in 
European energy markets”.645  Mete Goknel, a former Director General of BOTAS, highlighted 
that “Iran has the third largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. We cannot 
turn our back to Iran.”646 Ambassador Faruk Laloglu argued that, “This agreement facilitates 
implementation of the Nabucco project. It was not possible to fulfill our commitment in Nabucco 
without the gas deal with Iran. Moreover, this agreement integrates the Turkmen gas into the 
Nabucco project”.647 Saltuk Duzyol, the Director General of Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, 
noted that “We look at this issue from supply diversification perspective. This project contributes 
both to European and Turkish supply security. I don’t think the Americans will oppose it.”648 
Iranian elites gave parallel statements. Reza Kassaizadah Mahabadi, Iran’s deputy Oil 
Minister, noted that “We aim at penetrating the European Markets via Turkey. 1860 km pipeline 
with a 110 million cubic meter capacity, stretching from the Persian Gulf to Turkey, will be 
constructed. We estimate that the pipeline will require an investment of $8 billion. Once the 
pipeline is connected to Nabucco via Turkey, natural gas sales in Europe are likely to be 
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affected.”649 Ali Nurani, Iran’s Trade attaché to Ankara, conclued that “This agreement not only 
serves the interests of Iran and Turkey but it provides major benefits to the European 
customers.”650 
5.6. Cost effectiveness and security of pipelines through Iran  
Throughout the field research, I have discovered that the Turkish energy policy makers are also 
concerned about the security and cost efficiency of the pipelines. Some of the elites/analysts I 
interviewed reported that hydrocarbon pipelines from Iran are more cost effective than 
alternative pipelines from Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq and Russia. The experts also argued that 
pipelines between Iran and Turkey are less prone to physical supply disruptions due to natural 
disasters and terror attacks.  
According to my interviewees, the Iran-Turkey pipeline is relatively cost effective for 
three reasons. First, Iran is a neighbor of Turkey and pipelines directly enter into the Turkish 
homeland without paying any transit fees to third parties.651 When Turkey purchases 
hydrocarbons from non-neighbor parties (i.e. Azerbaijan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Qatar 
Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan), BOTAS pays substantial amounts of transit fees to transit 
countries. Second, pipelines from the non-neighbor resources need investments into longer 
pipelines that would be vulnerable to supply disruptions in the volatile Middle East.652 Moreover, 
each transit country will gain political leverage due to Turkey’s dependency on their 
transportation facilities. Third, pipelines from Russia go under deep waters. The costs of 
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replacement and recovery are very high in comparison with the land pipelines.653 Pipelines 
through Iran, however, never undergo water. It is easy to install the pipes and fix the disruptions. 
Recovery of regular pipeline pressure is less time consuming and less expensive.  
Some of the interviewees asserted that another advantage of the Iranian pipelines is their 
physical security and reduced vulnerability to terror attacks. Turkish Iraqi pipelines have been 
cut off hundreds of times as a result of terrorist attacks.654 The pipelines through Azerbaijan and 
Georgia have always been under the threat of war and Russian occupation. Potential pipelines 
from Egypt and Saudi Arabia have to cross the entire Middle East and will be more exposed to 
terror attacks and wars. Iran pays utmost importance to security of energy facilities because 
energy export is vital for survival of the regime. Turkey experienced only minor supply 
disruptions from Iran due to terrorist attacks. Iran has eliminated the PKK/PJAK camps in its 
territory and fights actively against the remnants of these terror networks. Therefore, the PKK is 
less likely to blow up the Turkish-Iranian pipeline, while it frequently attacks the Turkish-Iraqi 
pipeline. Even though the U.S. or Israel may attack Iran within the immediate future, Turkish 
energy experts anticipates no major disruptions of hydrocarbon flows. Therefore, Turkish elites 
are less concerned about physical supply disruptions along the Iranian pipelines. 
5.7. Containment of Iran contradicts with Turkey’s national interests  
Various U.S. officials including the former President George Bush, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and Ambassador Ross Wilson, demanded that the Erdogan Administration to 
stop further energy deals with the Iranian government. The American government was concerned 
                                                      
653 ibid 
654 Philip Shiskin “Pipeline thefts cripple Iraqi oil production” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2007.   
217 
 
that Turkey’s energy deals would undermine economic containment of an emerging nuclear 
“rogue state”. The Erdogan Administration, however, signed two memoranda of understanding 
in 2007 and 2008 that consolidated Turkey’s energy partnership with Iran. The rapid increase in 
the volume of energy purchases is a good indication in this regard.  Throughout my field 
research, I found that Turkey’s unwillingness to endorse American containment is driven by the 
leadership’s sense of the national interests and lack of trust in American policies. Turkish 
government officials believe that Turkey’s compliance with the U.S. demand will undermine 
Turkey’s economic, security and strategic interests. In this context, Turkish interests converge 
with Iranian interests and diverge with the policies of Washington. Moreover, Turkish 
government officials have become increasingly irritated with the U.S. policy of intervening in 
bilateral relations with Iran.   
The Turkish government devotes considerable energy to regional economic integration. It 
attempts to eliminate investment barriers and increase the interregional trade among the Caspian 
and Middle Eastern markets. In this context, Iran became a major trade partner of Turkey 
between 2002 and 2010. To put it another way, the economic interdependence between Iran and 
Turkey gained greater momentum throughout the Erdogan Administration. The Turkish Institute 
for Statistics reported that the overall trade volume between Iran and Turkey increased 730 
percent over the last decade.655 In 2008, Iran became the 7th largest import partner and 19th 
largest export partner of Turkey.656 At several platforms, Prime Minister Erdogan and Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad expressed their commitments to enhance bilateral cooperation on energy, 
security, transportation and industry. During President Ahmadinejad’s 2008 visit to Turkey, both 
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parties declared that they had reached a consensus to increase the bilateral trade to $30 billion. 
Prime Minister Erdogan noted that:  
Turkish and Iranian merchants have become like relatives and brothers of each other over 
the centuries. Turkish and Iranian investors share the same economic concerns and future 
prospects. The upward spiral in bilateral trade is quite natural. We are really pleasured 
with the rise of bilateral trade over $10 billion. Initially we planned to increase it to $20 
billion but commercial representatives suggested to increase it $30 billion. I believe that 
we will be ready for this. We as politicians will eliminate the barriers, the investors will 
do their part. When we attain trade volume of $30 billion Turkey and Iran will be in very 
advanced situation.”657  
 
Many Turkish elites asserted that the energy agreements with Iran promote Turkey’s 
national interests and regional economic integration. As Murat Mercan, the Chairman of 
Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, put it, the Erdogan Administration thinks that 
economic integration is the principle solution to regional conflicts.658 Turkish elites perceive the 
U.S. led sanctions as a major roadblock to regional economic integration. According to Murat 
Mercan, the American proposal to restrict bilateral trade with Iran undermines Turkey’s 
economic, strategic and security interests.659 For Mercan, Turkey’s participation in the economic 
containment against Iran not only terminates bilateral trade with Iran but also with the Central 
Asian Republics, because Iran controls the transit routes. The U.S. offers no major compensation 
for contributing to the containment of Iran. Therefore, the Erdogan Administration is determined 
to defend its interests even if it contravenes the interests of Washington and Jerusalem.660 Prime 
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Minister Erdogan asserted that “The United States is our strategic partner. However, neither the 
Americans nor the Israelis have the resources to meet Turkey’s energy demands”661 In another 
speech, Erdogan noted that “Iran has made an attractive offer. They offered to render extraction 
of natural gas in three fields without a competitive contracting process. We are pursuing national 
interests. Russians are running similar projects. We do not seek permission of Americans to 
promote our national interests… The U.S. should revise that approach.”662  Minister of Energy 
Taner Yildiz noted that “Iran has substantial energy reserves. Turkey is determined to take 
advantage of its geographic location. We give utmost importance to improving energy 
cooperation with our neighbors. We have taken important decisions through our negotiations 
with the Iran officials”.663 Turkish-Iranian energy deal is highly supported by the leaders of 
major state energy corporations and institutions. There is a convergence between the statements 
of the political actors and the institutional leaders, who also lay emphasis on the economic and 
strategic value of the energy partnership with Iran. Saltuk Duzyol, the Director General of 
BOTAS noted that, “We cannot disregard Iran for political reasons. We need Iran for energy and 
trade. According to our agreement 30 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas will be transferred to 
Europe over Turkey. Turkey will get three gas fields in the South Pars region that has an annual 
production capacity of 20.4 billion cubic meters. Iran is crucial for the Nabucco project we have 
to take advantage of it”.664   
The energy agreement with Turkey has numerous advantages for the Iranian government. 
Some interviewees argued that the interests of Turkey and Iran have been converging in the new 
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energy security landscape. According to Arif Keskin, Tehran makes nearly $10 billion from 
energy sales to Turkey and this makes a significant contribution to the revival of the Iranian 
economy and survival of the regime. Keskin noted that the energy partnership with Turkey is the 
most prestigious project accomplished by the Iranian government.665 Second, the energy 
partnership with Turkey lays the ground for Iran’s access to vast European markets. It helps to 
loosen the Western economic containment and facilitates Iran’s integration into the international 
economy. As interviewee Arif Keskin put it, Iranian leaders want to make sure that at least 
Turkey remains neutral if more severe economic sanctions are imposed on Iran. They perceive 
the gas agreements as an instrument of political leverage to shape Turkey’s position on the 
nuclear debate.666 Third, this agreement facilitates the flow of Turkmen gas overland through 
Iranian territories. Iran will make more profits from transfer of Turkmen gas. It will further 
integrate Iran into the central Asian markets. Fourth, economic revival helps to preserve the 
political stability and strengthens the post revolutionary regime.  
One major advantage of the agreement is the concession to the Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation’s (TPAO) to extract natural gas in the South Pars field of Iran. As, Taner Yildiz, 
Minister of Energy, put it “We will have the right to market at least 50 percent of the gas that we 
extract from the South Pars fields. This is an important privilege and concession. We think we 
can extract around 35 cubic million meters of gas per annum.”667 This indicates that the TPAO 
will be in the field and supervise pumping of natural gas. Some analysts argued that this will 
reduce supply disruptions in the winter, because the Turkish engineers will supervise the 
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extraction and pumping process. According to Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, Iran/Middle East analyst at 
International Strategic Research Organization, “The energy agreements allow the TPAO’s gas 
extraction in three fields without any contract. This agreement also allows the TPAO to 
supervise the gas pumping process in Iran. Therefore, the Iranians may not put forward 
unsubstantiated pretexts to cut down our gas in the middle of the winter. TPOA can directly 
respond to technical problems in gas extraction fields”.668  
The predominant majority of the Turkish elites became immediately offended when 
foreigners ask about the U.S. concerns about the current energy partnership between Iran and 
Turkey. Turkish elites lay special emphasis on Turkish sovereignty and independent pursuit of 
self interests. Turkey’s past image as the “spearhead” of Western neo-colonialism has become an 
increasingly irritating image among both the elites and Turkish citizenry. During Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey in August 2008, President Gul responded indignantly to 
a question about the U.S. concern with the energy deal. Gul asserted that “Expansion of relations 
on a regional level seems quite natural for Turkey, and it is not important what other states think 
of it. Turkey cares for its own interests. Turkey will establish good ties with its neighbors with 
the aim of stability and security in the region…We are an independent country. Here we look for 
our national interests…We have to make investment for [energy] supply security of Turkey.”669 
On his visit to the European Political Center at Brussels, Erdogan responded angrily to the 
Western demands to back down economic relations with Iran. He noted that “We will never cut 
down our relations with Iran. No one can define our policy. Turkey is not a tribal state. Turkey is 
a powerful country that has a great history. Therefore, we decide our destiny, we take our 
                                                      
668 Author's interviewwith Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, on January 14, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Ekinci. Chair of Iran 
Studies at the International Strategic Research Center (USAK). 
669 John C.K. Daly, “Analysis: Turkish Iranian Energy Ties”, Russo Dailly, August 21, 2008 
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decisions. No one can determine to whom we will talk and who we will not”670 Erdogan 
maintained that, “Iran is our neighbor and our bilateral trade exceeds $10 billion. We buy 10 
billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran. We have profound economic and strategic relations 
with Iran. Therefore, those who want us to cut down economic relations with Iran should first 
evaluate the situation thoroughly... We will never succumb to their demands to cut economic ties 
with Iran.”671 Hilmi Guler, the former Minister of Energy, strongly criticized the U.S. 
Ambassador Ross Wilson’s comments on Turkish-Iranian contracts. He noted that “national 
interests come first for us. We are a strong nation that has its own codes of conducts…We will 
continue to develop our ties with the neighbors. I, as a minister of Turkish state, have to work in 
accordance with national interests.”672 
Another source of resentment has been directed towards American economic sanctions. 
During the interviews, many of the officials and analysts reported that the American government 
has never kept its promises during the previous containment programs such as the Iran Libya 
Sanctions Act and the embargo against Iraqi government after the Gulf War.  One reason for 
Turkey’s non-participation in containment against Iran is the belief that the U.S. will not 
reimburse Turkey’s losses if Ankara abolishes energy and trade relations with Iran. One 
interviewevee Bayram Sinkaya explicated that “Americans did not keep their promises after the 
Gulf War. We lost over a hundred billion dollars during the embargo against Iraq. Now they tell 
us not to make investments in Iran over $20 million. They propose sanctions against companies 
that exceed this level. This is an unacceptable demand.”673 Celalettin Yavuz, a former military 
                                                      
670 Statements of Prime Minister Erdogan in Brussels at European Political Center, January 1, 2009.  
671 Statements of Prime Minister Erdogan in Brussels at European Political Center, January 1, 2009.   
672 Aktifhaber, “Hilmi Guler ABD’ye Cok Tepkili”, June 17, 2008 
673 Author's interview with Bayram Sinkaya on January 8, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. Mr. Sinkaya is a Middle east 
Specialist at the Middle East Strategic Research Organization (ORSAM). He also teaches at the Middle East 
Technical University (METU). 
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officer and strategist at TURKSAM, noted that “Every American intervention had dramatic 
impacts on regional economy. They destroyed Iraq which was our major energy supplier and 
trade partner. All countries could develop by means of regional trade. Americans themselves 
established NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. Why we couldn’t do it? We couldn’t do it because 
of U.S led wars and embargos.”674 One retired diplomat maintained that, “The Americans say 
that we should not sign these energy contracts. But they don’t show us how to diversify energy 
suppliers. At many times they told us to reduce dependency on Russia and do not buy Iranian 
gas. Where should we go? We cannot supply hydrocarbons from the aliens. Iran is the most 
viable alternative to reduce dependency on Russia.” 675 
One concern of Turkish foreign policy makers is preventing further alienation of Iran in 
the international system. For many elites, economic sanctions will further isolate Iran from the 
West and strengthen the hardliner fundamentalists in the Iranian regime. Turkish elites believe 
that Iran’s economic integration into the West will eliminate radicalism and promote democracy 
over the long term. 676 Contrary to the Americans, Turkish government officials want to integrate 
Iran into the international community. They think that an interconnected Iran will be less 
dangerous and radical and that advanced market integration will gradually erode radical 
superstructures in Iran. In this context, the gas agreement will be quite instrumental to integrate 
Iran into the international community.  
 
                                                      
674 Author's interview with Celalettin Yavuz on December 22, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Yavuz is  a former high 
ranking  military official, who is currently a senior security analyst at International Relations and Strategic Research 
Center  (TURKSAM). 
675 Author’s interview with a retired diplomat (X-23), on December 18, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. 
676 Author's interview with Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, on  December 24, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Laloglu 
currently serves in advisory board of Foreign Ministry 
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5.8. Critics of Turkish‐Iranian energy partnership 
The Erdogan administration’s energy partnership with Iran attracted five major criticisms from  
opponent elites and analysts. One major criticism from the pro-Western elites677 is that the 
growing energy partnership with Iran undermines Turkey’s strategic commitments to its Western 
allies, particularly to the United States. Turkey’s energy deal and trade partnership contradicts 
with the Western containment strategy. For many analysts, this will provoke some kind of 
retaliation from Washington and Jerusalem, Turkey’s long-term military allies. This pay back 
may be in the form of excluding Turkey from future regional initiatives of the U.S. and Israel. 
Erdal Saglam, a columnist at the Hurriyet Newspaper, argued that Iran is using Turkey to 
undermine international economic sanctions.678 Saglam asserted that there is a coincidence 
between the international pressures and Iran’s willingness to collaborate with Turkey on energy 
and security issues. Saglam called the Turkish government to be more vigilant against the 
exploitation of bilateral relations by Iran in an extremely critical time.  
A counter argument by the proponents of energy partnership with Iran is that in several 
respects this patnership also serves U.S. interests. First, they claimed that the agreements help 
Iran’s economic integration into the global economy. This will undermine the power of 
hardliners in the Iranian regime and promote moderate political views.679 Second, they argued 
that the agreement undercuts the monopoly of the Russian Gazprom and provides an opportunity 
to the Central Asian gas producers to access to global markets through alternative routes. This 
                                                      
677 There are still many pro-Western elites in Turkey, who argue that Turkey should preserve its strategic ties with 
the United States and NATO. It is hard to classify these elites into a single party or institution. They exist in the 
military, security institutions, diplomatic spheres, Rebuplican Peoples Party and even the Justice and Development 
Party.   
678 Erdal Saglam, “Turkiye-Iran Ekonomik Yakinlasmasi ve ekonomik ayagi”, Hurriyet Newspaper, October 19, 
2009. 
679 Author's interview with Bayram Sinkaya on January 8, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. Mr. Sinkaya is a Middle east 
Specialist at the Middle East Strategic Research Organization (ORSAM). He also teaches at the Middle East 
Technical University (METU). 
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will cut down Russia’s power projection in the region. Third, they claim that Iran’s energy 
partnership with Turkey may complicate Tehran’s security partnership with Russia that has been 
the principal promoter of the Iranian nuclear program.680 Once Iran actively engages in 
alternative energy pipeline project that cuts down Gazprom’s monopoly, the Russian government 
may become less willing to assist Iran’s nuclear power project.  
A second major criticism is projected towards Iran’s large scale contracts and its inability 
to fulfill its commitments to Turkey and other customers. According to this critical view, Turkey 
should not rely on Iran as a major energy supplier, because Iran has made so many energy 
agreements in order to undermine Western economic containment that it will eventually fail to 
fulfill its supply commitments. According to Energy Analyst Faruk Demir, “It is true that Iran 
has the second largest gas reserves. But they lack substantial production capacity. They 
themselves are dependent on Turkmen gas to fulfill their commitments to us. Therefore, Iran is 
not a major alternative to Russia”681 According to Arif Keskin, “Iran is has made 15 large 
contracts with all sorts of countries including China, India and Pakistan. I don’t think they will 
be able to comply with their commitments to us. Iranians are signing these contracts to 
discourage their neighbors from participating into international sanctions against Iran.”682 Some 
Turkish energy analysts indicated that Iran will have to channel a large volume of natural gas to 
recover the aging oil wells.683 For instance, energy specialist Tufan Erdogan noted that “Iran 
spends a large portion of the resources for recovery and domestic consumption, therefore it is 
                                                      
680 Author's interview with Serdar Erdurmaz on December 17, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Erdurmaz is a former 
Military Officer, Currently Chair of nonproliferation desk at International Relations and Strategic Research Center  
(TURKSAM). 
681 South European Times, “Turkiye Iran dogalgazinin guvenilirligini tartisiyor, January 09, 2008. 
682 Author's interview with Arif Keskin on December 12, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Mr. Keskin is a Senior Iran/Middle 
East Analyst at International Relations and Strategic Research Center  (TURKSAM). 
683 The experts asserted that Iran will have to use large volumes of natural gas to restore the oil supply in aging oil 
wells.  
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unlikely to meet its commitments towards Turkey and other customers”.684 According to 
Erdogan, Iran’s pumping capacity is also undermined by the new LNG project that supply 
natural gas to far away markets such as China.  
The third major criticism of the energy experts is periodic disruptions of supply in winter, 
when natural gas is needed most. For instance, a major supply disruption took place in January 
2008 when Turkey was experiencing very cold weather conditions. Iranians argued that the 
supply disruption was sparked by the cold weather and interruption of gas flow from 
Turkmenistan. Turkey lacks substantial storage capacity and supply disruptions from Iran 
directly undercut industrial production, residential heating and electric generation.685 Lack of 
excessive natural gas storage also emerged as a problem. Turkey’s existing contracts with Iran 
are “buy or pay” type agreements. Thus, if Turkey or the European customers fail to absorb the 
supply, Turkey has to pay for the natural gas that has never been received. As Yavuz Sir put it, 
the disruption incidents and “buy or pay” agreements raise questions about the reliability of Iran 
as an energy partner.686 
The fourth major criticism focused on the growing imbalance of trade between Iran and 
Turkey, particularly since 2002. Some interviewees contended that Turkish-Iranian energy 
partnership develops at the expense of Turkish exports is not an overall benefit. Arif Keskin 
noted that, “Today Turkey and Iran have over $10 billion bilateral trade. Energy trade constitutes 
the bulk of this figure. Iran is the one that really benefits from this partnership. Turkey’s 
investments in Iran are just around $1 billion. What I mean is there is a great disproportion. 
Ankara is really bothered with this asymmetry. There are certain legislative barriers against the 
                                                      
684 Tufan Erdogan, “Iran ile yapilan son gaz anlasmasi uzerine notlar”, EM Enerji, Sayi 3, September 2007, p.88 
685 Author's interview with Huseyin Bagci on December 28, 2008. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Bagci is a prominent Foreign 
Policy Analyst and Professor of International relations at Middle Eastern Technical University (METU). 
686 Yavuz Sir, “Katar’da Cikan bir Yazi”, October 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.globalstrateji.org/TUR/Icerik_Detay.ASP?Icerik=1217, [accessed May 13, 2010] 
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entry of Turkish companies into Iranian markets.”687 The growing imbalance of trade can be 
clearly seen at figure 5.10.   
Figure 5.10: Turkish Iranian, exports, imports and overall trade volume (1996-2007) 
 
Source: Turkish Institute for Statistics, Dis Ticaret Istatistikleri, Ankara, 2008 
Some key government officials and analysts I interviewed noted that Iran poses certain 
trade barriers. As Prime Minister Erdogan highlighted, “Iran continues to impose high tariffs on 
foreign products. Customs taxes are very high, sometimes goes up to 30-40 percent. Imposing 
high tariffs is not a pleasant policy when we try to increase bilateral trade. Our ministers will sit 
together and find a solution to this.” 688 One major barrier to bilateral trade was Iran’s 
constitutional restrictions on privatization. Several Turkish companies’ contracts have been 
turned down by the Iranian government with various pretexts. For instance, Iran cancelled Tepe 
Akfen Construction (TAV) investments in airports and Turkcell investments into 
telecommunication because of their alleged connections with Israel.689 
                                                      
687 Author's interview with Arif Keskin on December 12, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Mr. Keskin is a Senior Iran/Middle 
East Analyst at International Relations and Strategic Research Center  (TURKSAM). 
688 Star Newspaper, “Basbakan Erdogan’dan Iranda Ekonomik Mesajlar”, October 27, 2009. 
689 Author’s interview with a security official (X.31), January 6, 2010, Ankara/Turkey.  
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The fifth major criticism is directed towards Iran’s overpricing and arbitrage of central 
Asian natural gas. Some experts argued that Iran purchases Turkmen gas at a very low price and 
sell it to BOTAS after tripling the price. They asserted that Iranians offered much lower prices to 
its consumers in the East (i.e. Pakistan, Indica and China). Energy specialist Tufan Erdogan, 
noted that “Iran has signed a contract with India and Pakistan for 25 years. They will build a 
pipeline for $3 billion. What will be the price? Their price is $145-150 per 1000 cubic meters. 
Iranians are more lenient towards the Buddhist Indians than Turkish “Muslim” brothers.”690 This 
view was endorsed by interviewee Arif Keskin who noted that “Iran sells us the Turkmen gas 
after tripling the price. They promised to sell the gas to India and Pakistan 30 percent cheaper 
than Turkey.”691 According to the current terms of the agreement, the Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation will extract gas and sell it to Iranian state energy company. Then it will “buy it 
back” after the Iranians make reasonable rate of profit. This conditionality dramatically reduces 
the profit range for the Turkish companies.  
Another group of critics argued that the Turkey-Iranian energy partnership might provoke 
a response from the Russian government. They claimed that Russia might choose not to provide 
excess energy when Turkey needs extra natural gas in the winter.  For instance, Gokhan Yardim, 
the former director of BOTAS, asserted that “We have to preserve our ties with Russia, because 
there are upper and lower limits of the contract. They may choose not to meet our excessive 
demands. We have to preserve good ties with Iran too. We have experienced many supply 
disruptions in Iran.”692  
                                                      
690 Tufan Erdogan, “Iran ile yapilan son gaz anlasmasi uzerine notlar”, EM Enerji, Sayi 3, September 2007, p.88 
691 Author's interview with Arif Keskin on December 12, 2009. Ankara/Turkey. Mr. Keskin is a Senior Iran/Middle 
East Analyst at International Relations and Strategic Research Center  (TURKSAM). 
692 Zaman Newspaper, “Iran Anlasmasi Rusya’yi Kizdirdi: Bu kis fazla Gaz yok”, August 4, 2007.  
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5.9. Conclusion of the Chapter 
Turkey and Iran developed an energy partnership between 2003 and 2010. The Erdogan 
Administration signed an energy agreement with the Ahmadinejad administration in 2008 that 
proposes not only the supply of natural gas but also a strategic partnership on energy security. 
The new energy partnership signified a turning point in regional energy security for three 
reasons.  First, Iran allows Turkey to construct a direct pipeline from Turkmenistan. This will 
allow Turkey to establish itself as an energy hub in spite of  its lack of indigenous energy 
resources. Second, Turkey’s energy partnership with Iran breaks down the traditional checker 
board alliance system in the Caucasus.693 Third, Iran integrates into the European Nabucco 
Project that helps Tehran to break the yoke of intensifying economic containment. Turkey’s 
deepening energy ties irritate policy makers in Washington who are determined to prevent 
nuclearization of a rogue regime. My field research indicated that the Turkey’s energy 
agreements with Iran and noncompliance with the U.S. demands is driven by several factors.  
First, rapid industrialization and urbanization progressively increased the demand for 
natural gas and oil. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s demand for natural gas increased over 300 
percent and Turkish energy authorities sought to meet the domestic demand from the cheapest 
and nearest sources available. In this context, Russia and Iraq emerged as the predominant 
supplier both for natural gas and oil. By the early 2000s, however, Turkey’s dependency on 
Russia had reached alarming rates.  In line with the over-dependency, vulnerability to supply 
disruptions increased as the Blue Stream Pipeline crossed under deep water in the Black Sea. 
Concomitantly, Turkish electric generation is over 60 percent dependent on imported natural gas. 
                                                      
693 Checherds board alliance system appared in the Caucaus after the end of Cold War. The Alliance between 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia was countered by the alliance of Russia, Iran and Armenia.  
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Thus, over-dependency on Russian hydrocarbons creates a double vulnerability. The Turkish 
energy partnership with Iran is partially forged to reduce vulnerability to major supply 
disruptions in Russia.  
Second, the Gulf War (1991) and the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003) created major supply 
disruptions in Iraq, which had been a main energy supplier for Turkey.  Oil pumping ceased 
intermittently after the U.S. attack against Iraq in 2003. The pipelines and energy infrastructures 
were destroyed by the ongoing war, insurgency and terrorism. Iraq’s Petroleum Ministry 
reported over 400 terrorist/insurgency attacks on the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipelines. Once the 
legal flow of oil came to a halt, oil smuggling proliferated between Iraq and Turkey. The Turkish 
Ministry of Energy and Energy Markets Regulatory Authority reported record levels of increase 
in the dimension of black energy markets in Turkey. Frequent supply disruptions downgraded 
Iraq’s reliability and Iran emerged as a more dependable energy supplier.  
Third, the Erdogan Administration is dedicated to take the opportunity of Turkey’s 
geographic location to promote Turkey’s strategic interests. As Turkey provides the shortest line 
between the Caspian-Middle Eastern energy suppliers and European consumers, the AKP 
government seeks to make Turkey an interregional strategic energy hub. Europe’s growing 
dependency on Russia and its search for alternative supplies creates an opportunity to make use 
of Turkish territories as an alternative pipeline route. Russia’s initiation of the South Stream 
Project alarmed Turkish and European energy officials. Consequently,, the European Union and 
Turkey launched the Nabucco Project to diversify energy suppliers and reduce dependency on 
Russia. The pipelines through Turkey are the shortest, safest and most cost effective routes for 
the Iranian gas in accessing Europe. The Erdogan Administration’s recent energy partnership 
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with Iran not only helps to diversify supply but it facilitates the Nabucco project and serves 
Turkey’s strategic intent to be an interregional energy hub. Moreover, it provides access to 
Central Asian gas reserves that constitutes an important component of the multi-sourcing 
strategy of the Nabucco project.  
Fourth, cost efficiency and the security of the Iranian pipelines was another factor that 
laid the grounds for Turkish-Iranian energy partnership. Iran is a neighbor of Turkey and 
pipelines directly enter into the Turkish homeland without paying any transit fees to third parties. 
In contrast to the Russian Blue Stream line, pipelines from Iran never go under deep waters. It is 
easy to install the pipelines and fix the disruptions. Recovery of regular pipeline pressure takes 
much less time and it is less expensive. Another advantage of Iranian pipelines is relatively 
higher security against terrorist/insurgency attacks. Turkish elites are less concerned about 
physical supply disruptions along the Iranian pipelines. Even though the U.S. or Israel may 
attack Iran within the immediate future, Turkish energy experts anticipates no major disruptions 
of hydrocarbon flows.  
` Fifth, a major question was why Turkey disregards American demands to stop further 
energy/economic partnership with Iran.  My field research indicated that Turkey’s practical 
national interests outweigh the strategic commitments to its military allies, the United States and 
Israel. The Turkish government seeks regional economic integration and perceives American 
embargos as the principal roadblock on this goal. Turkey’s participation in the U.S. led embargo 
will not only undercut bilateral trade with Iran but it will restrict Turkey’s access to Central 
Asian Markets.  Another reason for Turkey’s resistance to join the containment of Iran is the 
belief that the U.S. will not reimburse Turkey’s losses if Turkey ends the energy and trade 
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relations with Iran. Turkish elites lay special emphasis on sovereignty and independent pursuit of 
self interests. Turkey’s past image as the “spearhead” of Western neo-colonialism has become an 
increasingly irritating image among the Turkish citizenry and elites. 
Even though there is a broad consensus among the key actors, Erdogan administration’s 
energy partnership with Iran provoked five major criticisms among analysts. Some critics argued 
that the energy agreements undermine Turkey’s strategic commitments to traditional allies and 
facilitate nuclearization of a neighbor. A second criticism is directed towards Iran’s capacity to 
fulfill energy commitments to both Turkey and Europe. The critics argue that Iran is over-
contracted and Iranian resources may fall short of meeting energy demands of all customers. 
Third criticism is directed towards supply disruptions in winter that undermined Iran’s reliability 
as an energy supplier. Fourth, criticism is raised at growing asymmetry of trade. The critics 
argued that the recent energy agreements exacerbate the imbalances of trade between Iran and 
Turkey. Fifth, some critics argue that Turkish-Iranian energy agreements may propel a payback 
by the Russian Gazprom that has been Turkey’s principal energy supplier.  
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CHAPTER 6  
DOES SECURITY RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN MEAN 
REALIGNMENT OF TURKEY?  
 
Turkish-Iranian security rapprochement has become a subject of intense debate among the 
analysts who are concerned that Turkey may shift the course of foreign policy from the West 
towards the Muslim East. According to the critics, Turkey’s three tiered security partnership with 
Iran contradicts its commitments to strategic allies. These pro-Western analysts claim that the 
AKP has a “hidden” agenda of an Islamic Union. They argue that AKP government’s détente 
with Iran and the Arab World coincides with deterioration of relations with Israel and the United 
States. The previous three chapters explained the underlying reasons of Turkish-Iranian 
rapprochement on counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy security. This chapter 
investigates whether the Erdogan Administration’s three tiered security partnership with Iran 
indicates Turkey’s realignment in the international system. Second, it seeks to answer whether 
the rapprochement policy is driven by Islamic identity/aspirations or practical national interests. 
Third, it explains why the Turkish government has become less committed to its Western 
partners. Ultimately, it explains why Iran cannot be an alternative to Turkey’s security relations 
with the West.  
My field research explored four major facts that explain the changes not only in Turkey’s 
Iran policy but also the general course of foreign policy. First, Turkey is not realigning from the 
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West towards the East, but is diversifying its relations in line with its leaders’ views of national 
interests. In other words, Turkish elites see the new posture as expansion of Turkey’s foreign 
relations towards the East while preserving its Western orientation. The new policy is not just 
supported by the Islamists, but by nationalists, neo-Marxists and liberals who support 
development of alternative foreign relations. However, there is strong opposition to an overall 
realignment towards Iran. The Kemalists and the Islamists oppose a strategic alliance with Iran at 
the expense of Turkey’s relations with the West.  Second, contrary to the projections of Western 
analysts, the Turkish-Iranian detente is not driven by Islamic identity or aspirations. Instead, the 
actions of Turkish foreign policy makers are based on their rational calculations of security 
interests. Identity is a source of conflict in bilateral relations rather than a catalyst for détente. 
Third, even though Turkey does not seek realignment, foreign policy makers have become less 
enthusiastic about fulfilling national commitments to traditional Western allies. Fourth, despite 
the ongoing resentment towards the West, most Turkish foreign policy elites believe that Iran 
cannot be an alternative to Turkey’s relations with West. Turkish security institutions preserve 
well established ties with their Western counterparts and do not see relations with the Iranian 
institutions as a replacement.     
6.1. Not realignment but diversification of relations  
Analyses of the statements of the government executives indicate that the Erdogan 
Administration does not seek realignment in the international system but diversification of 
relations and reducing dependency on the West. According to Burhanettin Duran, the Justice and 
Development Party’s (AKP) foreign policy posture can be formulated in four pillars: i) pursuit of 
practical national interests rather than the images that are favorable in the West, ii) better 
relations with the neighbors and resolution of regional conflicts, iii) diversification of foreign 
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relations rather than remaining exclusively focused on the West, and iv) proactivism in 
diplomacy rather than reactive passivity.694 These principles have been inspired by foreign 
minister Davutoglu’s strategic depth doctrine that is designed to elevate Turkey to a dominant 
regional power within the surrounding regions.695 The doctrine asserts that Turkey should deploy 
proactive diplomacy rather than a static posture to attain the status of global power.  
My field research indicated that there are two major camps in the AKP government in 
practice of foreign policy. The first camp is composed of Omer Celik (MP), Cuneyt Zapsu (MP, 
Chief Advisor to Erdogan), Saban Disli (Former Deputy Chairman of the AKP) and Egemen 
Bagis (Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator since 2009), who are in favor of Turkey’s 
pro-Western foreign policy and preservation of strategic partnership with the United States. The 
second camp is composed of Abdullah Gul (former Former Foreign Minister and President since 
2007), Ahmet Davutoglu (Foreign Minister), Hilmi Guler (Former Energy Minister), Taner 
Yildiz (Energy Minister) and Murat Mercan (Chairman of Parliamentary Commission on 
Foreign Relations) who are strong advocates of diversification of foreign policy. Prime Minister 
Erdogan is the overarching mediator between these two camps, but as time progressed he 
became more sympathetic towards the posture of the second group and the diversification of 
foreign relations. Turkey’s growing partnership with Iran is advocated by the second camp as it 
sought to diversify energy suppliers, trade relations and practical security partnerships. The 
second camp has climbed up to the highest ladders in the governmental sphere while the first 
camp remained at relatively inferior positions. Both groups, however, seek to restore positive 
relations with the Obama Administration despite several crises with the Bush Administration. 
                                                      
694 Burhanettin Duran, “JDP and Foreign Policy”, Hakan Yavuz (eds), The Emergende of a New Turkey, The 
University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2006. 
695 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu, Kure Yayinlari, Ankara, 2001, see also 
Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkiye Merkez Ulke Olmali”, Radikal Newspaper, February 26, 2004.  
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6.1.1. Denial of realignment  
Qualitative content analysis of leader statements indicated that almost none of the political actors 
perceive the three tiered security partnership with Iran as foreign policy realignment. Key 
political actors, Prime Minister Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul (former Foreign Minister), 
Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu asserted that 
Turkey is not moving away from the Western orientation and there is no deep structural change 
in Turkey’s international alignment. In his speech at Trabzon providence, Prime Minister 
Erdogan called the realignment allegations “an insidious black propaganda” and added that 
“Yesterday there were newspaper headlines arguing that Turkey is moving away from the West. 
The Israeli press and the international press that are under the control of Israelis tell the same 
thing. Who are you serving? We will not succumb to this black propaganda. We are not doubtful 
about our intentions.”696 Foreign Minister Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey’s new foreign 
policy outlook, severaly criticized the realignment allegations and asserted that “The arguments 
on structural realignment are not objective but malicious…We have to adopt the new 
conjuncture…We have done extensive reforms demanded by the EU over the past six years that 
other governments could not achieve in four decades…The realignment arguments are not based 
on a single empirical indicator.”697  During his speech at Mayflower Hotel, Washington, 
Davutoglu criticized the allegations about realignment and noted that “If they are claiming that 
we are realigning, they should present evidence that Turkish foreign policy makers are not 
fulfilling their responsibilities towards the EU and NATO.”698 Similarly President Abdullah Gul 
rejected the claims about realignment and stated that:  
                                                      
696 Erdal Sen, “Eksen Kaymasi Soylemleri Sinsi ve kara bir propaganda”, Zaman Newspaper, June 13, 2010.  
697 Haber7, “Davutoglu Eksen tartismasina sert cikti”, December 9, 2009 
698 Ahmet Davutoglu, Press speech, “Asil Eksen Degistiren Avrupa”, December 9, 2009 
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I’m consistently telling this in my speeches over the past several days. The realignment 
arguments are raised in wrong venues. Look at Britain. Look at Spain. Look at France. 
They have good relations with multifarious countries throughout the world. None talks 
about their realignment. None says that the British, Europeans and Spanish governments 
have lost their orientation…The allegations of realignment based on Turkey’s developing 
relations with the Muslim countries are driven either by ignorance or maliciousness.699  
 
The predominant majority of the elites and analysts that I interviewed also indicated that 
Turkey’s growing partnership with Iran does not mean a strategic realignment but it is 
“normalization” and expansion of the axis towards the East. For them, the neglect of the relations 
with the East for the sake of consolidating pro-Western course was the primary foreign policy 
failure of the previous governments. Many of them asserted that Turkey’s undeveloped relations 
with the East have to be revitalized to promote national interests. According to their view, even 
though there are some program changes, it does not indicate realignment of Turkey in the 
international system. Turkey’s realpolitik necessitates enhanced relations particularly with 
energy rich neighbors at the East, the North and South simultaneously. Murat Mercan, the 
Chairman of the Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Relations committee, asserted that, “Turkey is not 
realigning. Turkey is normalizing. We have unchangeable paradigms such as pro-Western 
trajectory of foreign policy. Our destination is European Union. But the world is changing and 
we are adjusting ourselves towards the new paradigms. We have to exploit the opportunities in 
other regions as well”.700 Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, who served in Foreign Minister’s Advisory 
Board, clarified that “Turkey is not realigning. It is normalizing its posture in international 
                                                      
699 Cumhuriyet Newspaper, “Gul’den eksen tartismalarina yanit”, June 14, 2010.  
700 Author's interview with Murat Mercan on January 4, 2010. Ankara/Turkey. Dr. Mercan is the  The Chairman of 
Turkish Parliaments Foreign Relations Committee. 
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politics. We are adjusting our alignment towards Ankara not towards Tehran.”701 According to 
Huseyin Bagci, “there is no realignment. Turkey is preserving its Western direction. I mean 
Turkey has well established ties with the West. We are just normalizing our relations with the 
East. But this does not take at the expense of our Western alignment…Turkey’s relation to the 
West is like a catholic marriage. Even though we can find some mistresses we cannot divorce 
from the West.”702 Similarly Burak Ozugergin, the spokesperson of the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
responded to a question about realignment as following, “Turkey is not realigning but we are 
expanding our relations. Turkey has a well established pro-Western course. Those who argue 
that we are changing the course of foreign policy still have a Cold War mindset”.703 
 
6.1.2. Strategic depth doctrine and diversification of relations  
The AKP’s new foreign policy is based on Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” 
doctrine, which he developed as a professor of international relations. Davutoglu is one of the 
few figures who found an opportunity to apply his thoughts/doctrine to foreign policy practice 
(similar to Henry Kissinger). According to the “Strategic Depth” doctrine, Turkey had placed too 
much emphasis on the relations with the West, but neglected the East, the North and the South. 
Unidirectional foreign policy has been undermining Turkey’s national interests and power 
projection capability. Davutoglu propounds that Turkey should develop economic, political and 
security partnerships with these neglected regions, particularly with the former Ottoman 
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territories.704 This approach is named “neo-Ottomanism” by many Turkish foreign policy 
analysts, but Davutoglu rejects using this title. His doctrine embraces Turkey’s historical and 
Islamic heritage to promote Turkey’s “soft power” throughout the Middle East, Balkans, 
Caucasus and Central Asia. It promotes the sense of grandeur and self confidence in Turkey’s 
interaction with the states in these regions, as Turkey aspires to be a core state.  
Statements of the key foreign policy makers and analysts indicate that Turkey’s growing 
partnership with Iran is a component of the Erdogan Administration’s efforts to diversify Turkish 
foreign policy. According to Foreign Minister Davutoglu, “Turkey is European. Turkey is Asian. 
We are African, we are Middle Eastern and we are Mediterranean. We have diversified relations 
with all these regions. We will be involved in all the incentives about these regions…  If the Iran 
conflict affects us we have a right to speak… We will not support the decisions that others take 
by excluding us from the negotiation table.”705 In another speech Davutoglu maintained that “We 
are devoting attention to Iran’s integration into the international system. Turkey has good 
relations with Iran and the United States simultaneously.”706 Ambassador Laloglu stated that 
“We are diversifying our foreign policy and developing our relations with Russia, Iran, Europe 
and the Middle East. We are not just looking toward the West but all other directions. This is 
quite normal. We are advancing our relations toward all directions. We are not just developing 
good relations with Iran.”707 According to Ihsan Bal, security analyst at International Strategic 
Research Organization, “Turkey is not realigning towards the Muslim World. It has very 
advanced relations with Christian Georgia and Serbia …Our presence in the Middle East, 
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Caucasus, Balkans and Africa has consolidated. This means we are remembering the East that 
we disregarded for a long time.”708 
 Another common argument among the elites is that Turkey is not just developing 
economic and security partnerships with Iran or the Muslim World, but with a diverse set of 
nations that includes Christian and Socialist states. Since the Erdogan Administration assumed 
power in 2002, Turkey has developed advanced relations with Christian states such as Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Russia and Serbia. In particular, the Erdogan Administration’s 
intergovernmental relations with Russia are more fully developed than relations with the Iran. 
Russia continued to be the largest energy and trade partner of Turkey in 2010. During President 
Medvedev’s visit to Ankara on May 2010, Turkey and Russia signed 17 strategic agreements 
that include reciprocal abolition of visa requirements, construction of a joint nuclear power plant 
in Turkey, increasing cooperation in counternarcotics, and removing barriers for 
transportation.709 Turkish President Gul emphasized that “Our friendship relations scaled up to 
the highest level of strategic partnership”. 710 Russian President Medvedev responded that “Our 
relations [with Turkey] radically changed over the past few years. It became multidimensional 
and strategic. Abolishment of visas is a historic incident”.711 President Medvedev maintained that 
“Our agreements indicate a giant leap in bilateral relations. These created historic 
opportunities… There are great opportunities in textile, electricity and food industry in addition 
to Energy partnership. Abolishment of visas will stir up reciprocal tourism. We have to use our 
own national currencies in bilateral trade. We have to establish a joint bank.”712 
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6.1.3. Turkey as a core state of an integrated region   
Many foreign policy makers and analysts argued that Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran is just a 
component of a reformulated Turkish grand strategy that seeks regional integration. The Erdogan 
Administration attempts to make Turkey a core state in the region. According to the foreign 
policy elites, this will be a milestone in Turkey’s quest for regaining “global power” status after 
two centuries. Prime Minister Erdogan articulated that “Turkey cannot remain at the periphery of 
this region. We are a core state. Turkey can no longer be defined as a regional power. We are 
progressively becoming a global power. We have to revise our strategic vision taking into 
account the new realities of the world.”713  
Indeed, the “strategic depth”, the “zero problem”714 and the “win-win” approaches of 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu are partially designed to promote regional integration under 
Turkey’s leadership.  Foreign Minister Davutoglu asserted that, “We have embraced a proactive, 
systematic and holisticapproach [in foreign relations]. Our foreign policy is centered at Ankara 
[Not East or the West]. Our perspective is 360 degrees.”715 The “holist approach” seeks 
elimination of barriers for movement of people and capital. In line with this strategy, the Turkish 
government abolished visa requirements with 62 countries that include Iran.716 Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu stated that “We have taken all the responsibility as a core state. It is important that we 
resolve all the problems with Turkey’s neighbors. We have to increase human mobility through 
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economic and cultural partnership. Turkey should produce a foreign policy that takes into 
account the values of the neighborhood.”717 In another speech Davutoglu maintained that:  
We are fulfilling one of our dreams. A traveler from Istanbul will freely move to 
Damascus, Amman and Beirut. Similarly, another traveler from Beirut can travel to 
Aleppo, and then to Urfa, and return back to his home at the end of the day. Another 
tourist from Aleppo should enter the EU through Turkey without any restrictions. We are 
going to fulfill this aim whatever it costs. This regional integration will expand once 
other friendly countries such as Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt join. This will 
harmonize the people of the region.”718 
 
The Erdogan Administration perceives military conflicts as a primary roadblock for 
regional integration. Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s “zero problems” strategy has been 
instrumental in eliminating the conflicts not only with Iran but also with Syria, Armenia, Russia 
and Greece. As interviewee Bulent Aras put it, Turkish government aims at “de-securitizing” 
intergovernmental relations with the neighbors, including Iran.719 For him, Turkey seeks to 
resolve regional conflicts depending on her increasing soft power. Turkey’s diplomatic overtures 
to prevent a potential American or Israeli attack against Iran are crafted to preserve a stable 
environment that functions as a fertile ground for regional integration. In this context, Turkish 
government elites see American interventions in the region as the principal barrier for economic 
and political integration. Many other interviewees asserted that the Erdogan Administration is 
dedicated to stand against Western “neo-colonial” ventures that stir up ethno-sectarian 
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conflicts.720 According to vast majority of foreign policy elites and analysts, the War in Iraq was 
just another neo-imperial initiative to colonize energy resources of the region. Many elites stated 
that Turkey opposes the return of colonialism in the region since it is perceived as the root cause 
of poverty, ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism. Many Turkish elites perceive the war 
plans against Iran as another attempt to regain control of Persian hydrocarbons under the pretext 
of preventing nuclear proliferation.721 In their perspective, a return of colonialism would 
undermine Turkey’s regional integration strategy.  
6.2. Power shifts in domestic politics and emergence of strong support for 
foreign policy diversification   
Even though this dissertation focused on the security aspects of foreign policy change, my field 
research indicated that four major changes in domestic politics facilitated the shift of state’s 
security posture and diversification of foreign policy: i) the AKP’s ascendance to power as a 
single party government shift of power in state machinery, ii) rise of alternative elites and decline 
of the Kemalist paradigm, iii) dramatic shift in the threat perceptions of governing elites and 
citizenry and iv) strong domestic support for foreign policy diversification. Chapter 3 presented 
the underlying reasons of the shift of threat perceptions among both the ruling elites and the 
citizenry. This chapter discusses the impact of other three factors on foreign policy change and 
Turkish Iranian détente during the Erdogan Administration. 
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6. 2.1. Rise of the AKP and shift of power in state machinery 
 
Many of the institutionalist literature claimed that the ongoing foreign policy change has been 
driven by the power shift from the ultra secularist military to the pan-Islamist politicians.722 
Traditionally, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had been dominating the foreign and security 
policy making process in the National Security Council (MGK). A growing array of 
institutionalists claimed that the balance of power within Turkey’s foreign policy machinery 
fundamentally changed throughout the EU accession reforms. Aydinli, Ozcan and Akyuz 
highlighted that there has been a constant transition of power from the military to the civilians in 
the post-Helsinki process as the EU strongly recommended demilitarization of Turkish 
politics.723  
My investigations revealed that there is a profound power shift in domestic politics, but 
EU accession reforms do not account for all the changes. Several other developments curtailed 
the power of pro-status quo military leaders and strengthened the hands of the government in 
several ways. First, amendments at the article 118 of the Turkish Constitution increased the 
number of civilian members at the MGK meetings and the civilian wing gained numerical 
superiority. Second, Turkey has elected civilian presidents since 1989.724 Thus, the military wing 
lost the most important seat in the MGK meetings.725 Third, in parallel with the Sixth 
Harmonization Package of the EU, the Erdogan Administration enacted the Law on the MGK 
and the MGK Secretariat in 2003, which enabled appointment of civilian secretary generals to 
                                                      
722 Metin Heper, “The European Union, the Turkish military and democracy”, South European Society and Politics, 
10(1), 33-44, 2005 
723 Ersel Aydinli; Nihat Ali Ozcan, & Dogan Akyaz, “Turkish Military's March toward Europe”, Foreign Affairs, 
85(1), 77-90, 2006 
724 Before 1989, 6 out of 7 presidents had come from military background.  
725 Especially after 2007, civilian wing has been enjoying unprecedented domination at the MGK meetings. The government is 
strongly supported by the president Gul who had been Prime Ministers deputy before assuming his current position.  
245 
 
the National Security Council. Most importantly, the law curtailed the powers of the MGK and 
downgraded it into an advisory/consultation board. Thus, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
became the most important actors in practice of foreign affairs. Fourth, military domination in 
the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) gradually eroded after the 1992, as President Ozal 
sought to demilitarize the organization. This policy has been embraced by the consecutive 
presidents, and all of the recent Directors of MIT are appointed among the civilian officials. 
Therefore, it became highly improbable that the military wing dominate the decision making 
process in the MGK meetings especially during single party governments.  
One of the most important developments is the emergence of the AKP as a single party 
government after the 2002 elections. The AKP won 365 seats out of 550 in the Turkish 
parliament. This number was sufficient to appoint all key officials including the President, 
Chairman of the Parliament and all ministers. The AKP became increasingly powerful as they 
held the majority in the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council. Under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan, the AKP elites began to dominate the decision making 
process in the state’s foreign policy machinery. Unlike the coalition governments, the AKP acts 
as a bloc in the National Security Council meetings that have a defining impact on the outcome. 
Statements of the interviewees indicated that the AKP leaders have the upper hand in their 
interactions with the security bureaucracy and did not succumb to bureaucratic politics.726 The 
AKP’s position was further strengthened after the election of Abdullah Gul as the President of 
Turkey, who chairs the National Security Council Meetings. 
However, my interviewees argued that power interactions in domestic politics were not 
significant determinants of the shift in Turkey’s Iran policy. An important interviewee Murat 
Mercan asserted that “We are mostly in consensus on our policy towards Iran. The shift of power 
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in the MGK did not really affect the decision making process.”727 Some key interviewees 
asserted that the military officials do not oppose development of practical security relations with 
Iran, because they are highly disappointed with the American conducts after the occupation of 
Iraq. Serdar Erdurmaz, intimated that the U.S. occupation of Iraq was a turning point for the 
threat perceptions of Turkish military and other members of the National Security Council.728 
Erdurmaz noted that “Since then [2003] the military has been supportive of the Erdogan 
Administration’s efforts to forge a closer security partnership with the Iranian government, 
because the military leaders are highly disappointed with the American posture in Iraq.”729 
Ambassador Faruk Laloglu, who served in the Advisory board of Foreign Ministry, noted that 
“The soldiers do not oppose improvement of bilateral relations with Iran, because they think that 
Iran has become a quite instrumental partner in counterterrorism strategy.”730 Tuncer Kilinc, the 
former Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, proposed that Turkey should 
forge closer security relations with Iran and Russia to stand against regional security threats.731 
In a similar fashion, more and more military officials began to appreciate the value of regional 
security partnerships.  
6.2.2. Rise of the new elites and decline of traditional elites  
 
The second major development is the concomitant rise of alternative elites in the sociopolitical 
domain. For many analysts, the shift in Turkish foreign policy is grounded on the rise of “new 
elites” and concomitant transformation of the domestic political and bureaucratic landscape. For 
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them, the rise of the new elites is the real revolution in Turkish politics rather than the apparent 
shift in foreign policy. Until the early 2000s, pro-Western secularism and Kemalism have been 
the dominant paradigms in the Turkish governmental system. Turkey’s post-Ottoman foreign 
policy was crafted by ultra-secularist elites, who aspired to transform a Muslim nation into a 
modern Western republic. Key government organizations such as the Foreign Ministry, Judiciary 
and Armed Forces have been champions of the pro-Western course of foreign policy. The ruling 
elite named themselves the “White Turks” and others the “Black Turks” to illustrate the 
intersubjective power relations.732 Sociologist Serif Mardin applied the center-periphery analysis 
to illustrate the interaction between the elites and Turkish citizenry. In his model, the periphery 
represented the Anatolian mass society that had no substantial control over the foreign policy 
making process. The “core” represented the educated and politicized secularist elites that 
controlled the decision making process not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics.  
 As Hakan Yavuz put it, the “White Turks” controlled the key bureaucratic positions in the 
Military, Judicial System, Education Boards and Foreign Ministry.733 Yavuz notes that the 
“Black Turks”, mainly the conservative nationalists and Islamists, were excluded from upper 
echelons of key governmental institutions. There had been a screening process to prevent the 
Islamists, Marxists and conservative nationalists from climbing up to higher ladders in the 
bureaucracy. According to the Kemalist elites, Turkey was bound to the West not only in 
military respects but also in the political, economic and ideological dimensions. As Robert Olson 
put it, even though Turkey’s “obsessive” pro-Western posture contradicted with national 
interests in some circumstances, the former elites did not deviate from this course of foreign 
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policy.734 According to Hakan Yavuz, “foreign relations filtered down from the secular elite’s 
self ascribed European Identity, which in turn was the basis of framing Turkish national 
interests.”735 
On the flipside, they kept intergovernmental relations with the Muslim countries, 
particularly with post revolutionary Iran, on a low profile for two reasons. One was related to the 
external image of the country. Turkish foreign policy makers aspired to promote Turkey’s image 
as a modern Western nation and avoided foreign policy conduct that would undermine this 
image. The other aspect was related to domestic image. The ruling secularist elites wanted to 
suppress alternative paradigms such as Islam, communism and liberalism to avoid a 
counterrevolution. In many respects, a unidirectional pro-Western foreign policy was the 
purview of elites out of touch with their society. For many foreign policy analysts, Turkey’s 
unidirectional pro-Western foreign policy was an abnormal phenomenon. For instance, Nasuh 
Uslu argued that Turkey’s neglect of the East was an elite-driven approach and unconditional 
support to Western initiatives, particularly the wars against the Muslim countries, has been 
highly unpopular within Turkish society.736 Uslu asserted that the vast majority of the Turks 
were against supporting the United States in the Gulf War. Similarly, the vast majority of the 
Turkish community is against the Iraq War and the embargo against Iran. According to the 
majority of analysts that I intervieved, the diversification of foreign policy, growing interaction 
with Iran, and development of better relations with the East mean normalization of Turkey’s 
alignment. This phenomenon is also recognized by foreign specialists on Turkey. According to 
Graham Fuller, “Turkey’s former foreign policy was quite unnatural. Turkey cut down its 
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relations with the Asian and Middle Eastern countries…After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
security threats waned down. Thus, Turkey could interact with the Caucasus, Iranians, Middle 
Easterners and Arabs. We have been observing normalization of Turkey’s alignment.”737 
The elitist posture however, began to dissipate in the 1980s as Turkey experienced a 
surge of “counter elites” against the hegemony of traditional secular elites in governmental 
domain. After the 2002 elections, the new elite took over the highest political positions and 
began to clash with the “old elites” that had been indifferent to social demands. According to my 
interviewees, the new elite have several characteristics. First, Suleyman Ozeren Argued that the 
new elites are in close touch with the realities and demands of the grassroots citizenry.738 Prime 
Minister Erdogan noted that “We came to power as an alternative to the elitist politics that 
showed no interest in the concerns of the citizenry. We are with the subjugated people.”739 
Second, they are sensitive to cultural values and religious freedoms but strongly oppose religious 
extremism. As President Abdullah Gul put it, the new elites want to “prove that a Muslim society 
is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary standards, while preserving 
its values, tradition and identity”.740 Third, they seek national interests in foreign policy rather 
than striving to promote images that are only favorable in the West.741 Fourth, According to 
Nasuh Uslu, the new elite embraces diversification of foreign relations and exploitation of the 
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opportunities at the East, the South and the North.742 Fifth, Cuneyt Gurer argued that the new 
elites are determined to stand against Western initiatives that are against Turkey’s national 
interests but they are ready to cooperate with the West when the joint initiatives serve mutual 
interests.743 One of my interviewees Suleyman Ozeren, asserted that:  
There is a center-periphery battle in domestic politics and foreign policy. The elite 
minority was out of touch with the realities of the Turkish people. Turkey’s relentless 
pro-Western foreign policy was never popular. A new group of elites has emerged at the 
periphery. The elites are seeking to balance Turkey’s foreign policy posture. The former 
elites were giving up national interests for the sake of integration into the West. The new 
elites think that Turkey’s national interests come first. They are ready to implement 
alternative foreign policy initiatives such as the energy deals with Iran and enhanced 
trade partnership with Russia.744 
 
The body politic of Turkey underwent profound changes after the concomitant rise of 
political Islam and nationalism that undermined the legitimacy of the previously uncontested 
political paradigm. The new elites, either Islamist, liberal or nationalist, began to question the 
premises of pro-Western foreign policy. The new elites have been quite supportive of foreign 
policy diversification and the three-tiered security partnership with Iran. They no longer want to 
be a “subcontractor of Washington” and assert that Turkey has been promoted from a peripheral 
actor to a core state in international politics. 745According to these elites, Turkey’s power 
projection will remain limited as long as it is seen as the spearhead of “Western neo-
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colonialism”. In line with the resurgence of nationalist and Islamist sentiments, Turkish society 
became very sensitive to foreign concessions, and maintenance of national sovereignty and 
national dignity. As Bulent Aras put it, the impression of pro-American (Amerikanci) and 
“westoxicated” foreign policy has become a highly unpopular image in Turkish politics.746 
Especially “the new elites” are determined to use the alternative opportunities in security and 
trade realms. They seek cooperation with the Iranian government in counterterrorism, nuclear 
security and energy security to promote national interests and preserve regional stability. 
6.5.3. Emergence of strong domestic support for foreign policy diversification  
 
During the field research, I observed that individuals from almost all walks of Turkish society 
support diversification of foreign relations. Apart from the elite/expert interviews, I have talked 
to hundreds of Turkish citizens since 2008 to understand their perceptions on the Erdogan 
Administration’s Iran policy. There is broad support among Turkish citizenry for diversification 
of foreign policy. In general, the vast majority of the people support forging of practical security 
partnerships with Iran, particularly in the post Iraq War security landscape. However, even the 
Islamists reject Turkey’s strategic alliance with Iran at the expense of the relations with the West. 
Quite interestingly, in Turkey mainstream Islamist scholars were more critical of Iran than 
secular politicians.  
Turkey’s diversification of foreign relations is supported by the other political parties 
such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Virtue Party (FP) 
and Great Union Party (BBP). As my interviewee Kaan Dilek put it, “secularists don’t really 
think differently from the AKP administration. They also want diversification of foreign 
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relations. This tendency has become clearer after the Iraq War.”747 This indicates that there is a 
broad consensus among the Turkish elites and the society about the necessity of diversification. 
General Tuncer Kilinc, former Secretary General of the National Security Council highlighted 
that “Given its location there are competing pressures on Turkey. Western partners want to see 
Turkey on their side against Iran but Turkey’s position requires maintaining ties with the Iranian 
government… In other words, Turkey cannot afford following a unidimensional pro-Western 
foreign policy given its economic and geographic ties.”748 Gulsun Bilgehan Toker, the deputy 
Chairman of the CHP argued that, “Turkey is a deep rooted country. We cannot change the 
course of foreign policy even if the AKP rules the political domain. We can also make some 
adjustments in line with national interests… Turkey should develop good relations with both 
sides. Turkey will be a model for the Middle East as a member of the European Union.”749 
Mustafa Kibaroglu, a Turkish non-proliferation and disarmament expert, argued that “Iran is now 
seen as the closest ally among almost all walks of Turkish community including the secular 
ultra-nationalists (ulusalci) because of their resistance to American domination in the region”.750 
Kemal Kirisci, a Turkish foreign policy analyst, asserted that “The AKP’s foreign policy 
attracted vast popular support because they are doing what the Turkish citizenry wants. Under 
the current conjunction there can be no other foreign policy.”751 
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6.3. Not Islamic Identity but national interests  
One major question before the field research was whether the Islamic identity or aspirations of 
the Erdogan Administration played any role in the Turkish-Iranian detente. A principal criticism 
against the AKP’s Iran policy was that the Islamic sentiments were drawing the Erdogan and 
Ahmadinejad administrations closer. According to the critics, the AKP was disguising its true 
Islamic aspirations and engaging into hypocrisy (Takiyye) to disguise its real intentions. During 
the field research, I sought to shed light on the question of the role of identity on Turkey’s Iran 
policy. It is true that many key actors in the upper echelons of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) came out of the ashes of the Welfare (RP) and Virtue (FP) parties that had been abolished 
by the Constitutional Court due to their Islamic pedigrees. However, during interviews and 
content analysis, it was surprising that almost all the political elites and analysts rejected the role 
of Islamic Identity in Turkish-Iranian détente. Indeed, many analysts argued that identity is a 
source of conflict in bilateral relations rather than being a catalyst for intergovernmental 
dealings. Almost all the elites and analysts gave convincing rational statements that the progress 
in bilateral relations is driven by mutual interests.  None of the elites or analysts that I 
interviewed used Islamic justifications to explain Turkish-Iranian détente.  
Prime Minister Erdogan, Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc, and President Abdullah 
Gul, were three important figures in the Welfare Party and gave pro-Islamist statements during 
their membership in the Welfare Party before 1997. It is also a generally known fact that many 
key political figures are practicing devoted Muslims. However, after the 2002 election victory, 
Prime Minister Erdogan and other key members of the AKP reiterated that the new government 
would not follow Islamist domestic and foreign policies. Instead, they asserted that the AKP 
government would seek pragmatic goals, further integration with the European Union and would 
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remain committed to democracy, secularism and liberalism. Indeed, the AKP is not entirely 
composed of the Islamists, but is an ad hoc collation of a wide range of liberals, nationalists, 
Islamists and democrat elites that stood against state corruption, nepotism and incompetence of 
coalition governments.  
Between December 2002 and July 2010, the AKP Government enacted 283 laws.752 In 
addition to legislative reforms, the AKP changed several articles of the Turkish constitution in 
2010. None of the enacted laws or the constitutional changes has Islamic connotations. The 
overwhelming majority of the new laws were enacted for legislative harmonization with Europe 
and promoting a liberal democratic system. Indeed, the AKP is criticized by hardcore Islamists 
and nationalists for not adhering to women’s rights to wear headscarf in public offices and 
schools.753  
In the foreign policy domain, despite growing resentment towards the West, the key 
political actors of the AKP made it clear that Turkey would preserve its pro-Western course. 
Contrary to the Erbakan Administration, the AKP elites asserted that the ultimate destination for 
Turkey is European Union, not Iran or Islamic union. Prime Minister Erdogan explicated that 
“our party clearly refuses to be a party that imposes an ideology on the nation and will not 
denigrate religious values by exploiting them in politics”.754 The AKP distanced itself from the 
pro-Islamic discourse to embrace a broader array of voters. Unlike his predecessor Erbakan, 
Prime Minister Erdogan avoided over criticism of the United States and European Union. In 
many venues he argued that Turkey represents the best synthesis of modernity, liberal democracy 
and Islam that can be a bridge between the Muslim World and the West.  
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Instead of totally rejecting a pro-Western foreign policy, the AKP government seeks to 
remain in the Western alliance, but developing practical partnerships with other countries on the 
basis of practical interests. In his speech at SETA Washington DC, Erdogan noted that “We 
neither seek a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy nor realignment. These claims intended to 
overshadow our government. We still keep the Western orientation but we are developing our 
relations with neighbors. We cannot lose the East, we cannot lose the North and we cannot lose 
the South. We are capable of viewing the world through 360 degrees.”755 Erdogan’s following 
statements exemplify the rejection of sheer Islamism in party politics:  
My political views have been in a state of constant evolution. Naturally, I have been 
profoundly influenced by those that preceded me…In some Western newspapers and 
publications; my party is described as an “Islamic party” or as “Muslim Democrat”. 
These characterizations are not correct. This is not because we are not Muslim or 
democrat, but because we believe that they need to be considered in two different 
contexts…Turkey wishes to take its “political Magna Carta”, which rests on a synthesis 
between its Muslim identity and modern values, much further by becoming an active 
leader of the system of modern values, and thus to provide the world with a new 
renaissance perspective which can be a new source of inspiration.756 
 
The political leaders are aware of the fact that identity-based rapprochement with Iran 
could undermine Turkey’s image not only in the West but also in the Sunni World. Turkey’s 
political and religious elites have been careful not to make any religion based interaction with 
Iran particularly in the post 28 Subat period.757 In many of their statements Prime Minister 
Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu elucidated that the AKP strongly rejects foreign policy 
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based on ethnic or religious identity. Foreign Minister Davutoglu charged that “those who argue 
that our policy is driven by Islamist sentiments are ignorant about Turkey’s geography. You can 
have a reliable argument if we are just developing good relations with Iran and Syria. However, 
if we are developing good relations with all the neighbors regardless of their ethnic and religious 
identity, then none can criticize us.”758 Key foreign policy makers maintain that Turkey will 
follow its national interests rather than ideological aspirations. In bilateral relations with Iran, 
Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu always laid emphasis on mutual 
interests but never made references to Islamic sentiments. According to Erdogan, “Iran always 
held a very strategic location in the region with its dynamism and human capital. Our partnership 
will make substantial contributions to regional and global security. We have to see the full side 
of the glass. I hope our friendship lasts for long years…It is very hard to win friendships but it is 
easy to win enemies.”759 After his visit to Tehran, Erdogan stated that that  
We have conducted very fruitful negotiations with the Iranians. We are giving utmost 
importance to our relations with Iran in all issues. Our relations continue to develop on 
the principles of good neighborhood and noninterference into domestic politics. We are 
acting in coordination with the Iranian government on many political and economic 
initiatives. We had a strategy when we took over the government. We would improve our 
relations with our neighbors. Over the past seven years we are determinately moving in 
this direction…Turkey and Iran are two important players in regional politics. We can do 
many things for regional peace. We should not be the crux of problems but initiator of 
solutions. 760 
 
  Almost all of the analysts that I interviewed also rejected the role of Islam in Turkish-
Iranian détente. None of them reverted to Islamic verses or statements of religious authorities to 
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explain the security partnership between Iran and Turkey. All of the interviewees gave rational 
statements to explain the shift of Turkey’s Iran policy. According to Cuneyt Gurer, “Islamic 
identity is not a primary determinant of Turkish Iranian relations. It is of secondary importance. 
The primary issue is national interests. Islamic identity, however, helps eliminating the mistrust 
among foreign policy makers.”761 According to another foreign policy analyst Mehmet Sahin, “A 
religious party does not necessarily pursue an Islamic foreign policy. We had two moderate 
Islamist governments before; Menderes and Ozal Administrations. Both governments sought to 
establish deeper ties with the West rather than realigning towards the Muslim World. In the early 
years, the AKP exerted relentless efforts in support of the EU accession process.”762 Bayram 
Sinkaya emphasized that, “We cannot say that Islamic identity played a key role in the Erdogan 
administration’s détente with Iran. Erdogan puts emphasis on trade, regional integration, political 
stability, human rights, and regional development. Erdogan proclaims that they are not Islamist. 
Erdogan does not like the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Iran’s hardliner Islamism has 
no appeal for him.”763 
Some analysts also rejected the argument that post-revolutionary Iran is pursuing an 
Islamist foreign policy. Proponents of this view argued that, Iran developed partnerships with 
Russia and Armenia (Christian states) against Turkey and Azerbaijan (Muslim States) in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Iran supported communist PKK against Muslim Turkey. 
According to them, Iranian foreign policy is not driven by Islamist sentiments, but President 
Ahmadinejad, increasingly use Islamic rhetoric in foreign policy to attract the support of mass 
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societies in the Muslim World. These analysts believe that the Iranians are not motivated by 
Islamic sentiments during the ongoing détente with Turkey, but are merely pursuing national 
interests. They seek to loosen the Western containment through energy, trade and security 
partnership with Turkey. For instance, Mehmet Sahin asserted that: 
Iranians are not necessarily pursuing an Islamic foreign policy. Their Islamic rhetoric is 
just a tool to gain strategic advantage within the Muslim World. How do we understand 
it? First, they [Irania government] have been supporting the Christian Armenia against 
Muslim Azerbaijan. Second, they have been collaborating with the Russians in Central 
Asia. This cooperation takes place against Turkish or American influence. Iran has never 
criticized Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia but they have been criticizing 
Turkey’s initiatives. Third, instead of Pakistan, Iranians are collaborating with the 
Russians on nuclear enrichment. Ultimately, Iranians were providing intelligence to the 
Americans against a Muslim Taliban. Iran has more advanced security cooperation with 
Russia than Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we cannot claim that Iranian foreign policy is 
utterly driven by Islamic sentiments.764 
 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Turkish elites see Islamic identity as a source of 
conflict with the Iranians, because Iran and Ottoman Turkey had been the champions of two 
competing paradigms in Islamic philosophy. While Ottoman Sultan became the caliphate and the 
protector of the Sunnis in 1517, the Saffavid dynasty and successive Persian rulers assumed the 
patronage of the Shiites.765 According to Kaan Dilek, as both powers aspired to attain 
predominance in the Muslim World conflict became unavoidable. Dilek asserted that “Persians 
have always remained hostile towards the Ottomans for two reasons. First, the Ottomans 
defeated them in the Battle of Caldiran… Second, Ottomans became the leader of the 
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predominant Sunni majority, whereas the Iranians could only project power over the Shiite 
minority.”766 He maintained that “In many circumstances we have seen that the Iranians allied 
with the Christians to break down the Ottoman predominance in the Muslim World.”767 Another 
foreign policy analyst argued that, “Iranians don’t really like rise of skilled Islamist leaders in 
other countries. Resurgence of Islam in Turkey irritated the Iranian Ayatollahs, because this will 
undermine Iran’s leadership claims in the Muslim world. You will not see Palestinians with 
Ahmadinejad posters but we have been seeing Erdogan posters in the hands of Palestinian, 
Lebanese, Syrian and even Egyptian groups.”768 Mehmet Sahin asserted that “We cannot explain 
the ongoing bilateral rapprochement on the grounds of convergence of religious identities. We 
have principally different religious understanding. Turkish religious leaders never admired the 
Iranian Ayatollah. I think it was in 1993, Fethullah Gulen told that if the road to heaven goes 
through Iran, he would find another route to bypass it.” 769 Moreover, Turkey’s mainstream 
Islamist scholars perceive Iran as a problematic figure in the Muslim World. According to the 
Islamists, Iran’s hardliner fundamentalist approach is tarnishing the image of Islam throughout 
the world.  
6.4. Turkey became less enthusiastic to fulfill commitments to Western 
Allies  
 Previous Turkish governments had been involved into many U.S. led initiatives (i.e. Korean 
War, Gulf War and Embargo against Iraq) in order to strengthen strategic ties with the West. In 
many of these initiatives, such as the embargo against Iraq after the Gulf War, Turkey made 
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significant contributions despite the conflict with Turkey’s national interests. As Celalettin 
Yavuz put it, the West promised to recompense Turkey’s loses but these promises were never 
kept.770 My field research indicated that even though Turkey does not seek a structural change, 
foreign policy makers are becoming less willing to fulfill commitments towards the western 
allies for several reasons. First, there is a profound resentment toward the United States mainly 
because of its conduct after the occupation of Iraq. Second, the Turkish government became less 
enthusiastic for EU accession reforms due to double standards and lack of trust to European 
officials. Third, NATO’s reluctance to deploy forces to help Turkey undermined the 
organization’s importance for Turkey. Moreover, NATO has become impractical in dealing with 
terrorism and ethnic separatism that became the principal concerns of the Turkish National 
Security Council. Fourth, Turkish society became increasingly opposed to unidirectional pro-
Western foreign policy that contradicts with national interests.  
 
6.4.1. Resentments towards the United States and NATO 
As discussed in chapter three, many of the officials and elites that I interviewed argued that the 
shift of Turkey’s security policy is driven by fundamental changes after the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq in 2003. In the new security landscape, the U.S. intervention emerged as the principal 
destabilizer in the region and undermined the regional status quo. It stirred up ethno-sectarian 
violence and Kurdish micronationalist independence movements. It unleashed the age old ethnic 
battle between the Kurds and the Arabs, Turks/Turkmens, and the Iranians. Turkish elites have 
been quite irritated with American conduct in the post-Iraq occupation period. The major source 
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of resentment against the United States is the American support for the Kurdish revivalism. The 
U.S. intervention in Iraq was a great disappointment for pro-Western Turkish elites that became 
increasingly critical of the American unilateralism. Predominant majority of the elites, analysts 
and citizens believe that the United States has a “secret agenda” of creating an independent 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq. According to many reliable public surveys (i.e. USAK survey on 
public perceptions on foreign policy) the U.S. became the “principle foreign threat” against the 
national security of Turkey in the eyes of the Turkish citizenry after 2003. Islamists, socialists 
and conservative nationalists in Turkey believe that American interventions in the region serve 
the interests of mainly four groups: petroleum companies, weapon producers, Israel, and the 
Neocons.771 Almost none of the elites and alysts that I interviewed believed in White House’s 
claims that the U.S. intervenes to build democracy and prevent nuclear proliferation in hostile 
regimes. According to Islamist foreign policy analyst Alptekin Dursunoglu, “Jewish lobbies 
want to reshape the Middle East in line with Israeli foreign policy and security interests. Their 
interests converge with the Neocons and petroleum companies who want to re-colonize the 
regional resources”.772 In this context, both the Islamists and nationalists perceive Iran as an ally 
against Anglo-American “neo-imperialist interventions”.773 According to Sedat Laciner, 
“American aggressive policies in the Middle East draw the countries of the region closer. Even 
the countries that had perennial conflicts got together to stand against negative consequences of 
American interventions. The growing partnership among Iran, Syria and Turkey is an exemplar 
of this phenomenon.”774  
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One major cause of the resentment was the Bush Administration’s way of depicting 
Muslims in the post 9/11 period. The Judeo-Christian crusading rhetoric of the Neocons’ in the 
Bush administration irritated both the Islamists and nationalists in Turkey. 775 Association of 
Islam with terrorism created a strong backlash in Turkish society. Even the secular individuals 
responded with anger against the frequent use of “Islamic terrorism” by American officials. 
Suleyman Ozeren, Director of UTSAM argued that “Bush’s statements were really arrogant. He 
told that ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’. This is a very dangerous 
statement. His crusade rhetoric during the War in Iraq infuriated both Turkish foreign policy 
elites and the society. These kinds of statements have been fueling anti-Americanism in 
Turkey.”776 Another interviewee Celalettin Yavuz, noted that  
After the 9/11, the Muslim states began to contemplate their situation more thoroughly 
[about the Islam and world affairs]. The Americans and the Europeans were seen as a 
stigmatizing the Muslims as if they were all terrorists. The ban for minarets and cartoon 
crisis [in Denmark] aggravated the Muslim communities. Moreover, Bush’s use of 
“crusade” to describe the Iraq war further alienated the Muslims. We might have a weak 
memory but we are not stupid. Muslim countries understood that they should jointly 
respond against the Neocon campaign to depict the Muslims as terrorists. They felt that 
they should come together.777  
 
Similarly Turkish elites became increasingly critical of NATO after the Cold War. 
During the field research, Turkish analysts and officials presented four major criticisms of 
NATO. First, NATO was reluctant to respond to Turkey’s demands during the Cyprus War and 
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the Gulf War. Celalettin Yavuz, a retired military officer, charged that whenever Turkey really 
needed the assistance of its strategic allies, NATO members dragged their feet. 778 Mustafa 
Kibaroglu, a non-proliferation and disarmament expert, argued that “many foreign policy elites 
think that NATO does not fulfill its commitments to Turkey. In 1991, President Ozal demanded 
a NATO defense shield against a potential encroachment by Saddam. He got the answer very 
late. They sent a few outdated and underpowered systems. Some of them could never return to 
Europe because they broke down.”779  
The second major criticism is that NATO is unable to respond to terrorism and ethnic 
separatism, which became the foremost national security problems for the Turkish government. 
Murat Mercan, the Director of Turkish Parliaments Foreign Relations Committee, asserted that 
“Cold War security paradigms are over. There are new security paradigms. We are not dealing 
with superpowers, we are not dealing with other state level threats either. We are dealing with 
micronationalist movements and terrorism. You cannot resolve the new problems with Cold War 
alliances. We need new practical partnerships. Our relations with Iran are based on this 
paradigm.”780 According to Bulent Aras, “The post Cold War security environment entails 
regional partnerships to cope with contemporary security conflicts. It is quite natural that we are 
cooperating with Iran to respond to mutual security threats such as terrorism and sectarian 
violence.” 781 According to Kaan Dilek, “The ongoing détente is driven by the shifts in regional 
and global environments. After the end of Cold War, despite the fact that NATO has preserved 
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its strategic value, it became an impractical framework to deal with the regional security 
challenges. We now need practical partners who share similar threat perceptions.”782 
   The third criticism is that NATO functions as a tool of the United States to preserve its 
global hegemony. As Mustafa Kibaroglu put it, “Many people in Turkey’s governmental sphere 
think that NATO is an institution that is established to protect American hegemony. For many 
military officials and bureaucrats NATO has lost its meaning. This view is not just driven by 
Islamic sentiments but also by nationalist credentials.”783 Fourth criticism came from the Islamist 
elites who argued that Islam has become the new target of NATO after the demise of 
communism. Necmettin Erbakan, former Prime Minister of Turkey (1996-97) argued that “After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO executives were ambivalent about abolishing the 
organization. Thatcher said that no security organization can live without an enemy. She said that 
the NATO needed an enemy to justify its existence. They implanted Islam as the new common 
enemy after the dissolution of the Soviets.”784 Erbakan criticized NATO for remaining silent 
against the genocides in Bosnia, Somalia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya. These four resentments 
reduced the Turkish elite’s commitment to fulfill its responsibilities to NATO.  
 
6.4.2. Resentments towards EU  
The resentments towards EU mostly result from “double standards” and “delaying tactics” 
during the accession process. In the immediate aftermath of the 2002 election victory, the AKP 
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government acclerated the EU accession reforms in economic, judicial, legislative and political 
realms. Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul (Became president in 2007) exerted 
relentless efforts to persuade the European leaders to support Turkish accession. Turkey became 
an official candidate after the Helsinki Accords in 1999, and accession negotiations began on 
October 3, 2005.785 Since then the AKP has been exerting relentless efforts to enact accession 
reforms. However, the EU’s “double standards” and never-ending preconditions discouraged the 
Erdogan Administration from making further compromises. Statements of European leaders such 
as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel indicated that 
European leaders are unwilling to see Turkey in European Union. By 2010, 18 out of 33 
negotiation fields were suspended. France blocs the negotiations in four fields and Cyprus blocks 
14 negotiation fields.786 The Erdogan Administration is dedicated not to make further 
concessions to resolve the deadlock in the accession negotiations. Prime Minister Erdogan 
criticized that “Turkey has waited 45 years at the European gates. We have accomplished the 
demanded reforms… Prolonged European hesitation is discrimination against Turkey”.787 Serdar 
Erdurmaz stated that “The Europeans told us that you have no place in Europe. They said that 
our strategic mission was over once the USSR was dismantled. The West thought that they did 
not need us in NATO anymore. This created a shock in Turkish politics. Therefore, we began to 
seek alternative alignments quite normally.”788 As Erdurmaz put it, public support for EU 
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membership was experiencing the lowest level in 2009 since Turkey’s application for 
membership.789 
Turkey’s efforts to diversify foreign policy were precipitated when Turkish elites became 
convinced that the EU would not accept Turkey at least within the immediate future. When it 
became clearer that Turkey would not be accepted by the European Union, Turkish elites saw no 
point in making further commitments to the accession process. A growing array of elites believe 
that accession into European Union is unlikely for a Muslim Turkey. Put another way, many 
Turkish elites believe that the “Muslim Identity” is the principal reason of the EU’s rejection of 
Turkish membership. The elites acknowledged that Turkey and Europe come from different 
cultures and civilizations that clashed for over a millennium. Even though the post-Ottoman 
elites sought to westernize the country, the deep cultural discord remains a principal source of 
divergence. In this context, rising nationalistic and pan-Islamist political views oppose 
supranational institututional limits on Turkish national sovereignty. As Mehmet Sahin put it, 
“EU’s dragging of its feet on Turkish accession exacerbated the disappointment towards the 
West. The disappointment with the West compelled many pro-Western elites to support the 
AKP’s diversification of foreign policy and rapprochement with Iran.”790 Cuneyt Gurer, a 
Turkish EU expert, asserted that “divergent identity construction or the Muslim identity of 
Turkey has been the major point of reference for anti-Turkish camp in the EU enlargement 
policy”.791 Ziya Onis notes that the end of the strategic encounter with the communism threat and 
the emerging clash of civilization between Islam and the West made it difficult for Turkey to join 
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the Christian club.792 Onis maintained that after nine decades of intensive interaction more 
Turkish elites believe that we are the “others” in Europe.   
 
6.5. Iran cannot be an alternative to Turkey’s security ties with the West  
 
Despite the deepening resentments, Turkish foreign policy elites do not see Iran as an alternative 
to the West. They stress that Turkey will preserve the strategic alliance with the United States 
and NATO. Similarly, even though EU accession process came to a halt due to French and 
Cypriot vetoes, Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu asserted that the 
ultimate destination for Turkey is Europe, not Iran. Put another way, throughout the 
rapprochement process with Iran, Ankara is not significantly weakening its ties with Washington 
or Brussels. Foreign Minister Davutoglu frequently meets with American officials, mainly 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to discuss relevant matters about Iran’s nuclear program. 
Turkish institutions continue to implement EU accession reforms ignoring the political gridlock 
in the accession process. Turkey’s security institutions remains interconnected with their 
Western counterparts. Turkish elites believe that Iran is not an alternative to the West, and 
Turkey cannot afford dissociation from the West for several reasons.  
Turkey’s national defense strategy is highly integrated with the United States and NATO 
in three respects. First, by 2010, Turkish Ministry of Defense ran several modernization 
programs with the United States and Europe. These programs are indispensable for Turkey’s 
military power projection in the future. Turkey remains partly dependent on American 
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conventional weapons for national defense. The majority of Turkish air force is composed of 
American made F-16 aircrafts. Omer Kurkcuoglu emphasized that “Our air force is 
predominantly dependent on the United States. We cannot forge a major air battle without a 
supply agreement with Washington”. 793 Turkey participated in joint development of F-35 fighter 
that further integrated Turkey into Western defense initiatives. According to Faruk Sonmezoglu, 
“The United States continues to be the most important military partner of Turkey. Our military 
technologies and communication systems are integrated. We cannot break the ties with 
Washington”.794 Second, Turkey does not have its own nuclear deterrence capability and Ankara 
remains dependent on NATO’s nuclear shield. Third, Turkey’s national defense strategy has 
been integrated with NATO and the United States since 1952. Turkey continues to run joint 
military exercises with the United States and contributes to ISAF in Afghanistan.  
Turkish security institutions are integrated with the American and European counterparts 
in terms of sharing intelligence and experience. Numerous Turkish military officers have been 
trained in various American institutions such as the Army War College, Naval Post Graduate 
School, and the U.S. Air Force Academy. Joint training programs helped the Turkish officers to 
gain Western standards in military practices. Similarly, many law enforcement and intelligence 
officers are trained in various American universities and institutions. By 2010, nearly 100 law 
enforcement executives pursue graduate education and attend special training programs in 
various American universities and law enforcement organizations. American trained officers 
serve as an insurance of preservation of security partnership between the United States and 
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Turkey. Turkey does not foresee having similar types of training partnerships with Iran or other 
Muslim countries. Most of the foreign training programs by Turkish security institutions target 
the officers of the Turkic nations and Partnership for Peace members.795    
Even though the Turkish elites appreciate Iran’s contributions in the fight against the 
PKK and PJAK, they do not see Iran as an alternative to Turkey’s strategic security partnership 
with the West. Some interviewees noted that security cooperation between Iran and Turkey is not 
mature in several respects. First, Turkey’s law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies 
are adapted to run joint operations with their Western counterparts. Turkish institutions are 
designed to function optimally in Western standards. One security official noted that “Even 
though we began to exchange intelligence extensively with Iran, this does not mean that we will 
run joint military practices as we have been doing with the Western institutions over the past six 
decades. We are gradually overcoming the trust problem, but there are other problems such as 
the language, divergences in operational codes of conduct and legislative disharmony.”796  
Second, Iran’s image as fundamentalist Islamic regime remains a major handicap in developing a 
deep and abiding security alliance. The Turkish law enforcement, intelligence and military 
organizations refrain from publicizing their cooperation with Iranian institutions. One 
interviewee noted that “Iranian revolutionary guards are listed as a terrorist organization by the 
Bush Administration. Americans are our NATO ally. Our military institutions cannot run joint 
practices with an organization [Iranian revolutionary guards] that is perceived as a terrorist 
network by our strategic allies.”797 Even though there is an ongoing partnership against the 
PKK/PJAK, the Turkish security institutions, particularly the Armed Forces, continue to oppose 
further joint military practices that would be perceived as a military realignment of Turkey.  
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Given these conditions, Turkish elites believe that Turkey cannot abandon the strategic 
security partnerships with the United States and Western institutions. Tayyar Ari, a Turkish 
foreign policy analyst noted that “Today we can develop better relations with Iran. We can have 
good neighborhood relations. We can have much advanced economic relations. But I don’t think 
it is possible that we will forge military partnership neither with Russia nor Iran. They cannot be 
alternative to our strategic and military partnership with the West.”798 For Mumtaz Soysal, a 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, “The Turkish-U.S. partnership was based very much on 
strategic interests rather than a sharing of worldviews. Their political cultures have emerged 
from quite different histories, political philosophies, and social and institutional development. 
Their mutual strategic concerns overrode these differences.”799 Another foreign policy analyst 
Ramazan Gozen, asserted that “Under the current circumstances, Turkey is unlikely abolish its 
military alliance with the United States. The American presence in the region, existing military 
partnerships, multidimensional trade relations and alliance in international institutions makes the 
United States an indispensible ally for Turkey.800 According to Beril Dedeoglu, a foreign policy 
analyst at Galatasaray University, “There is no alternative to Turkey’s pro-Western trajectory. 
Even those attempts to develop better relations with the Muslim World take place within 
Turkey’s pro-Western grand strategy”.801 According to Faruk Sonmezoglu “The U.S. and NATO 
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remains the principal allies of Turkey in military practices, technology, communication and 
equipment. Our system is integrated with the U.S. and NATO.”802  
The key government officials including the President, Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister reiterated Turkey’s commitments to retain the economic, political and security relations 
with the West. Even though the resentment peaked in the post 2003 period, the elites 
acknowledged that Turkey cannot afford dissociation from the West. Turkey has become one of 
the largest economies in the world and it is highly integrated with the European and American 
markets. Turkey remains a member of G-20, OECD and WTO that makes dissociation from the 
Western economies impossible. The Turkish government has acknowledged that economic 
prosperity rests on a thorough integration not only with the regional economies but also with the 
rest of the World. As Kasim Gulecyuz put it, “The AKP acknowledges that they live in a world 
where the leading Western powers –despite significant competition and conflicts among them- 
have established global economic, political and military supremacy are keen to impose their 
liberal democratic norms and values on other societies”.803 
Despite rampant criticism of EU, Turkish political elites continue to argue that the final 
destination of Turkey should be Europe, not Mecca or Tehran. Contrary to the common 
perception in the West, the AKP is more lenient to the EU than the diehard Kemalists or 
Islamists. As Omer Kurkcuoglu put it, “The Justice and Development Party has been more 
positive towards the EU than the Erbakan Administration. We cannot say that the AKP is turning 
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its back to Europe”.804 Unlike hardliners, moderate Islamist elites have become more supportive 
of the EU accession process for several reasons. First, the EU accession reforms restrain the 
power projection capability of the Turkish military over civilian politics. The Islamists have 
become proponents of the EU membership because they perceive the accession refoms as an 
invaluable opportunity to break the yoke of Kemalist elites. In the Turkish political realm, more 
democratization means more power for the Islamists. On the flipside, political instability and 
authoritarianism serves the interests of pro-status quo Kemalist elites. The Islamists refrain from 
putting much emphasis on the relations with Iran, because it stirs up Kemalist resistance against 
this initiative. Second, they believe that religious and political freedoms will be protected in the 
European Union. Abolishment of Islamist parties will be more difficult after implementation of 
the EU encouraged political reforms. Third, accession reforms will end minority rule in Turkey 
and manipulations of ultra-secularist elites will be delegitimized. On the flipside, ultra-secular 
Kemalists strongly reject the EU accession reforms on the grounds that the reforms undermine 
the power of ultra-secularist elites. As the Republican Party (CHP) seems unlikely to win 
elections in the foreseeable future, democratization means rendering of the control of the state to 
the new Islamist elites. Fourth, the Islamists see EU membership as the mean to stand against 
aggressive American interventionism in the region.805 Given the above mentioned justifications 
moderate Islamists have become supportive of the EU accession reforms. They refrain from 
overemphasizing the partnership with Iran as they anticipate strong opposition from the powerful 
Kemalist elites.  
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6.6. Conclusions of the Chapter  
The Erdogan administration has forged a security partnership with Iran on counterterrorism, 
nuclear proliferation and energy security. This Turkish Iranian security partnership provoked 
major criticisms from the Western foreign policy analysts who claimed that Turkey is realigning 
from the West towards the Muslim East. The analysts and the politicians who put forward the 
realignment arguments mostly come from the pro-Western and pro-Israeli spheres, who also 
claim that the AKP has a “hidden” agenda of Islamic Union. They argued that the AKP 
government’s rapprochement with Iran and the Arab World coincides with its embitterment of 
relations with Israel and the United States. This chapter investigated whether the Erdogan 
Administration’s three tiered security partnership with Iran indicate Turkey’s realignment in the 
International system. Second, it sought to answer whether the rapprochement policy is driven by 
Islamic identity/aspirations or practical national interests. My field research indicated five major 
facts about Turkey’s alignment.  
First, Turkish elites and analysts do not perceive the intergovernmental security 
partnership with Iran as an indicator of Turkey’s realignment from the West towards the Muslim 
World. Almost all of the political and bureaucratic elites flatly reject the realignment arguments. 
Instead, they perceive the new posture as diversification of Turkish foreign policy through 
developing relations with the neglected East, North and South. According to the key political 
elites, the realignment argument is “black propaganda” projected by “malicious” analysts. They 
perceive the new posture as the end of an unpopular unidirectional outlook and normalization of 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Neglect of the relations with Russia, Iran, the Caspian region and the 
Arab World contradicts the national interest of Turkey that aspires to regain a global power 
status. Diversification of foreign policy rests on Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s strategic depth 
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doctrine that lays special emphasis on promoting relations with the neglected states. It promotes 
the sense of grandeur and self confidence in Turkey’s interaction with the Middle Eastern and 
Caspian countries, as Turkey aspires to be a core state or regional hegemon. Thus, from the 
broader perspective, Turkey’s security partnership with Iran is not an indicator of realignment 
but it is an essential component of foreign policy diversification.   
  Second, contrary to the projections of Western analysts, Turkey’s diversification of 
foreign relations and tactical security partnership with Iran is supported by the predominant 
majority of the Turkish citizenry. Even the Kemalists and diehard secular military leaders 
became supportive of diversification and forging of practical security relations with Iran in the 
post-Iraq War period. Turkey’s diversification of foreign relations is supported by other parties 
such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Virtue Party (FP) 
and Great Union Party (BBP).  However, the real shift in Turkish foreign policy is propelled by 
the rise of “new elites” that came from the periphery of Turkish socioeconomic domain. 
Turkey’s neglect of the East and the Muslim World was an approach of traditional elites, who 
paid little attention to the demands of the citizenry.  After the 2002 elections, however, the new 
elite took over the highest political positions and began to clash with the old elites who were 
indifferent to public opinion on foreign policy. The new elite’s foreign policy diversification is 
fulfillment of a long overdue public demand on foreign affairs. The new elites have been quite 
supportive of foreign policy diversification and the three-tiered security partnership with Iran. 
They no longer want to be a “subcontractor” of Washington and assert that Turkey has been 
promoted from a peripheral actor to a pivotal state in international politics. According to these 
elites, Turkey’s power projection will remain limited as long as it is seen as the spearhead of 
“Western neo-colonialism”.  
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Third, one major question before the field research was whether Islamic identity or 
aspirations of the Erdogan Administration played any role in Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. 
Statements of key governing elites and analysts indicate that Islamic identity has no significant 
role in the Turkish Iranian security rapprochement in the post-Iraq war landscape. The political 
leaders are aware of the fact that identity based rapprochement with Iran would undermine 
Turkey’s image not only in the West but also in the Muslim Sunni World. Therefore, Turkey’s 
political and religious elites have been quire reserved not to make any religion based interaction 
with Iran particularly in the post 28 Subat period. In many of his statements Prime Minister 
Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu elucidated that the AKP strongly rejects foreign policy 
based on ethnic or religious identity. Instead, mutual interests and threat perceptions have been 
drawing Ankara and Tehran closer. Resurgence of political Islam helped to overcome the 
negative image of Iranians as “fundamentalist evils”. However, a radical Shiite Iran has never 
become a role model for the Turkish religious community which has a more benign and 
moderate view of Sunni Islam. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, my field research indicated 
that identity is a source of conflict in Turkish-Iranian relations rather than stimulator of 
rapprochement. Turkey’s mainstream Islamist scholars perceive Iran as a problematic figure in 
the Muslim World. According to the Islamists, Iran’s hardliner fundamentalist approach is 
undermining the image of Islam throughout the World.  
Fourth, due to growing resentments towards the United States, NATO and EU, Turkish 
government elites became less committed to make further concessions to pro-Western foreign 
policy. Even though Turkey does not seek to realign, the ruling elites became less dedicated to 
fulfill the governmental commitments to Western powers and multilateral institutions. The 
resentment towards the U.S. is mainly because of U.S. attitudes and action in the post Iraq 
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occupation period. These include failure to cooperate against the PKK and support of Kurdish 
nationalism. The resentment towards the EU is a result of European double standards, hypocrisy 
and failure to comply with the accession promises. The resentment towards NATO is driven by 
its reluctance to mobilize forces and resources whenever Turkey needed. Many elites in Turkey 
began to question the value of NATO for Turkey’s national security policy. NATO has been 
quite instrumental in responding strategic threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies, but the 
organization has been far less effective in responding non-state threats. The resentment towards 
EU is sparked by the European “double standards” and reluctance to support Turkey’s accession 
despite its fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. More and more Turkish elites believe that the 
main reason for denial of Turkish accession is its “Muslim identity” that contradicts the cultural 
heritage of a predominantly Christian community. This cumulative resentment is not only 
pushing forward the search for alternative practical relations, but it is undercutting Turkey’s 
commitment to contribute to Western security initiatives. 
Ultimately, despite the resentments towards the West, Turkish elites do not see Iran as an 
alternative to its strategic ties with the West. Turkey has deep rooted relations with Europe and 
the United States since the beginning of the Cold War. Rather than a strategic replacement, the 
AKP leaders view the relations with the East as a complement to their ties with the West. At this 
juncture the AKP is completely different from its predecessor Welfare Party that sought to 
abolish the strategic alignment with the West. Turkish security institutions are integrated with the 
Western security organizations. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. Moreover,  
 Turkey has long been a member of multilateral economic institutions such as the OECD, G-20 
and WTO that integrate Turkey with the Western economies. The Turkish economy is highly 
integrated with the European markets particularly after the Custom’s Union Agreement in 1995. 
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Turkey’s trade with Europe is much larger than the bilateral trade with Iran. Given these 
circumstances, most Turkish elites believe that Turkey cannot afford to break economic and 
strategic relations with the West. Contrary to the prevalent view in the West, many Turkish 
Islamists have become true adherents of the EU accession for two reasons. First, the accession 
reforms help in eliminating barriers to democracy in Turkey. More democracy means more 
power for the Islamists and nationalists. Second, they view the European Union as the principal 
resistance platform against American unilateralism and aggressive interventionism in the Middle 
East.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS  
 
This dissertation investigated the underlying reasons for the Turkish-Iranian security 
rapprochement during the Erdogan Administration, and attempted to discover whether or not the 
ongoing détente with Iran indicated Turkey’s realignment in the international system. Turkey’s 
ongoing intensive security cooperation with Iran was selected as a case study for two reasons. 
First, the new posture of the Erdogan Administration demonstrates a profound shift in Turkish 
foreign policy and contradicts the traditional patterns of Cold War alliances. Second, this entente 
with Iran took place at a very sensitive time when Turkey’s two allies, the United States and 
Israel, were ramping up efforts to prevent Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons capability. 
To answer the research questions, the thesis adopted the security approach, which 
propounds that the major foreign policy changes are driven by the shifts in the balances of threat. 
This dissertation tested three assumptions in three policy fields: counterterrorism, nuclear 
security and energy security. It employed a rigorous qualitative analysis methodology to explore 
the perceptions of key decision makers on these security fields. Fundamental tenets of the 
security approach have been drawn from precepts of the realist paradigm in international politics 
that seeks the roots of foreign policy change at the shifting balances of threat. Contrary to the 
mainstream realist approaches, however, the security model used in this dissertation does not 
assume the state as a unitary actor. Instead, it drew elements of Graham Allison’s analytic 
framework and proposes that security policy is the outcome of constant bargaining among the 
major government elites in the National Security Council.   
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This security model acknowledges that Turkey’s security policy, relations with Iran and 
alignment in the international system are not unilaterally determined by the chief executive. 
Instead, as in most democratic countries, policy is shaped by constant pulling and hauling among 
various actors. Since the 2002 elections, Prime Minister Erdogan has been the most important 
actor in Turkey’s foreign policy decision making process. The Prime Minister is assisted by key 
members and other governmental leaders in the practice of foreign affairs. In fulfillment of this 
task, the Prime Minister’s outstanding deputies have been three consecutive foreign ministers; 
Abdullah Gul, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoglu. Among them, Ahmet Davutoglu laid out the 
grounds of Turkey’s new foreign policy when he was National Security Advisor between 2003 
and 2009. Davutoglu became foreign Minister in 2009 and played a leading role in in 
construction and implementation of foreign affairs. The former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
(2003-2007) became the Turkish President in 2007. Two consecutive energy ministers, Hilmi 
Guler (2002-2009) and Taner Yildiz (2009-) played defining role in energy security partnership 
with Iran as they commanded the operations of state energy companies and institutions such as 
the General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs (PIGM), the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation 
(BOTAS), and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). The Prime Minister is also assisted 
by the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and General 
Directorate of Security (EGM) in security related issues. These agencies provide necessary 
information/intelligence to the Prime Minister, President and the National Security Council. 
These key actors reconciled their differences and reached a consensus on foreign policy 
diversification, forging practical and mutually beneficial security relations with Iran.  
280 
 
7.1. Generalizing the empirical findings on security approach 
The Turkish Iranian détente is a multi faceted phenomenon that rests on diverse factors in each 
policy domain. No single internal or external factor thoroughly explains the concerns of policy 
makers in shifting Turkey’s security relations with Iran. As explicated in the analytic models of 
Rosati, Gustavsson and Clunan, the cumulative impact of various internal and external factors 
laid out the grounds for the change of foreign policy. Analysis of the phenomenon was 
complicated, because the policy makers had divergent calculations in dealing counterterrorism, 
nuclear security and energy security policies. Various intervening internal and external factors 
increased the complexity of the decision making process. 
In general, statements of the policy makers and analysts indicated that Turkey’s growing 
security partnership with Iran does not indicate a shift in alignment from the West to the Muslim 
World. Turkish elites and analysts do not perceive the security partnership with Iran as an 
indicator of Turkey’s realignment in the international system. They argued that Turkey’s security 
partnership with Iran is driven by practical regional considerations in all three policy domains 
rather than macro level alignment concerns or Islamic aspirations. Even though many key actors 
in the Justice and Development Party identify with religious social networks, their statements 
indicate that the Erdogan Administration does not seek to align itself with the Muslim World at 
the expense of the existing pro-Western orientation. Throughout the interviewing process, almost 
all political and bureaucratic elites unequivocally rejected the claims that Turkey is realigning. 
Instead, they perceived the new posture as diversification of Turkish foreign policy through 
developing relations with the neglected East, North and South. According to key political elites, 
the realignment argument is “black propaganda” that is projected by “malicious” analysts. They 
perceive the new posture as ending of an unpopular unidirectional outlook and normalization of 
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Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran is an integral part of the Strategic 
Depth doctrine of Foreign Minister Davutoglu that seeks to expand Turkey’s relations with the 
East in line with national interests. In so doing, the Erdogan Administration not only addresses 
practical security interests but it also attempts to regain a strengthened and more influential 
position in the Middle East.      
7.1.1. Underlying reasons for counterterrorism partnership  
According to the security approach, foreign policy restructuring is fundamentally driven by the 
leader’s shifting threat perceptions. From this perspective, traditional forms of strategic alliances 
become obsolete and the states develop practical coalitions against elusive terror organizations 
that can penetrate any society and strike from any direction. My investigations revealed that this 
security approach has been a useful framework in understanding the foreign policy changes in 
Turkey. The empirical research confirmed that resurgence of PKK terrorism after the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq laid out the grounds for Turkey’s growing counterterrorism partnership with 
Iran. Regional threat perceptions of Ankara and Tehran converged as both wanted to preserve the 
regional status quo and territorial integrity. The Erdogan and Ahmadinejad administrations began 
to see each other as allies in reconstructing the post-Iraq war landscape of the Middle East. 
However, the shift in the balance of threat does not provide a complete explanation of 
counterterrorism partnership between Ankara and Tehran. Various other internal and external 
factors played significant roles in the shift of Turkish security policy.  
In the external domain, disappointment with Turkey’s traditional allies, particularly the 
United States, spurred the incentives to craft alternative practical partnerships with the countries 
that are exposed to Kurdish separatism.  Even though American officials gave alluring promises, 
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the PKK camps in Northern Iraq were not eliminated. Much of the American intelligence 
feedback was out of date and inaccurate. Moreover, existence of the U.S forces in northern Iraq 
inhibited Turkish incursions into the Iraqi territories. High ranking American officials, including 
former President George W. Bush objected to Turkish invasion of northern Iraq on the grounds 
that it would destabilize the only relatively stable part of that country. Various crises between 
Ankara and Washington undermined bilateral trust between the two Cold War allies. In 
particular, revealations of the U.S.-PJAK connection created strong resentment among Turkish 
security elites. In this context, the Iranian government launched a rigorous counterterrorism 
campaign against the mutual PKK/PJAK threat to win the hearts and minds of Turkish foreign 
policy elites. Apart from frequent attacks against the PKK compounds, Iranian security and 
intelligence institutions began to provide actionable intelligence to Turkish security institutions. 
Under these circumstances, Iran emerged as an ally of the Erdogan Administration against PKK 
terrorism and micronationalist Kurdish separatism that threatened the regional status quo. Iran’s 
new policy was highly appreciated by almost all echelons of the Erdogan administration.  
Internally, a broad consensus among Turkish foreign policy elites strengthened the hand 
of the Erdogan Administration in forging practical security relations with Iran. This consensus 
was mainly driven by the shift of threat perceptions after the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the 
Ergenekon investigations. Turkey’s governing elites no longer anticipated a regime threat or 
support of terrorism from post-revolutionary Iranian governments. Statements of many 
intelligence officers and security analysts indicated that Iran’s alleged connection with the 
Turkish Hezbollah was exaggerated. Concomitantly, public surveys showed that only one 
percent of the Turkish population perceived Iran as a significant threat. Instead, the U.S. and 
Israel became the most dangerous states in the eyes of the Turkish citizens. The shift in threat 
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perceptions gradually eroded the negative image of Iran among both the Turkish elite and the 
mass society. Accordingly, domestic opposition to relations with post-revolutionary Iran has 
been replaced by strong nationwide support particularly after the occupation of Iraq.   
7.1.2. Explaining Turkey’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear program 
The security approach assumes that states will balance against the emergence of neighboring 
nuclear powers, because the spread of nuclear weapons radically shifts the balances of 
power/threat in the region. In conventional wisdom, the Erdogan Administration is expected to 
try to counteract Iran’s attainment of nuclear weapons. However, the Prime Minister and many 
other foreign policy actors have proclaimed that Turkey will neither endorse economic 
containment nor military intervention. In the United Nations Security Council meetings Turkey 
consistently voted against the sanctions on Iran. Prime Minister Erdogan and other members of 
the cabinet supported Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear energy. My field research revealed that 
Turkey's leniency towards the Iranian position stems from a variety of perceptions of policy 
makers that can be divided into three categories: i) perceptions of Iranian nuclear program, ii) 
perceptions of U.S. nuclear policy and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and iii) perceptions 
of economic sanctions and military engagement.   
In general, Turkish political elites believe that Iran has a right as a non-nuclear state party 
to the NPT to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For them, the West unfairly puts 
pressure on Iran because there are over 400 nuclear reactors in the World, many of them 
operated by other non-nuclear state parties to the NPT. Author’s interviews and content analysis 
indicated that the prevailing position of the Erdogan Administration is that Iran is enriching 
uranium not to develop nuclear weapons but to develop civilian nuclear energy. Key government 
authorities asserted that there is no evidence of diversion to weapons grade enrichment. Even if 
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Iran does develop nuclear weapons, Turkish elites believe that Tehran will not use them 
aggressively against Turkey or its allies. In their view, Turkey will not be the target of Iran 
because there is no ongoing or even recent conflict with the Iranians. In the eyes of the Turkish 
political elites and analysts, Iranians are just as rational and deterrable as the existing nuclear 
powers. Iran will never attack the U.S. preemptively because its leaders are fully aware of the 
asymmetry of destructive capability. Iran will not attack Israel preemptively either, because 
Israel has nuclear superiority, retaliatory strike capability and protection from the United States. 
Throughout my field research, I observed thoroughgoing disrespect for the NPT regime 
and American non-proliferation policy. Turkish security analysts maintain that neither the United 
States nor Israel can present any convincing evidence that Iran is enriching uranium to 
weapons’s grade levels. Turkish intelligence and security officials believe that American threat 
projections depend on “fabricated” intelligence that has not been confirmed by HUMINT. 
Turkey’s Prime Minister and other key members of the AKP government believe that the West 
imposes a double standard in enforcement of the non-proliferation regime. They asserted that 
pro-Western regimes never experience sanctions, whereas the anti-Western regimes are 
selectively targeted by the existing nuclear powers. For them, the IAEA and the UN Security 
Council are heavily influenced by the United States and these institutions are unlikely to behave 
in a just manner. Prime Minister Erdogan argues that denuclearization should start with the 
existing nuclear powers that promised to disarm while enacting the NPT.  For him, the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council should take the lead in eliminating their nuclear 
arsenals instead of putting pressure on states that have no proven nuclear weapons capability.   
Most Turkish elites believe that economic sanctions and military agression against Iran 
are unlikely to compel the Iranians to surrender to Western demands. Author’s interviews 
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revealed that Turkish foreign policy makers do not believe that economic sanctions against Iran 
will be effective. They believe that the Western efforts are futile and economic sanctions will not 
work against an energy rich country. This view consolidated as Turkey, China, India, and the 
major European countries signed bilateral energy and trade agreements with Iran. Turkish elites 
believe that a military campaign against Iran is unlikely to achieve the desired outcome because 
nuclear facilities are dispersed and buried underground. A total destruction of nuclear capability 
would require an invasion of Iran by land forces. Turkish security experts believe that a land war 
with Iran is unwinnable for both the United States and Israel. In the Turkish view, a potential war 
against Iran would undermine Turkey’s national interests in several respects. First, it might 
destabilize the entire region and lead to dissolution of Iran along ethnic lines. Micronationalist 
movements may spill over and a separatist Kurdish campaign might undermine territorial 
integrity of Turkey. Second, war would almost certainly terminate Turkey’s bilateral trade with 
Iran.  Fourth, it would also likely to lead to major energy supply disruptions, which would drive 
up the price of oil and gas for an energy dependent country. Soaring energy prices would have 
negative consequences for national industry and commerce. Moreover, war would disrupt 
Turkey’s access to Central Asian markets that are major consumers of Turkish products. Finally, 
an invasion of Iran would will stir up anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism among the Turkish 
community and the government would be hard pressed to preserve its ties with the West and 
Israel.   
7.1.3. Explaining the energy security partnership   
The core assumption of the energy security approach is that states seek alternative suppliers to 
reduce vulnerability to major supply disruptions, and the use of energy disruption as a coercive 
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instrument in foreign policy. Throughout the field research, statements by government elites and 
analysts supported this assumption of the energy security approach. By the early 2000s, Turkey’s 
dependency on Russia reached alarming rates and vulnerability to supply disruptions increased 
as the Blue Stream Pipeline crossed under the Black Sea. Concomitantly, Turkish electric 
generation is over 60 percent dependent on imported natural gas which creates a double 
vulnerability. My investigations revealed that the Turkish energy partnership with Iran is 
partially forged to reduce vulnerability to major supply disruptions from Russia.  
However, statements of government officials and analysts indicated that various other 
factors significantly influenced the construction of a bilateral energy partnership. First, the Gulf 
War (1991) and the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003) caused major supply disruptions in Iraq that 
had been a main energy supplier to Turkey. Oil pumping ceased intermittently after the U.S. 
attack against Iraq in 2003. The pipelines and energy infrastructures were destroyed by the 
ongoing occupation, insurgency and related terrorism. Iraq’s Petroleum Ministry reported over 
400 terrorist/insurgency attacks on the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipelines. Frequent supply disruptions 
downgraded Iraq’s reliability and Iran emerged as a more dependable energy supplier. Second, 
cost efficiency and security of the Iranian pipelines were two other reasons that laid the grounds 
for the Turkish-Iranian energy partnership. Iran is a neighbor of Turkey and joint pipelines 
directly enter into Turkish homeland without paying any transit fees to third parties. In contrast 
to Russian Blue Stream line, pipelines from Iran never pass under deep waters. Thus, Turkish 
elites are less concerned about physical supply disruptions along the Iranian pipelines. Third, the 
Erdogan Administration’s energy partnership with Iran facilitated the Nabucco project and 
serves Turkey’s strategic interests as an interregional energy hub. Moreover, it provides access to 
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Central Asian gas reserves that constituted an important component of the multi-sourcing 
strategy of the Nabucco project.  
My field research sought to clarify why Turkey disregards American demands to stop 
further energy/economic partnerships with Iran. I found that that Turkey’s practical national 
interests outweigh the strategic commitments of its military allies, mainly the United States and 
Israel. The Turkish government seeks regional economic integration and perceives American 
embargos as the principal roadblock to this goal. Turkey’s participation in the U.S. led embargo 
would not only undercut bilateral trade with Iran but it would also restrict Turkey’s access to 
Central Asian markets. Moreover, Turkish elites do not believe that they would be reimbursed 
for economic losses that would certainly occur if they participated in the containment of Iran. 
Turkish elites laid special emphasis on sovereignty and independent pursuit of self interests. 
Turkey’s past image as the “spearhead” of Western neo-colonialism has become an increasingly 
irritating image among the Turkish citizenry and elites. In this context, bandwagoning with the 
U.S. containment of Iran is perceived as a betrayel of sovereignty and national interests.   
7.2. The role of domestic politics  
According to the domestic politics approach, changes in the course of foreign policy are driven 
by domestic factors such as regime changes, realignment of constituencies, institutional 
restructuring and the rise of alternative political paradigms. Even though this dissertation focused 
on the security aspects of foreign policy change, my field research indicated that four major 
changes in domestic politics catalyzed the shift of state’s security posture: i) the AKP’s 
ascendance to power as a single party government, ii) rise of alternative elites and decline of the 
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Kemalist paradigm, iii) dramatic shift in the threat perceptions of governing elites and citizenry 
and iv) strong domestic support for foreign policy diversification.  
One of the most important developments is the emergence of the AKP as a single party 
government after the 2002 elections. The President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other 
key AKP administrators were devoted advocates of revision in security strategy and foreign 
policy diversification. This revisionist political wing became increasingly powerful as they held 
the majority in the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council. Under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Erdogan, the AKP elites began to dominate the decision making process in the 
state’s foreign policy machinery. Unlike the coalition governments, the AKP acts as a bloc in the 
National Security Council meetings that have a defining impact on the outcome. Statements of 
the interviewees indicated that the AKP leaders have the upper hand in their interactions with the 
security bureaucracy and did not succumb to bureaucratic politics. The AKP’s position was 
further strengthened after the election of Abdullah Gul as the President of Turkey, who chairs the 
National Security Council Meetings.  
The second major development is the concomitant rise of alternative elites in the 
sociopolitical domain. For many analysts, the shift in Turkish foreign policy is grounded on the 
rise of “new elite” and simultaneous transformation of the political and bureaucratic landscape. 
After the 2002 elections, the new elite took over the highest political positions and began to clash 
with the “old elite” that was indifferent to social demands. The new elites were quite supportive 
of foreign policy diversification and the three-tiered security partnership with Iran. They no 
longer wanted to be a “subcontractor of Washington” and asserted that Turkey has been 
promoted from a peripheral actor to a core state in international politics. According to these 
elites, Turkey’s power projection will remain limited as long as it is seen as the spearhead of 
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“Western neo-colonialism”. The impressions of pro-American (Amerikanci) and “westoxicated” 
foreign policy have become highly unpopular images among these elites, who are determined to 
exploit alternative opportunities in the security and trade realms. They have advocated for a 
security partnership with the Iranian government to promote national interests and preserve 
regional stability. 
The third major development is the dramatic shift in domestic threat perceptions 
particularly after 2003. The Turks began to see Iran as an instrumental partner in energy, security 
and trade. Iran’s cooperative posture against the PKK has been quite influential in shifting the 
threat perceptions of both the Erdogan Administration and Turkish society. In the eyes of the 
Turkish elites, Iran’s acquittal from the patronage of Turkish Hezbollah and the end of efforts to 
export its fundamentalist regime also played significant roles in the shift of public threat 
perceptions. Bilateral relations with Iran have been re-legitimized as a result of shifting threat 
perceptions. The shift in threat perception catalyzed a reevaluation of the Turkish-Iranian 
relations and eroded the negative image of Iran among both Turkish elites and the larger society. 
On the flipside, Turkish elites and citizenry began to see the United States and Israel as principal 
threats to national and global security. They perceive the United States and Israel as much more 
aggressive actors than Iran.  
Fourth, a strong support for foreign policy diversification emerged among the new elites. 
Turkey’s diversification of foreign relations is supported by the other political parties such as the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Virtue Party (FP) and Great 
Union Party (BBP). Even the Kemalists and diehard secularists began to support foreign policy 
diversification in the face of rising resentment towards the United States, EU, and NATO. This 
tendency became increasingly clear after the Invasion of Iraq. In this context, Turkey’s growing 
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security partnership with Iran is also supported by the prevailing majority of the community as it 
is perceived as an instrumental component of foreign policy diversification.  
7.3. The role of Islamic identity  
According to the aspirational approach, the restructuring of foreign policy is impelled by the 
shifts in prevailing political identity and aspirations. States realign in the international system 
when prevailing political identities and aspirations are overthrown by revisionist images. One 
major question before the field research was whether the Islamic identity or aspirations of the 
Erdogan Administration played an important role in Turkish-Iranian détente. Statements of the 
key governing elites and analysts indicate that Islamic identity played a marginal and even 
insignificant role in Turkish Iranian security rapprochement in the post-Iraq war landscape. 
Turkey’s political leaders were aware that identity based rapprochement with Iran would 
undermine Turkey’s image not only in the West but also in the Sunni Muslim world. Therefore, 
Turkey’s political and religious elites steered clear of any religion based interaction with Iran, 
particularly in the post 28 Subat period. In many statements Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu have made it clear that the AKP strongly rejects foreign policy based on 
ethnic or religious identity. Instead, mutual interests and joint threat perceptions have drawn 
Ankara and Tehran closer. Resurgence of political Islam helped to overcome the negative image 
of Iranians as “fundamentalist adversaries”. However, a radical Shiite Iran has never become a 
role model for the Turkish religious community that practices a more benign and moderate form 
of Sunni Islam. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, my field research indicated that identity is 
a source of conflict in Turkish-Iranian relations rather than a catalyst of rapprochement. Turkey’s 
mainstream Islamist scholars perceive Iran as a problematic figure in the Muslim world. 
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According to the Islamists, Iran’s hardliner fundamentalist approach is undermining the image of 
Islam throughout the world.  
7.4. Final remarks‐ looking for the future  
Iran is the largest neighbor of Turkey that has abundant energy resources and market 
opportunities for Turkish entrepreneurs. Iran lies at a very strategic location and functions as 
gateway to the Central Asian Turkic republics. Turkey and Iran has convergent views on Kurdish 
separatism, nuclear security and energy security. Particularly after 2003, Turkey and the United 
States have contrasting interests in the Middle East. A concessive pro-American foreign policy 
has become highly unpopular among the Turkish electorate which strongly advocates foreign 
policy diversification. Under the existing circumstances, Turkey will continue to expand 
relations with Iran even when this conflicts with the American interests. However, Turkish 
government does not see Iran as an alternative to Turkey’s strategic security partnership with the 
United States and NATO. This dissertation put forth the perceptions of Turkish elites and 
analysts on the three tiered security partnership with Iran. However, there is a need to investigate 
the following issues.  
First, the dramatic shift in public threat perceptions has profound effects on the course of 
Turkish security policy. This dissertation briefly explained how Turkey began to view Iran as a 
benign state, while the United States and Israel appeared more dangerous in the eyes of the 
Turks. However, a full doctoral dissertation may be devoted to explain the remarkable shift in 
public threat perceptions and how it effects the decision making process among the foreign 
policy elites.  
Second, my investigations revealed that the Turkish-Iranian security partnership is not 
mature at the institutional level. Put another way, Turkish security institutions could not yet 
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develop highly sophisticated institutional cooperative frameworks with their Iranian 
counterparts. Further research is needed to explicate the underlying reasons of institutional 
mismatch and how both governments could overcome existing barriers.  
Third, during my field research, I observed that the Turkish-Iranian security partnership 
is not limited to counterterrorism, nuclear security and energy security.  Some of the 
interviewees asserted that there is growing cooperation in counternarcotics. Indeed, cooperation 
against drug trafficking became an important component of bilateral security relations.  Iran is an 
important transit destination of Afghan opiates on their route to European markets. Iran has 
appointed narcotic liaison officers to Turkey and relevant institutions have begun to exchange 
actionable intelligence and conduct joint operations. Upon Iranian requests, Turkish 
counternarcotics institutions have begun to act as mediators in rendering relevant 
counternarcotics intelligence to their Western counterparts.  There is a need for further research 
to understand the underlying reasons for growing cooperation on counternarcotics.  An entire 
doctoral dissertation could easily be devoted to investigate why Ankara and Tehran shifted from 
a non-cooperative stance to a cooperative posture against the trafficking of opiates over the 
Balkan route.  
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1: Oil Pipeline Networks in Europe and the Middle East 
 
Source: http://www.radio-utopie.de/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/eu-versorgungsnetz-von-ol-
pipelines.jpg 
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APPENDIX 2: Turkey’s transit and domestic pipeline networks 
 
Source: http://memrieconomicblog.org/bin/content.cgi?news=2114 
 
Botas Pipeline projects 
 
Source: http://www.botas.gov.tr/images/icerik/harita/BotasProject.jpg 
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APPENDIX 3: Nabucco and South Stream pipelines 
 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Projet_Pipeline_South_stream_et_Nabucco.png 
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APPENDIX 4: Turkey’s natural gas purchases 1987‐2008 
 
  RUSSIA  IRAN RUSSIA BLUE ST AZERBAIJAN
NIGERIA 
LNG
ALGERIA 
LNG
SPOT 
LNG TOTAL 
1987 433 - - - - - - 433 
1988 1.136 - - - - - - 1.136 
1989 2.986 - - - - - - 2.986 
1990 3.246 - - - - - - 3.246 
1991 4.031 - - - - - - 4.031 
1992 4.430 - - - - - - 4.430 
1993 4.952 - - - - - - 4.952 
1994 4.957 - - - - 418 - 5.375 
1995 5.560 - - - - 1.058 240 6.859 
1996 5.524 - - - - 2.436 80 8.041 
1997 6.574 - - - - 3.300 - 9.874 
1998 6.539 - - - - 3.051 644 10.233 
1999 8.693 - - - 77 3.256 332 12.358 
2000 10.079 - - - 780 3.962 - 14.821 
2001 10.931 115 - - 1.337 3.985 - 16.368 
2002 11.603 669 - - 1.274 4.078 - 17.624 
2003 11.422 3.520 1.252 - 1.126 3.867 - 21.188 
2004 11.106 3.558 3.238 - 1.034 3.237 - 22.174 
2005 12.857 4.322 4.969 - 1.030 3.851 - 27.028 
2006 12.246 5.691 7.403 - 1.118 4.203 80 30.741 
2007 13.799 6.158 9.346 1.279 1.420 4.277 170 36.450 
2008 8.013 2.253 6.068 2.620 717 2.743 339 22.752 
 
Source: http://www.botas.gov.tr/ 
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APPENDIX 5: Turkey’s energy profile after the Cold War 
 
 
 
Source: BP Statistical review 
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APPENDIX 6: Interview Questions  
 
1. What kinds of experiences do you have in practice/analysis of Turkish energy or security 
policies?  
2. What kinds of major changes do you observe in Turkey’s energy and security policies 
during the Erdogan administration? Do you think Turkey has been realigning in the 
international system? If yes could you please explain why and how?  
3. Do you think Turkey has been moving away from the US‐Israel security axis? Why did 
Turkish governments give up bandwagoning American‐Israeli containment of nuclear 
Iran? 
4. Have you been involved in Turkish government’s decision making process over energy 
and security partnerships with Iran? I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on 
this matter. 
5. Who are the proponents of Turkey’s growing security partnership with Iran and what 
are their main arguments? 
6. Who are the opponents of Turkey’s growing security partnership with Iran and what are 
their main arguments?  
7. What are the underlying reasons of intergovernmental counterterrorism cooperation 
against the PKK and PJAK?  
8. Why does the Erdogan Administration support Iran’s nuclear energy program? 
9. What are the underlying reasons of bilateral partnership on energy security?  
10.  To what extent cooperation with Iran on counterterrorism, nuclear program and energy 
security indicates realignment of Turkey?  
11. How did the pan‐Islamic aspirations of the Erdogan Administrations shape the 
rapprochement with the post revolutionary Iran? 
12. How do you think the power shift in the National Security Council affect Turkey’s 
intergovernmental relations with Iran? 
13. How could the Erdogan administration overcome the resistance from the pro‐status quo 
secularist elites and military leaders? 
14. Do the decision makers face any pressure from the European or American officials on 
Turkey’s intergovernmental relations with Iran? 
15.  Do you have any other comments on this issue?      
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